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ABSTRACT 
A STATE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FACTORS 
INFLUENCING NURSING HOME QUALITY OF 
CARE REGULATION 
Taney J. Vandecar-Burdin 
Old Dominion University, 2009 
Director: Dr. John C. Morris 
While over one million elderly reside in U.S. nursing homes, little attention has 
been given to the factors that influence state nursing home regulation and how state 
regulations differ from the federal regulations. The focus of nursing home research 
literature has been on factors that impact quality of care at the individual patient and 
organizational level. The state comparative literature, which examines the differences 
between state policy choices, focuses on fiscal nursing home policymaking. An 
important gap exists in the literature in that state decision-making regarding nursing 
home quality of care policy has not been explored. 
This study of U.S. nursing home quality of care regulation examines the factors 
that affect whether or not state nursing home regulations exceed the federal regulations. 
Most of the variables utilized in the current study were not significant in predicting 
whether or not states exceed the federal quality of care regulations. There does appear to 
be some demographic, socioeconomic and political influence. States with higher 
Medicaid payments per elder were more likely to exceed the federal regulations. States 
with Democratic governors were less likely to exceed the federal regulations, however, 
this was in the opposite direction than expected. States with traditionalistic political 
cultures may also be less likely to exceed to federal regulations for quality of care. 
Once other state-level factors were controlled for, Medicaid payment and political 
culture were no longer significant predictors of whether or not states exceed the federal 
quality of care regulations. Party control of the legislature emerged as significant with 
the odds of states with Democratic legislatures being 13 times more likely to exceed the 
federal regulations than Republican-controlled legislatures. Percent minority population 
also emerged as significant with a one percent increase in minority population decreasing 
the odds of exceeding the federal regulations by 7.5%. The variables and theory needed 
to explain differences in state nursing home policy may be different from other policy 
areas in terms of what factors affect policy outcomes. This study shows that a purely 
quantitative approach to state comparative studies may not be the best approach in all 
cases and interviews with key nursing home stakeholders should be pursued to further 
inform the decision-making processes regarding nursing home regulation. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
There are over 37 million citizens ages 65 or older currently living in the United 
States. Many of these elderly will eventually come to need professional care in a 
residential setting with approximately 1.5 million people currently living in nursing 
homes (National Centers for Health Care Statistics, 2004; U.S. Census Bureau, 2006; 
Dohm, 2000). However, the quality of care provided by nursing homes has historically 
varied from state to state and from home to home leading to intense scrutiny and 
increased regulation over the past four decades (Winzelberg, 2003; Walshe, 2001). 
Despite efforts to increase regulation and to improve the quality of care in nursing homes, 
poor care conditions still exist with the percentage of nursing homes cited for abuse 
violations almost tripling between 1996 and 2001 (Minority Staff of the House 
Committee, 2001; Winzelberg, 2003; Walshe, 2001). 
Statement of the Problem 
While the history of nursing home regulations has been detailed and described in 
historical accounts (see Vladeck, 1980; Walshe, 2001; Holstein & Cole, 1996), very little 
attention has been given to the factors that influence state policymakers regarding nursing 
home licensure regulation, how state regulations differ from the federal regulations and 
what factors affect differences in state nursing home regulations. Much of the nursing 
home research literature focuses on the various factors which can impact quality of care 
at the individual patient and organizational level (see Elwell, 1984; Zinn, Spector, Hsieh, 
& Mukamel, 2005; Chou, 2002; Harrington, Woolhandler, Mullan, Carrillo, & 
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Himmelstein, 2002). The state comparative literature, which focuses on the differences 
between state policymaking processes and policy choices, is also silent on the issue of 
nursing home regulation except for fiscal policymaking. Issues regarding the elderly 
rarely attract the same attention from policymakers as those involving crime or education 
which take up precious fiscal and other resources (Lockhart & Giles-Sims, 2007). 
Consequently, ".. .the federal government cannot be expected to encourage the states to 
upgrade their elder care public resources or improve provider regulation" given the 
perception of other pressing social policy issues (Lockhart & Giles-Sims, 2007, p. 15). 
An important gap exists in the literature in which the processes and factors 
involved in state decision making regarding nursing home quality of care have not been 
explored. As the number of elderly continue to grow, the demands on the nursing home 
industry will also increase. Yet the literature provides no guide as to how nursing home 
regulatory decisions are made at the state level and how future decisions might be made 
to address the escalating pressures on states as they try to provide quality care and to 
meet federal funding regulations. The following chapters will detail the long and 
disjointed history of nursing home regulation in the United States as well as the issues 
that can arise when differences exist between state nursing home regulations and the 
federal regulations for public funding. The proposed study will fill an important gap in 
the literature by examining the differences between state and federal regulations as well 
as the state level factors which predict nursing home policy decisions. 
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From the Poorhouse to the Nursing Home 
To understand modern policy regarding nursing homes it must be examined in the 
context of the history and development of institutional long-term care. The evolution of 
long-term care for the elderly in the United States was actually an outgrowth of poor 
relief and poorhouse institutional policy (Holstein & Cole, 1996; Schell, 1993; Katz, 
1984). From the colonial period to about the 1820's, care for the poor, ill, and elderly 
was not stigmatized, was flexible and often family or community-based. "Fostered by 
the small size of communities, and as yet untouched by urban individualism or 
industrialization, early American communities saw poverty and ill-health as home-grown, 
familiar, and not morally blameworthy" (Holstein & Cole, 1996, p. 22). It is important to 
point out, however, that the differences between those living in poverty and those 
struggling with poor health were not usually recognized and the priority of poor relief 
took precedence over any other social issue during this time (Holstein & Cole, 1996). 
Pauperism soon increased as cities grew and as capitalism and immigration also 
increased (Katz, 1984). But the ".. .communal and religious values did not survive the 
rapid changes that overtook American society in the decades after the Revolution" 
(Holstein & Cole, 1996, p.22). Thus, from about 1820 to 1865, attitudes toward the poor 
took a dramatic turn given these economic and demographic changes (Holstein & Cole, 
1996). Poverty was no longer seen as typical and blaming the poor became the norm 
(Holstein & Cole, 1996). The general perception was that the growing and changing 
cities had contributed to the need for poor relief as did individual overindulgence -
particularly with alcohol (Katz, 1984). The general cause of poverty was linked to 
individual weaknesses and helped give rise to the institutional solution for those living in 
poverty - the almshouse or poorhouse. A distinction was made between the worthy and 
unworthy poor with the question being "[h]ow to keep the genuinely needy from starving 
without breeding a class of paupers who chose to live off public and private bounty rather 
to work" (Katz, 1984, p. 114, Holstein & Cole, 1996). White American women were 
often those viewed as the "worthy" poor while immigrants, minorities and males were 
categorized as less deserving (Holstein & Cole, 1996). 
Poor relief became institutionalized via publically supported poorhouses and 
almshouses which served as symbols to deter or punish those living in poverty. 
Conditions were intentionally deplorable in order to motivate people to take work at any 
pay. "In this way, fear of the poorhouse became the key to sustaining the work ethic in 
nineteenth-century America" (Katz, 1984, p. 118). And still the distinction between the 
poor and other needy groups was largely absent. "Designed by poor relief administrators 
to reform and punish the poor, these institutions housed the poor of all ages, as well as 
the sick, the retarded, the mentally ill, and the socially deviant" (Holstein & Cole, 1996, 
p. 23). The poor elderly who were lacking family support were thus forced to the 
almshouses and since distinctions between the general poor and those who were poor, 
elderly and sick were not usually made - those elders in poor health were not singled out 
for specialized support (Holstein & Cole, 1996; Katz, 1984). 
Starting in 1865, conditions within the almshouses become harsher for the elderly 
as they started to constitute the majority of almshouse residents. This resulted from 
reform, rehabilitation, and educational efforts to take specific groups out of the 
almshouses. Thus, the creation of specialized homes for other needy populations such 
the mentally ill (mental hospitals/institutions), the young (orphanages), and the able-
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bodied poor (workhouses) left the elderly poor to the dire conditions within the 
almshouses - a setting which could not address their needs (Holstein & Cole, 1996). The 
rise in medical knowledge did not help the case of the institutionalized elderly in this era 
as they were seen as unworthy of the beds and staffing reserved for the acutely ill in most 
hospitals (Holstein & Cole, 1996). While various women's organizations and socially-
conscious nurses tried to collect information about the health conditions within the 
poorhouses and to establish some type of nursing care, those efforts were often met with 
resistance at the local level. "Political entanglements, low pay, low status, job insecurity, 
and lack of women's political power appear to have combined to hamper the progress of 
almshouse nursing" (Schell, 1993, p. 208). 
The fiscal strain experienced by many city governments that were funding and 
managing most almshouses also contributed to the worsening conditions but so too did 
the Puritan and Social Darwinist beliefs that poverty was the result of some personal trait 
(Vladeck, 1980; Holstein & Cole, 1996). Problems such as poor health, old age, and 
unemployment were ignored in favor of "bad character, immorality, and deviance" and 
these dominant".. .assumptions about poverty and ill health had a cascading effect on the 
aged and indirectly influenced American social welfare policy for generations" (Holstein 
& Cole, 1996, p. 27). It was not until the early 1900's that there appeared to be growing 
recognition of the special case of the frail and ill elderly versus others within the 
almshouse as the percentage of elderly within the population as a whole started to rapidly 
increase. And this was coupled with the ".. .more than 7 million who, by the time of the 
enactment of Social Security in 1935, were experiencing deprivation and destitution to a 
degree unmatched in American history" (Vladeck, 1980, p. 35). Pension advocates used 
6 
the hated image of the almshouse in their argument for old-age pensions. "If older people 
had a dependable source of income, so the reasoning went, they would no longer need the 
almshouse as a place of last resort" (Holstein & Cole, 1996, p. 33). 
Financial Support for the Nursing Home Industry 
The 1935 Social Security Act in part laid the foundation for what is now the 
modern-day nursing home industry. Title I of the Social Security Act, by stipulating that 
no Old Age Assistance (OAA) funds, ".. .which were delivered in the form of matching 
grants to states, be extended to any person living in a public institution directly stimulated 
the already burgeoning commercial nursing home industry" (Holstein & Cole, 1996, p. 
34, Schell, 1993). The refusal to provide public relief or pension to the elderly living in 
public homes was in part due to the loathing pension advocates had for the almshouse 
and the belief that a public pension program would allow the elderly to remain in their 
homes and eradicate the need for those almshouses. "This policy was intended to support 
home care as an alternative to the almshouse by providing funds to people for remaining 
or returning to the community" (Schell, 1993, p. 210). However, since the Social Security 
Act did not provide any type of health insurance, those elderly too sick to return or 
remain at home were forced to remain in the almshouses or some type of institutionalized 
care setting. And the Title I restriction against funds paid to those in public homes 
spurred the growth of the private nursing home industry. "Despite its goal of 
deinstitutionalization, the Social Security Act inadvertently fostered the transfer of the 
chronically ill elderly to private and voluntary nursing homes" (Schell, 1993, p. 210). 
Private nursing homes were able to fill the need since their patients were eligible for 
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Social Security pension funds and could then pay for their own care with those funds 
(Schell, 1993). 
Yet even the privately owned nursing homes were not able to address the medical 
needs of the elderly. "By the early 1950's, it was becoming quite clear that caring for the 
chronically ill was a serious national problem" (Holstein & Cole, 1996, p. 36). 
Amendments to the Social Security Act in 1950 allowed payments to those patients in 
publically funded facilities in response to bed shortages and the increased wariness of 
private nursing homes. "Even at a very early stage, there was widespread dissatisfaction 
with proprietary nursing homes. Facilities were often dilapidated and frequently unsafe; 
medical and nursing care was minimal; reports of exploitation and abuse of residents 
quickly circulated" (Vladeck, 1980, p. 38). The 1950 amendments also allowed for 
federal matching of payments made directly to health providers for the poor elderly and 
those who were permanently disabled living in nursing homes - thus establishing the 
vendor payment system (Vladeck, 1980). The vendor payment system greatly changed 
the way that decisions regarding ".. .costs of care, as well as the quality and level of 
services to be provided, are made in a set of transactions between providers and the state 
- transactions in which patients are not even participants" (Hawes, 1987, p. 233). 
Finally, states had to establish licensing programs for nursing homes and while most 
states did develop such laws, there was not much consistency between states, the 
requirements were trivial and not regularly enforced (Vladeck, 1980). 
The promise of nursing and medical care within nursing homes was therefore 
often an empty one with very few licensed nurses on staff and even fewer physicians 
involved in nursing home care (Vladeck, 1980). In 1954, an amendment was made to the 
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Hill-Burton program, which originally provided construction grants for hospitals, to 
include not-for-profit nursing homes. The condition was that nursing homes built with 
Hill-Burton dollars had to be affiliated with a hospital as well as meeting certain physical 
and staffing standards (Holstein & Cole, 1996; Vladeck, 1980). The affiliation with a 
hospital put these nursing homes under the purview of the Public Health Service (to 
include the Department of Health, Education and Welfare - HEW) and made way for 
more medically focused long-term care (LTC) for the chronically ill elderly. "Nursing 
homes would never again be solely the extension of the welfare system; they now 
belonged to health policy as well" (Vladeck, 1980, p. 43). The Kerr-Mills Act of 1960 
also provided states with greater matching funds for costs associated with health care for 
the poor elderly and others deemed to be medically indigent (Capitman, Leutz, Bishop, & 
Casler, 2005). "The moral argument behind this expansion reasoned that the sick 
elderly—those with chronic conditions—do not have to be come impoverished to have 
their health services expenses paid" (Grogan, 2008, p. 59). 
Faced with increasing political pressure from the newly formed American 
Nursing Home Association and increasing demand for nursing home beds, the federal 
government also began permitting construction loans for private nursing homes through 
the Small Business Administration (SBA) and the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) 
(Holstein & Cole, 1996; Vladeck, 1980; Mara, 2008). However, these dollars did not 
come with the same conditions as the Hill-Burton program and the number of proprietary 
homes increased substantially with the FHA guaranteeing almost a billion dollars in loans 
(Vladeck, 1980). "Federal funds, offered with few strings, transformed the nascent 
home for the aged into a burgeoning business enterprise. Rather than demand for nursing 
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home care being reduced, as reformers had anticipated, it increased almost immediately" 
(Holstein & Cole, 1996, p. 41). And these new homes and beds did not come with the 
associated medical or hospital-based care (Vladeck, 1980). 
Medicare and Medicaid 
As the national Medicare and Medicaid programs were being developed, the 
ancestry of the modern day nursing home had its own consequences. There were those 
within the federal government who did not want to fund custodial care for the elderly 
poor through health programs and health dollars (Vladeck, 1980). "Old age homes paid a 
price for their origins as poorhouses. Emerging as part of the structure of public relief, 
they never wholly lost the stigma attached to welfare" (Katz, 1984: 137). Therefore, the 
Medicare/Medicaid Bill of 1965 "...occurred in a highly charged political environment 
that led to a compromise limiting Medicare coverage for LTC to a new class of extended 
care facilities (ECFs) and for stays of less than 100 days, while the Medicaid program 
encouraged the states to offer both this level and a lower level of nursing home care to 
the indigent" (Capitman, Leutz, Bishop, & Casler, 2005, p. 11). 
The Medicare system provided for and continues to provide old-age health 
insurance for hospital and physician expenses (acute care) with very little coverage for 
long-term care costs. Medicaid paid the larger portion of long-term care but only after 
other individual assets and resources are used (Binstock, Cluff & Mering, 1996; Harris & 
Benson, 2006). Medicaid was to provide health coverage to all those receiving welfare 
benefits or who were otherwise determined to be medically indigent and services 
included those provided in skilled nursing homes (those with a physician serving as 
medical director) (Vladeck, 1980). There were still concerns, however, with the quality 
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of care in nursing homes and the lack of inspection guidelines within most states. The 
Medicare and Medicaid Bill included another attempt to address nursing home quality by 
making public funds for nursing homes contingent upon compliance with federal 
regulations regarding patient quality of care and quality of life (Harris & Benson, 2006). 
Once again, little effort was made by officials to enforce those standards tied to 
public dollars. Many homes could not meet the standards established and exclusion from 
the Medicaid program would have meant severe financial hardship for those homes and 
ultimately, many facilities would have been forced to close (Winzelberg, 2003). 
However, noncompliance was dealt with by the "substantial compliance" designation 
which allowed facilities more time to come into compliance and still receive public 
funding. While many facilities fell into this category, many never met the requirements 
to obtain full compliance (Winzelberg, 2003). This occurred partly due to the assumption 
that nursing homes would eventually improve anyway, that costs would rise significantly 
if the regulations were consistently upheld, and due to the apparent need for more nursing 
home beds (Holstein & Cole, 1996). The underlying message to nursing home regulators 
was: to ensure the best possible care without".. .requiring more than incremental 
increases in Medicaid expenditures and don't stir up a political fuss. Avoid possible 
disasters like nursing home fires at all costs.. .but remember that nursing home operators 
are constituents, too" (Vladeck, 1980, p. 173). 
Medicaid, as an entitlement program, provided an unique challenge in planning 
for nursing home care costs which are determined ".. .not by how many budget dollars 
there are to go around, but by how many people with entitlements to Medicaid benefits 
find themselves in a nursing home at any time—a matter over which the states have only 
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indirect control" (Vladeck, 1980, p. 75). States would like to keep nursing home costs 
very low but this is usually associated with poor quality. Plus, providers are unlikely to 
serve those in need of nursing home care if the Medicaid reimbursement rates are too 
low. Thus, states have to increase their rates in order to ensure that there is sufficient 
nursing home care available (Vladeck, 1980). 
Due to changing demographics and to the public funding made available for 
nursing homes, the size and total number of homes substantially increased. From 1960 to 
1970, the number of nursing homes increased by 140 percent and the number of nursing 
home beds increased by 232 percent while the expenditures for nursing home care 
increased from $500 million in 1960 to over $2 billion in 1970 (Subcommittee on Long-
Term Care, 1974). And the vast majority of homes built during this time were privately 
owned and often part of a chain (Winzelberg, 2003). By the 1970's, the pattern of 
financial support for patients in privately owned nursing homes had already been 
established. And this pattern had emerged during a period of dramatically growing need 
for long-term care outside of the home given increasing life expectancies, movement of 
older children away from their parents to take service-sector jobs or those supporting 
wartime needs, and more women seeking work outside of the home (Holstein & Cole, 
1996; Schell, 1993). The availability of public dollars for nursing homes had the 
following consequences: "[h]omes grew larger, more bureaucratized, more medicalized, 
and soon more corporatized. Bad conditions led to even more regulation, and regulation 
inspired further bureaucracy" (Holstein & Cole, 1996, p. 44). 
While stricter regulations were meant to improve conditions within nursing 
homes, they often inadvertently forced smaller homes out of business as they could not 
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meet some of the physical and fire safety codes required. This left the market open to the 
larger corporate-owned homes which may have been more modern at the time but also 
less "homelike" (Vladeck, 1980, p. 168; Holstein & Cole, 1996). Concerns had grown 
that the regulations had emphasized structure and process rather than patient outcomes 
(Capitman, Leutz, Bishop, & Casler, 2005). But prior concerns about growing long-term 
care costs resulted in the development of "certificate of need" (CON) laws which 
mandated that".. .a prior determination that a new or expanded facility was needed 
before it could be granted a license to operate" (Vladeck, 1980, p. 127). This was an 
attempt to limit the number of long-term care facilities within the states during the 1960's 
and 1970's. However, shortages of nursing home beds due to restrictions placed on 
nursing home construction made the threat of closure for poor quality nursing homes an 
empty one. Given excess demand and limited supply, many nursing home consumers did 
not have a wide range of options for care even when local nursing homes have been cited 
for poor service quality (Nyman, 1987). 
Federal Recognition and Response to Poor Nursing Home Quality 
In 1974, the Senate Subcommittee on Long-Term Care released a report detailing 
the failures of nursing home public policy. The report presented the findings of several 
hearings between 1969 and 1973, findings from special subcommittee studies, and 
information from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW). The report 
painted a very grim picture of the nursing home industry and stated that the ".. .entire 
population of the elderly, and their offspring, suffer severe emotional damage because of 
the dread and despair associated with nursing home care in the United States today" 
(1974, p. iii). The public perceptions of nursing home placement were assumed to 
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include ".. .protracted suffering before death" and to be ".. .almost synonymous with 
death" (1974, p. 7). The report cited the failure of establishing and enforcing meaningful 
standards within nursing homes, cases of abuse, misuse of medications, dependence on 
largely unqualified staff, and the continuing problem of nursing home fires. The report 
called for ".. .Congress and the executive branch to create a comprehensive national 
policy with respect to treatment of the infirm elderly.. .and to improve the quality of life 
for the 1 million Americans presently residing in U.S. long-term care facilities" (1974, p. 
11). 
The 1987 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) resulted from a study by 
the Healthcare Financing Administration (HCFA), a General Accounting Office report, 
and a report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM). These sources further elaborated on the 
poor quality care in nursing homes and the abuses of residents and their rights (Capitman, 
et al, 2005; Castle, 2001). The IOM report cited problems with interpreting inspection 
results, how to score facilities on their performance and determine overall compliance, 
the predictability of when nursing home surveys would be conducted, and relying on staff 
and record review data to determine quality of care (Wunderlich & Kohler, 2001). The 
IOM also generally found problems in the following areas: 
(1) Attitudes of federal and state personnel about enforcement objectives and 
processes; (2) federal rules and guidelines for states; (3) variation among states in 
policies and procedures; and (4) resources to support enforcement activities 
(Wunderlich & Kohler, 2001, p. 141). 
OBRA emerged to improve regulation and quality of care within the nursing home 
industry and included the Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA) (Castle, 2001; Wunderlich 
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& Kohler, 2001). "The 1987 OBRA established new process standards for residents' 
rights, nurses' aide training, monitoring of psychotropic medications, and medical 
direction" (Capitman, et al., 2005, p. 13; Winzelberg, 2003). The Minimum Data Set 
(MDS) for gauging resident functioning was also developed which provides data 
regarding patient quality of care (Capitman, et al., 2005; Winzelberg, 2003). The focus 
was shifted to now address both processes and outcomes of nursing home care 
(Wunderlich & Kohler, 2001). 
Current Regulatory Requirements 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS - formally HCFA) is 
charged with ensuring that nursing homes receiving federal funds meet certain 
requirements (OIG, 1999). But it is the state that establishes regulations for the licensure 
of nursing homes that wish to operate within its borders (Walshe, 2001). The state's own 
regulations for licensure require that all nursing homes maintain certain standards and not 
just those homes receiving federal funding (Walshe, 2001). "State regulations may 
parallel or exceed federal requirements and generally have separate provisions for 
licensing nursing homes, undertaking surveys or inspections, investigating complaints, 
identifying deficiencies, and taking enforcement action" (Walshe, 2001, p. 131). 
Regardless, most nursing homes still have to attend to both federal regulations and state 
licensure requirements which can be confusing and contradictory (Walshe, 2001). For 
example, when a deficiency is found during the survey process, it may be enforced 
through either federal or state procedures or both (Walshe, 2001). 
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The CMS is responsible for certifying nursing home facilities that receive either 
Medicare or both Medicare and Medicaid funding while states are responsible for 
certifying Medicaid-only facilities. The certifications are established through surveys (or 
inspections) of the facilities which the states usually conduct on behalf of CMS (OIG, 
1999). CMS is ultimately responsible for developing and upholding the federal 
regulations for those nursing homes that choose to receive Medicare and Medicaid 
funding. "The state survey, licensing, and certification agencies are responsible for 
surveying or inspecting nursing homes to check their compliance with the regulations, 
investigating complaints and reporting the results to the CMS" (Walshe, 2001, p. 130). 
The inspection teams are generally multi-disciplinary in nature and must have at least one 
registered nurse included (OIG, 1999; Winzelberg, 2003). When inspectors find that a 
nursing home is not in compliance with a specific requirement, the home is given a 
deficiency (OIG, 1999). In order to measure consistency between the written record and 
actual care, a group of residents requiring different types of care are interviewed and their 
records reviewed (Winzelberg, 2003). "Each standard.. .measures their medical, nursing 
and rehabilitative care, dietary and nutrition services, activities, social participation, 
sanitation, infection control, and physical environment" (OIG, 1999, p. 9). 
Per OBRA, the quality of care provided by nursing homes must allow patients to 
".. .attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental and psychosocial well-
being" (Capitman, et al., 2005, p. 13). States are also required to have in place and 
enforce state licensing regulations, federal certification standards and to include an 
ombudsman program (Capitman, et al., 2005). Ombudsman programs operate with 
volunteers and paid staff who work on behalf of the elderly in ".. .identifying and 
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resolving complaints, making regular visits to nursing homes, and engaging in a variety 
of different advocacy activities" (OIG, 1999, p. 3). The federal government is also 
required to validate the inspection findings of at least 5 percent of the total number of 
nursing homes surveyed in a given year to help ensure survey standardization 
(Winzelberg, 2003). To avoid non-enforcement issues of the past associated with fear of 
closure of much needed facilities, new sanctions were also developed. "Potential 
remedies included civil money penalties up to $10,000 per day, a directed plan of 
correction, installation of a temporary manager, and payment denials for all new or 
current Medicare and Medicaid admissions" (Winzelberg, 2003, p. 2553). These 
sanctions depended upon the severity and scope of survey deficiencies (Winzelberg, 
2003). 
In 1991, the then HCFA's Online Certification and Reporting System (OSCAR) 
was established to include data for the current facility survey as well as data for the three 
most recent surveys. Much of the data generated by the surveyors is based on the nursing 
home's deficiencies. Nursing home staff also enter data about facility and patient 
characteristics (OIG, 1999). In 1995, the certification process was changed so that 
nursing homes were subject to an unannounced survey no later than 15 months after the 
date of the most recent standard survey (OIG, 1999). Seventeen main categories were 
established for the federal regulations covered in nursing home surveys, which include 
about 185 individual items (OIG, 1999). The nursing home has thus emerged as the most 
strictly regulated settings for doctors and other medical staff to practice. "Although the 
regulatory requirements of nursing home have been increased, the impact on overall care 
remains to be determined. It is hoped that nursing facilities will become more 
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progressive under the law, and that public perception of nursing homes will improve" 
(Vaca, Vaca, & Daake, 1998, p. 168). 
Certain improvements within nursing homes have been documented since the 
implementation of OBRA including fewer physical and chemical restraints of residents 
and lower rates of urinary incontinence and catheterization (Walshe, 2001; Minority Staff 
of the House Committee on Government Reform, 2001). However, problems with 
quality still remain - particularly regarding resident outcomes such as pressure sores, 
malnutrition, dehydration and feeding problems (Walshe, 2001; OIG, 1999). A decade 
after OBRA, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) (1999) reported that quality of 
care deficiencies were actually increasing and while OBRA mandated certain resident 
rights and services as well as administrative standards, there had been no formal review 
of the OBRA reforms or their effectiveness. Indeed, it had been reported that final 
enforcement regulations for OBRA were not enacted until 1995 (Hovey, 2000). The OIG 
report also found vast differences in how states detect, report and examine alleged cases 
of nursing home abuse. There was also general agreement among nursing home 
administrators that inadequacies in staffing lead to quality of care issues. Thus, many 
nursing homes lack proper supervision which results in preventable accidents, lack of 
proper assistance with activities of daily living, and inadequate care of pressure sores 
(OIG, 1999). 
The Current Context for Nursing Home Care and Regulation 
Nursing homes operate under the tension of providing care that addresses medical 
and rehabilitative factors as well as the residential and social needs of patients. Further, 
the federal government's role in long-term care is significantly shared with the states in 
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both financial support and determining eligibility for public funding (Lammers & Liebig, 
1990). State survey agencies thus have double accountability - to their own state agency 
as well as the CMS (Walshe, 2001). This struggle between state and federal 
responsibility for long-term care has had to balance ".. .both the desire for more decisive 
action on the part of federally oriented reform advocates and the recognition that state 
cultures and differing orientations toward regulation create substantial pressures for 
variation" (Lammers & Liebig, 1990, p. 142). 
Another tension exists in that CMS and state survey agencies are both funders and 
regulators (Walshe, 2001). Public funding provides for almost 75% of all nursing home 
care and Medicaid funds require a state match. Medicaid expenses thus usually represent 
one of the largest general fund expenditures for state budgets (Hovey, 2000). Yet 
changes in regulations can result in increased costs and pressure to increase 
reimbursement rates (Walshe, 2001). "Therefore, the already difficult tasks of insuring 
quality long-term care is all the harder, because the same government entities responsible 
for ensuring quality will be forced to fund the needed quality improvements" (Hovey, 
2000, p. 44). 
With Medicaid expenses totaling over $24.3 billion for nursing homes in 1996, 
quality of nursing home care and nursing home regulation has become a political and 
economic issue for many states, in addition to addressing the medical and social needs of 
patients (Sainfort, Ramsay, & Monato, Jr., 1995; Winzelberg, 2003; Walshe, 2001; OIG, 
1999). There is some debate as to the value and stringency of nursing home regulations 
(Walshe, 2001; Hovey, 2000). There are those who think that regulations should be even 
more stringent and enforcement efforts increased in order to improve pervasive quality 
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problems. Others believe that the regulatory onus put upon nursing homes is already too 
severe, extremely costly, and has created ".. .a punitive, adversarial climate that is hostile 
toward quality improvement" (Walshe, 2001, p. 133). The argument is for simpler 
regulation which focuses on those nursing homes which are consistently out of 
compliance with severe and widespread quality deficiencies (Walshe, 2001). The 
regulations in general have been criticized for not focusing on positive outcomes or 
improving well-being but instead rely mainly on measuring the existence of or lack of 
problems and deficiencies (Wunderlich & Kohler, 2001). The U.S. regulatory model in 
general has been described as one developed ".. .as much to protect the public purse 
against fraud or graft as the consumer against ill-treatment or exploitation" (Day & Klein, 
1987, p. 313). 
Studies have shown that the average number of deficiencies varies widely across 
states with Rhode Island averaging 4.3 per facility, Washington DC averaging 15.8 and 
Wyoming 15.4 in 2006 (Harrington, Carillo, & Blank, 2007). It has also been determined 
that surveyors still fail to uncover quality of care problems during the inspection process 
(Wunderlich & Kohler, 2001). This ".. .cross-state variation in the quality of the nursing 
facility long-term care, that growing numbers of elderly citizens will likely require, is a 
public issue, minimally, since public programs are either the primary or only payment 
source for 77% of the slightly over 1.5 million elderly nursing facility residents" 
(Lockhart & Giles-Sims, 2007, p. 2). 
States also differ as to what is included in their nursing home regulations and 
other statutory policies regarding the elderly. For example, states vary as to their 
definitions of institutional elder mistreatment and whether or not they have mandatory 
reporting for elder abuse (Daly & Jogerst, 2006; Payne & Gainey, 2004). Yet despite the 
history of lax state and federal regulatory guidelines, the fragmentation of the regulatory 
process and the existence of differences cited in both federal and state regulations 
regarding nursing home care (Walshe, 2001), little examination at the state level beyond 
Medicaid reimbursement policies has taken place. And while a host of research has 
identified various lower level (resident and facility) factors that are associated with the 
quality of nursing home care, no apparent examination of the actual content of state 
nursing home regulations and how they might differ from the federal regulations has been 
presented in the literature. The state comparative literature, which uses ".. .the American 
states as units of analysis to investigate how political, economic, and sociological factors 
affect government policies" (Tucker, 1982, p. 176), is silent on the issue of what factors 
explain state nursing home regulation decisions outside of Medicaid policy and 
reimbursement rates. 
Statement of Purpose 
The elderly are the fastest growing segment of society (Dowd & Durick, 1996) 
and the 16 million baby boomers born between 1946 and 1964 have already started to 
retire (Dohm, 2000). As the number of elderly residing in nursing homes is expected to 
increase to 6.6 million by 2050 (Mitty 2001), the strain on the nursing home industry to 
provide good quality care will increase as will the need for reviewing and revising state 
and federal regulations regarding nursing home care (Walshe, 2001). However, there is 
little to no knowledge about what factors affect state decision makers as they develop 
nursing home licensure requirements. Therefore, the proposed state comparative study 
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aims to answer the following research question: What state level factors predict whether 
state regulations will exceed federal regulations regarding quality of care? More 
specifically: What nursing home industry variables predict whether state regulations will 
exceed federal nursing home quality of care regulations? What political variables predict 
whether state regulations will exceed federal nursing home quality of care regulations? 
What socioeconomic variables predict whether state regulations will exceed federal 
nursing home quality of care regulations? What demographic variables predict whether 
state regulations will exceed federal nursing home quality of care regulations? And what 
other state policy and other variables predict whether state regulations will exceed 
federal nursing home quality of care regulations? 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The course of nursing home regulation and policy has progressed slowly and 
disjointedly to the present time. Yet the factors that have affected nursing home 
regulatory decisions at the state level have not been examined in the literature. This 
chapter will summarize the few state comparative studies surrounding nursing homes that 
deal with fiscal and Medicaid policy as well as studies detailing the factors associated 
with quality nursing home care. This review of the research literature will conclude with 
the development of several research hypotheses tested by the current study. 
Differences in State and Federal Regulation 
Nursing home policy and the development of regulatory criteria have evolved in a 
fragmented fashion and have faced much criticism in the literature. The Department of 
Health and Human Services oversees Medicare and Medicaid programs through Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). While state governments are responsible for 
licensing nursing homes, they must monitor those in accordance with federal/CMS 
regulations if they intend to provide care and be reimbursed for patients with 
Medicare/Medicaid coverage. The state conducts nursing home inspections or surveys 
about once a year to ensure that they are meeting the minimum quality and performance 
standards but may be inspected more often if there are concerns about performance 
(Walshe, 2001; OIG, 1999). The federal regulations have historically been described as 
focusing too much on the medical aspects of patient care and ignoring social or emotional 
needs of a suitable quality of life as well as "representing the bare minimums rather than 
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desirable standards of quality" (Hawes, 1987, p. 235; see also Munroe, 1990). The 
approach to annual surveys has been described as ".. .a 'cookie-cutter' approach that 
neither adequately rewards good quality care nor deals forcefully enough with poor-
quality care" (Walshe, 2001, p. 135). The American model of regulation is also 
characterized as punitive in nature which may adversely affect quality. "The current 
regulatory process is criticized for its punitive character, existence of redundant channels 
of accountability, and surveyors' inability to detect all preventable problems" 
(Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2008, p. 348). 
Differences in the types of regulatory models used in the nursing home industry 
are apparent between the U.S. and other countries. Given that the United States' nursing 
home industry has been witness to more scandal and controversy than other countries, the 
level of detail and number of inspectors is greater than countries such as Australia or 
England (Braithwaite, Makkai, & Braithwaite, 2007). The American regulatory model is 
ultimately more deterrence focused in which punishment is emphasized through what is 
perceived as an accusatory and adversarial process (Braithwaite, Makkai, & Braithwaite, 
2007; Day & Klein, 1987). The rationale is such that if negative behavior is punished, it 
will eventually improve. The British regulatory model, however, is more compliance 
focused with the emphasis on prevention and the use of increased resources to improve 
quality issues (Day & Klein, 1987). The U.S. conception of quality is often based on 
medical and technological interventions while Britain focuses on patient comfort and 
creating a home-like atmosphere. Those who argue the merits of the compliance-based 
regulatory system conclude that".. .the quality of life in nursing homes is influenced as 
much by the social environment as by the tutelage of the regulatory agency (Day & 
Klein, 1987, p. 340). 
There are differences within the American states regarding the history and image 
of nursing homes as well as the size of the regulatory bureaucracy. For example, New 
York has had a long and very public history of nursing home abuses and scandal while 
Virginia has not had such a negative public image. "The image of the nursing home 
owner as a predatory, amoral calculator neatly fits the New York experience. In contrast, 
Virginia has not such legacy of well-publicized horror stories" (Day & Klein, 1987, p. 
321). Historically, some American states such as Virginia, have employed regulatory 
philosophies that are more like those in England than the regulatory philosophy in New 
York (Day & Klein, 1987) although the difference between American states may be 
diminishing (Braithwaite, Makkai, & Braithwaite, 2007). It has also been noted that 
there is much variation across states in terms of overall health policy including ways to 
contain costs, increase access to care, and provide quality care (Miller, 2005). Quality 
can vary ".. .from excellent in a growing but still relatively small proportion of homes to 
seriously substandard in perhaps as many as 10 to 20% of facilities nationwide, with the 
majority of homes in some states having notably poor records" (Hawes, 1987, p. 234). 
Regulatory stringency has also had negative consequences for patients and the 
ability of homes to provide innovative care. "Innovation - achieving regulatory goals but 
by other than the institutionally approved means - has been substantially destroyed by 
decades of input-oriented regulation" (Braithwaite, Makkai, & Braithwaite, 2007, p. 139). 
Thus, instead of focusing on achieving positive patient outcomes, nursing home 
administrators are often managing to meet written standards (Braithwaite, Makkai, & 
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Braithwaite, 2007). Less numerous, broad standards have been narrowed down 
repeatedly so that by 1986 there were 500 federal nursing home standards in addition to 
the state standards. "In the late 1980s there were some valiant efforts at rationalizing and 
reducing the numbers of standards and protocols. Even so, in most states inspectors 
continued to check compliance with around a thousand federal and state rules" 
(Braithwaite, 2007, p. 223). 
Yet nursing home regulation in the United States is reportedly much improved 
from its earliest days. It is ".. .tougher and better resourced than in any other nation we 
know of, and tougher and better resourced than other domains of American business 
regulation we know o f (Braithwaite, Makkai, & Braithwaite, 2001, p. 67). This 
regulation has served important functions including weeding out some of the most 
unscrupulous nursing home owners and operators. "It has driven most of the crooks from 
the industry - the organized criminals and property fraudsters - and it has driven out 
financially struggling small providers ('mom-and-pops') who often provided poor quality 
care" (Braithwaite, Makkai, & Braithwaite, 2007, p. 44). 
Regulation is necessary given the vulnerable and highly dependent elderly (and 
other populations) cared for within nursing homes. Given the complexity of their 
medical and treatment needs, nursing home patients are often unable to advocate for 
themselves (Wunderlich & Kohler, 2001). With the large amount of public dollars spent 
on long-term care and the regulations tied to those dollars has come an increased amount 
of documentation within nursing home records - although there is some question as to 
quality of that documentation (Braithwaite, Makkai, & Braithwaite, 2007). Since the 
government has such a large investment in nursing home care, ".. .it has a responsibility 
to hold providers accountable for fiscal integrity and the quality of care provided to 
beneficiaries" (Wunderlich & Kohler, 2001, p. 138). 
As previously described, nursing homes must abide by federal standards in order 
to receive federal funding yet states have their own licensure requirements as well, so 
there ".. .is really not one system of regulation but two -federal certification and state 
licensure—running side by side. This results in some duplication, occasional conflicts, 
and considerable confusion" (Walshe, 2001, p. 136). The state licensure requirements 
may vary widely (Wunderlich & Kohler, 2001; Walshe, 2001) and may complement or 
exceed the federal regulations although many states may simply mirror regulations at the 
federal level (Walshe, 2001; Vladeck, 1980). While many states have relied on 
enforcement via the federal surveys by matching their regulations to those at the federal 
level in order to reduce costs and duplicative inspection efforts, variation in standards and 
enforcement still exists at the state level (Braithwaite, Makkai, & Braithwaite, 2007). 
Some efforts have been made to increase the transparency of the differences 
between the state and federal regulations. Researchers at the University of Minnesota 
created the "NH RegsPlus" website to serve as a resource to researchers and citizens to 
search state regulations and to increase the transparency of nursing home regulation 
factors that may impact improved resident quality of life. The site contains comparisons 
between state regulations and the federal regulations through the use of narrative and 
comparison tables (NH Regulations Plus, 2008). Further, Daly and Jogerst (2006) found 
that only 14 states and Washington DC had institutional mistreatment definitions in their 
nursing home regulations but even those few states varied in how extensively they 
defined elder mistreatment in institutional settings. Other than this one descriptive study 
27 
focusing on one concept of care, the literature does not specifically address how 
individual states differ from each other in their nursing home regulations or how state 
regulations differ from the federal regulations. Therefore, the dependent variable of 
interest for this study is whether or not state regulations exceed the federal regulations for 
quality of care. 
Based on the literature to be discussed below, the state level factors hypothesized 
to impact state nursing home regulations for this study are categorized as follows: nursing 
home industry factors, demographic factors, socioeconomic factors, political factors, and 
state policy factors. Since there have been very few state comparative studies regarding 
long-term care and none that examine the content of the nursing home regulations 
themselves, the literature review reflects this gap in knowledge about what factors 
influence state nursing home regulatory policy. The assumptions and hypotheses 
presented here are based on studies regarding Medicaid and other long-term care policies 
as well as other state comparative studies dealing with related human service and social 
policies. A summary of the various models can be found in Figure 2.1 below. 
28 
Nursing Home Industry Model 
Demographic Model 
Socioeconomic Model 
Political Model 
State Policy Model - ~ 
Figure 2.1. Current Study Models. 
Nursing Home Industry Model 
While much of the long-term care research has focused on quality and studies 
have been conducted at the resident or nursing home level, little attention has been given 
to state policy regulations or other state-level differences beyond fiscal policies (see 
Unruh & Wan, 2004; Munroe, 1990; Liu & Castle, 2005; Castle, Degenholtz, & Engberg, 
2005). Therefore, it appears that much of the nursing home research has skipped a step 
or two - focusing on the outcomes of nursing home regulation (for example, the number 
and/or types of deficiencies) - rather than the regulations themselves and what factors 
influenced their implementation. Nevertheless, previous research addressing individual 
resident or organizational characteristics can still inform our understanding of the nursing 
home industry and important concepts can emerge which may in turn influence nursing 
home regulatory decisions. 
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State Nursing Home 
Regulations As 
Compared to Federal 
Regulations 
Nursing Home Ownership 
The historical development of nursing home policies and increasing regulations 
helped to establish a nursing home industry that is largely controlled by private 
organizations providing thousands of nursing home beds (Walshe, 2001; Braithwaite, 
Makkai, & Braithwaite, 2007). "Indeed, the very private nursing home industry was a 
creation of New Deal regulatory ambitions to shut down aged care in dilapidated 
almshouses" (Braithwaite, Makkai & Braithwaite, 2007, p. 22). Relying mainly on 
private providers for nursing home care may be problematic given the prospective 
payment system utilized in most states. "Under prospective payment, providers receive a 
rate set in advance for a bundle of services, without adjustment for actual costs.. .To the 
extent that facilities make money by curtailing services, quality may be adversely 
affected" (Wunderlich & Kohler, 2001, p 239). Quality may also be adversely affected 
if demand is high and supply is low especially when nursing homes can charge higher 
rates for private paying residents compared to what they receive for Medicaid-supported 
residents. "Under excess demand, nursing homes can attract as many Medicaid residents 
as they want, regardless of quality" (Wunderlich & Kohler, 2001, p. 245). Despite the 
attempts of regulation, nursing home market forces may ultimately not incentivize high 
quality care (Walshe, 2001). 
Indeed, many studies have confirmed that for-profit facilities provide lower 
quality care than non-profit and/or government facilities (Elwell, 1984; Zinn, Spector, 
Hsieh, & Mukamel, 2005; Chou, 2002; Harrington, Woolhandler, Mullan, Carrillo, & 
Himmelstein, 2002) and for-profit homes have also had higher rates of abuse as reported 
by staff (Jogerst, et al., 2006). The common explanation is that for-profit homes attempt 
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to lower costs and increase revenues by lowering quality - for example, by providing 
fewer services or relying on inadequate or less qualified staff (Gottesman, 1974, 
Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2008; Munroe, 1990; Zinn, Spector, Hsieh, & 
Mukamel, 2005). In the case of using less qualified staff or more of them, the rationale is 
that".. .nursing home administrators [are] trying to achieve cost control through salary 
savings. It is suggested that such action produces a trade-off between operational costs 
and quality" (Munroe, 1990, p. 264). 
Fottler, Smith and James (1981) examined the relationship between profits per 
patient day and quality in 43 for-profit nursing homes in Southern California. Quality 
was measured by nursing hours and other staffing hours per patient day. The most 
significant predictors of quality were profitability and percent of Medicaid patients which 
were both negatively associated with quality. Quality is thus higher in those homes with 
lower profits (profitability decreases because service intensity - the quantity/quality of 
labor - increases) and with fewer Medicaid patients. Fottler et al. conclude that".. .the 
most significant finding in this study is that profits can be increased by decreasing the 
intensity of patient care services (i.e., quality)" (1981, p. 537). 
A study of 424 "old age institutions" (OAIs) or nursing homes in New York State 
using data from the Annual Report of Residential Health Care Facilities compared the 
expenses allocated by government, non-profit and privately owned homes for nine types 
of services as well as the availability of nursing staff (Elwell, 1984). The service data 
were measured on a dollars-spent per patient day basis for administration, medical, 
rehabilitation, social services, activities, nutrition, housekeeping, and other professional 
services. The staffing variables for all nursing staff, registered nurses, and other 
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professional staff were measured as the number of staff hours per patient day and 
physician hours per patient week. The results showed that privately owned homes were 
negatively correlated with each of the service expense measures, non-profit institutions 
had positive correlations, and government homes had moderate positive correlations with 
service expenses. Even after controlling for per diem costs, occupancy rates, patient 
functioning, and proportion of Medicaid patients - government and non-profit homes 
spent more per day in the various service areas than privately owned institutions. 
Although there were weaker correlations with the staffing variables, government and 
non-profit institutions provided more nursing and physician hours than the privately 
owned homes (Elwell, 1984). 
Cost savings through the use of less qualified staff was illustrated in a study of 
455 long-term care facilities in California between 1985 and 1986 (Munroe, 1990). 
Private homes reported a lower ratio of registered nurse (RN) hours to licensed 
vocational nurse (LVN) hours and lower costs per resident day than did their non-private 
counterparts. Further, these differences in staffing had an impact on the quality of care 
provided within those facilities. A significant and positive relationship was found 
between quality, as measured by the number of health deficiencies during the annual 
survey, and the ratio of RN hours to LVN hours per resident day (Munroe, 1990). 
A study of over 13,000 Medicare/Medicaid certified facilities in 1998 also 
examined the differences in quality care based on ownership status (Harrington, 
Woolhandler, Mullan, Carrillo, & Himmelstein, 2002). The average number of quality of 
care, quality of life and other deficiencies were significantly higher for investor-owned 
homes than non-profit or public homes (5.89 deficiencies compared to 4.02 and 4.12 
32 
respectively). Rates of severe deficiencies were also higher in investor-owned homes 
than their non-private counterparts. Even after controlling for percentage of Medicaid 
patients, case mix, chain ownership, and region of the country, investor-owned homes 
were still significant predictors of higher deficiency rates (Harrington et al., 2002). 
Lockhart and Giles-Sims (2007) conducted a cross-state study to examine the 
degree to which various state factors explained differences in the resources that states 
contributed to elderly long-term care. The authors used a measure of total nursing home 
resource adequacy derived from three items (the number of Medicaid-certified beds per 
1000 residents 65 or older, the percent of Medicaid expenditures allocated to nursing 
homes, and the Medicaid nursing home expenditures divided by the state cost of living) 
as well as a per-unit (or per patient) measure. The results showed that the percentage of 
nonprofit homes in states was positively associated with nursing home resource adequacy 
(both total and per unit). Thus, states with a greater percentage of nonprofit homes 
provide more ample Medicaid reimbursement for long-term care. 
While non-profit homes may provide better quality care they may not be as 
accessible as for-profit or public homes as reflected by lower proportions of Medicaid 
patients. It has been argued that public nursing homes have a significantly higher share 
of patients receiving Medicaid than nonprofit homes (Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 
2008): 
The largest group of for-profit providers, composed of so-called Medicaid Mills, 
provides lower quality of care and greater access to the Medicaid recipients. A 
smaller group of 'elitist' nonprofit facilities cultivates quality but is less 
accessible to Medicaid clients. Finally, a small and decreasing number of public 
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facilities serve the traditional safety-net role and provide high-quality care" 
(Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2008, p. 345). 
Explanations for differences in for-profit and nonprofit nursing home quality 
include the rationale of failed contract theory such that when asymmetrical information 
exists about nursing home quality, "...for-profit organizations have more incentive to 
engage in opportunistic behaviors and to maximize their profits" (Chou, 2002, p. 295). 
Chou (2002) used a national representative sample of institutionalized disabled elderly 
needing assistance with at least one activity of daily living over a ten year period. Chou 
(2002) found that there were no significant differences between for and non-profit 
facilities in the time until death or negative health outcome (dehydration, pressures sores, 
or urinary tract infection) when family members visited within a month after admission. 
However, nonprofits performed better when there was asymmetrical information present 
(no child or spouse visiting within one month of admission). The duration of time until 
death, dehydration, and urinary tract infections were shorter in for-profit homes when 
there was no visitation within the first month of admission. "When the resident lacks 
family members to monitor the service, the for-profit homes will have less incentive to 
maintain the quality of care" (Chou, 2002, p. 307). 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992) add a category to the nonprofit and for profit sectors 
to include the third sector. "This sector.. .is made up of organizations that are privately 
owned and controlled, but that exist to meet public or social needs, not to accumulate 
private wealth" (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 44). Organizations in the third sector may 
perform better at tasks where there is little or no profit to be gained, human compassion is 
expected, greater levels of trust are given by those being served, and special individual 
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attention are necessary - all of which could be used to describe nursing home care 
(Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Other third sector strengths include the ability to reach a 
variety of populations and providing holistic solutions to problems (Osborne & Gaebler, 
1992). Health providers outside of the private sector may also be more "patient-
centered" and this may have a positive effect on quality (Amirkhanyan, Kim, & 
Lambright, 2008, p. 329). Many nonprofit nursing homes referred to here and in the 
nursing home literature in general would likely fall into this third sector. For purposes of 
this study, however, this distinction of a third sector is irrelevant as the nursing home 
literature in general does not categorize homes in this manner. The ownership 
distinctions are generally categorized as for profit, nonprofit and public/government. 
It is unclear how nursing home ownership may affect state nursing home 
regulations since this relationship has not previously been tested in the literature. 
However, since nonprofit homes appear to provide better quality care and may be more 
concerned with quality of care in general (versus profits), states with more nonprofit 
homes may reflect the nonprofit concern for quality of care in their nursing home 
regulations. States with a larger private nursing home industry should be less likely to 
have more stringent regulations given the negative impact that additional regulation could 
have on profits. 
HI: States with a greater percentage of nonprofit nursing homes will be more 
likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for 
quality of care. 
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Influence of the Nursing Home Industry 
The history of nursing homes has shown that interest groups related to the nursing 
home industry have wielded their influence over policy issues. For example, the 
American Nursing Home Association exerted pressure upon the federal government in 
the 1950's and 1960's to allow construction loans for private nursing homes through the 
SBA and the FHA without the necessity of being linked to a hospital (Holstein & Cole, 
1996; Vladeck, 1980; Mara, 2008). The administrative burden and associated costs with 
regulation means that nursing home owners have a vested interest in shaping regulation 
to meet their needs and this interest can show itself in regards to the legislature and 
executive branches (Harringinton, et al., 2002). "For example, nursing home providers 
have made large political contributions; in some states nursing home providers are 
prominent in the local political party hierarchies; and some state and federal legislators 
have substantial financial interests in nursing home care" (Walshe, 2001, p. 138). 
Political meddling with inspection and enforcement efforts, including nursing home 
administrators having state representatives and senators present during inspection visits, 
has been documented in nursing home regulation fieldwork (Braithwaite, Makkai, & 
Braithwaite, 2007). 
The state comparative literature has illustrated the general impact that interest 
groups can have on state policy. Jacoby and Schneider (2001) examined state 
expenditures for 15 different policy areas including corrections, education, health, 
hospitals, transportation, and housing/community development to measure differences in 
policy priorities for 1992 and what factors determine those priorities. Their analysis 
showed that interest group strength had a very powerful impact on the policy priorities of 
states as did public opinion. Private interest groups often call for "particularized benefits 
for their members" with a narrow policy focus (p.560). Jacoby and Schneider (2001) 
found that these groups had the ".. .strongest impact on the relative allocation of policy 
resources" (p. 562). 
In a more specific example of interest group influence, Radcliff and Saiz (1998) 
found that the greater organizational strength of labor unions was associated with higher 
per recipient expenditures on AFDC, per pupil education spending, and total state 
spending per capita from 1964 to 1982. "The larger the share of the work force 
represented by unions, the more progressive the tax code and the more liberal policy in 
general" (Radcliff and Saiz, 1998, p. 121). States with more powerful unions therefore 
represent a more formidable agent acting on behalf of the interests of those in the 
working class. 
Wiggins, Hamm, and Bell (1992) examined over 700 randomly sampled bills 
from California, Iowa, and Texas to determine the impact of interest groups, the 
governor, and majority and minority leaders on the final outcome of the bill. While 
overall the analysis showed that elected officials can diminish the influence of special 
interest groups, those groups are considerably more involved in the legislative process 
than the other actors as measured by the proportion of bills on which the actors indicated 
a position. It is also important to point out that the interest groups and the other elected 
officials were only in conflict about 20% of the time on issues in which both are 
involved. Further, ".. .a major finding is that party influence agent involvement is 
limited, plus there is a greater propensity for party leaders to agree with group positions 
when involved" (Wiggins, Hamm, & Bell, 1992, p. 97). 
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Historically, policies regarding regulation and long-term care reimbursement have 
come about through the interplay of nursing home providers, members of the legislature, 
and other bureaucrats but not necessarily including the recipients of care. "Patients' main 
contribution to reform has come not through voting or lobbying, but through needless 
suffering and tragic deaths" (Hawes, 1987, p. 237). While the elderly are often thought 
to have significant political influence (Vladeck, 1980), most nursing home patients do not 
have the ability (physical, cognitive, or financial) to have a strong influence on major 
policy issues such as state and federal nursing home regulation (Weissert, 2008). 
The influence of advocacy groups for the elderly, such as the American 
Association for Retired Persons (AARP) is unclear. For example, Lockhart and Giles-
Sims (2007) controlled for the ratio of AARP membership to the elderly population in 
their examination of state nursing home resource adequacy but found little significant 
effect of this variable in their analyses. Yet, Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, and Goldstein 
(2002) found that AARP membership did have a significant positive effect on state 
nursing home expenditures in the 1990's. The issue of nursing home care is just one of 
many for groups like the AARP and they tend to focus on the issues of the "young-old" 
who are generally not living in nursing homes (Weissert, 2008). "Resources spent 
pursuing the interests of the very old group of Americans who make up the long-term 
care population would be unlikely to increase AARP's membership, dues receipts, or 
political clout" (Weissert, 2008, p. 326). The lack of political action committees (PAC) 
that could make contributions to politicians who sit on influential committees addressing 
issues of aging and long-term care also diminishes the AARP's influence compared to 
other interest groups (Weissert, 2008). 
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In contrast, nursing home providers ".. .are well-organized and politically astute. 
Many benefit financially from the very conditions and policies that result in increasing 
costs, discrimination and poor quality" (Hawes, 1987, p.237). This is not to negate the 
fact that interest groups have and continue to work on behalf of nursing home residents 
including the National Council of Senior Citizens, the National Association of State 
Long-Term Care Ombudsmen Programs, and the American Association of Retired 
Persons (Hawes, 1987). However, the long history and pattern of privately owned 
nursing homes and the fact that the majority of nursing homes are privately owned makes 
nursing home owners a powerful and familiar influence in this particular policy arena 
(Vladeck, 1980; Hawes, 1987). As the results of Jacoby and Schneider (2001) indicate, 
interest groups with a narrower focus, like the nursing home industry, may be critical to 
increasing the salience of their issues in the eyes and ears of state policymakers. The 
scope of issues addressed by groups such as the AARP may hinder their effectiveness as 
an interest group for nursing home care (Weissert, 2008). States with more nursing 
homes will likely have a stronger nursing home lobby that may pressure policymakers to 
ease regulatory burdens. Thus, the total number of nursing homes per state will be used 
rather than a per capita measure. 
H2: States with a greater number of nursing homes will be less likely to have 
nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
Nursing Home Size 
The differences in both the ownership and the size of nursing homes have been 
the subject of study when looking at quality and access to care. While small homes may 
create an environment that is more "home-like" and may positively impact care quality, 
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larger homes may ".. .benefit from economies of scale and can create more efficient 
structures and processes in service delivery" (Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 1008, 
p. 332). Yet this efficiency may not equate to quality care. A study of nursing home 
inspection records of over 14,000 U.S. nursing homes from 2000 to 2003 showed that 
for-profit facilities had a significantly higher number of regulatory violations than non-
profit and public nursing homes. There was no such difference between non-profit and 
public nursing homes. Additionally, as homes grew in size, so did the number of 
deficiencies in private homes as compared to public homes (Amirkhanyan, Kim, & 
Lambright, 2008). 
Other facility-level studies have revealed associations between structural variables 
and nursing home deficiencies. A study examining the characteristics associated with 
deficiency citations as defined by the Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA) found that 
larger facilities and for-profit facilities were more likely to have health related citations, 
citations related to appropriate services, training provision citations, and resident 
assessment citations (Castle, 2001). Generally it was found that deficiency citations were 
not highly contingent upon nursing or specialist staffing levels. "The results of this 
analysis, especially those results examining deficiency citations for the provision of 
appropriate services and resident assessments, are consistent with the belief that larger 
nursing homes are less willing to or able to provide individualized care in line with that 
required by the NHRA" (Castle, 2001, p. 88). 
Similarly, Zinn, Spector, Hsieh, and Mukamel (2005) examined the changes in 
quality measure scores during the first five reporting quarters for the Nursing Home 
Compare dataset. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services developed the 
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Nursing Home Compare website to provide nursing home consumers and the general 
public with information about deficiencies, staffing patterns, and other home 
characteristics. Quality measures of interest evaluated various characteristics of nursing 
home residents including loss of ability to perform basic daily tasks, infection, pressure 
sores, pain, and use of physical restraints. The analysis showed that, in general, nonprofit 
and smaller nursing homes had better initial quality measures scores than their larger or 
for-profit counterparts (Zinn, et al., 2005). While the differences between various types 
of facilities diminished overtime, the "... limited association between organizational 
characteristics and improvement trends raises concerns that the gaps in outcomes by 
facility type at baseline may persist" (Zinn, et al., 2005, p. 729). 
There have been other explanations for the role of nursing home size on quality. 
In a study of 104 randomly selected nursing homes in Wisconsin, Sainfort, Ramsay, and 
Monato, Jr (1995) found that nursing home size was positively correlated with process 
and structure variables used to partially define quality. Process variables included 
measures such as staff attitudes towards residents, variety and adequacy of activities, 
communication between residents, and planning and evaluation. Structure variables 
included staff credentials, cleanliness of the home, and maintenance. However, size was 
not significantly correlated with outcome variables such as resident grooming or mood, 
resident physical condition, and awareness. The authors conclude that since 
organizational characteristics, like nursing home size, ".. .are not under direct 
management control and not likely to change over time...such immutable organizational 
characteristics are essentially exogenous to the quality process" (Sainfort et al., 1995, p. 
83). 
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Again, the relationship between nursing home size and state nursing home 
regulations has not been developed in the literature. Since smaller nursing homes may 
fare better in terms of overall home quality, it is possible that states with smaller nursing 
homes also are more concerned about quality of care. And additional regulatory burdens 
might be greater for nursing home administrators who are managing larger health care 
facilities. Nursing home size will be measured by the number of beds per nursing home. 
H3: States with smaller nursing homes will be more likely to have regulations 
that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
A variety of nursing home industry factors have been shown to be influential in 
determining quality and other aspect of care. The percent of homes that are nonprofit 
ownership, the average size of nursing homes, and the size of the nursing home industry 
in each state are frequently mentioned and will be examined to determine what effect, if 
any, they have on state nursing home regulatory policy. See Figure 2.2 below. 
Nursing Home Ownership (Nonprofit +) 
Size of Nursing Home Industry (-) 
Nursing Home Size (-) 
Figure 2.2. Nursing Home Model. 
Demographic Model 
Nursing homes provide specific services to those with specialized needs and are 
not strictly homes for the aged. Almost 12% of nursing home residents are under the age 
of 65 (n=l 74,900) and 14.5% of nursing home residents are minorities (n=216,200) 
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(National Centers for Healthcare Statistics, 2004). While there is some diversity within 
the nursing home population, the "typical" nursing home resident is a white female aged 
75 years or older and receiving Medicaid benefits (Harris & Benson, 2006; Gottesman, 
1974; Hawes, 2003). And those working in nursing homes are mostly female as well 
(Harris & Benson, 2006). Since states vary in their demographic make-up, it is 
anticipated that various demographic factors will impact state policy decisions regarding 
nursing home care. 
Age 
As individuals age, the chances for the need of nursing home care increase with 
almost half of all nursing home residents at least 85 years or older (Harris & Benson, 
2006). "In addition, because the most rapidly growing segment of the population is 
those aged 85 or older, the proportion of persons estimated at risk for nursing home use at 
some time in their lives is expected to increase over time" (Hawes, 2003, p. 447). States 
with older populations will therefore face increased demand for nursing home care than 
states with lower proportions of older citizens. A large elderly population ".. .can place 
significant demands on health care delivery systems, thereby pressuring decision makers 
to initiate health care reform..." (Carter & LaPlant, 1997, p.21). Indeed, states with a 
larger percentage of elderly citizens (65 and older) have shown to adopt health care 
policy reforms more quickly than other states (Carter & LaPlant, 1997). 
Age has shown to be a significant factor in the fiscal policies regarding long-term 
and nursing home care. Miller (2005) found that states with older populations tend to 
show greater demand for the use of and financial assistance with public health services. 
Kane, Kane, Ladd, and Veazie (1998) studied state variation in overall Medicaid 
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spending for long-term care per elder and then the portion spent on home and 
community-based services per elder for the 50 states and Washington, DC. There was 
wide variation between states regarding expenditures on nursing home care and home and 
community based services The authors found that states with a higher percentage of 
elderly ages 85 and older, higher proportions of elderly minorities, and higher proportions 
of elderly living alone had higher levels of total Medicaid spending on long-term care. 
However, these variables were not significant in explaining differences in home and 
community-based service expenditures. 
Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, and Goldstein (2002) examined Long-term Care 
Program and Market Characteristics survey data gathered by interviews with state 
officials in the 1980's and 1990's to determine the relationship between state long-term 
care policies and a variety of state Medicaid long-term care expenditures. The long-term 
care expenditures included (on a per capita basis): total long-term care expenditures, 
nursing home care expenditures, total expenditures for community-based care, and share 
of long-term dollars supporting community-based care. The analysis showed that the 
percent of population 85 years and older and per capita income were positively associated 
with increased long-term care expenditures. These two demand variables were also 
positively associated with increased nursing home expenditures (Miller, et al., 2002). 
States with older populations would have greater demands on long-term care, 
would need to regulate that care, and in general may be forced to be more sensitive to the 
needs of the oldest elderly. Studies have shown that states with older populations have 
allocated greater resources to nursing homes and have adopted health care reforms more 
quickly. 
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H4: States with larger percentages of elderly ages 85 and older will be more 
likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for 
quality of care. 
Gender 
Nursing home care and care for the elderly in general are largely female 
dominated phenomena. As previously mentioned, the majority of nursing home residents 
and nursing home staff are women (Harris & Benson, 2006). Just over one million 
women live in nursing homes and comprise 71% of residents (National Centers for 
Health Care Statistics, 2004). Since women tend to outlive men and are more likely to 
live into their later years, they are more likely to need nursing home care (Harris & 
Benson, 2006; Administration on Aging, 2000). Yet, elderly women are also more likely 
to be living in poverty - over 70% of the elderly living below the poverty line are 
women, and women are only half as likely as elderly men to be receiving income from a 
pension (Administration on Aging, 2000). Elderly women are twice as likely to live in 
poverty compared to males and the chances for living in poverty increases for women as 
they age (Administration on Aging, 2000). Given that women outlive men, this is 
particularly significant as they come to need increased medical and other types of care 
and yet may be unable to pay for it without government assistance. 
Eighty-five percent of the nursing home workforce is also female (Harris & 
Benson, 2006). Yet, most of those working in nursing homes are poorly paid nursing 
aides not making above minimum wage (Harris & Benson, 2006). Not only are women 
the primary recipients and providers of nursing home care, but they are also the primary 
recipients and providers of informal care in the community (Horowitz, 1985; Mui, 1995; 
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Stone, Cafferata, & Sangl, 1987). Studies have shown that 60 to 85% of those receiving 
informal care in their homes are elderly women (Horowitz, 1985; Mui, 1995, Stone, 
Cafferata, & Sangl, 1987). Many of these elderly women have moderate to severe care-
giving needs based on activities of daily living (ADL) (Stone et al., 1987; Mui, 1995). 
Approximately 70 to 75% of caregivers to the elderly outside of institutions are 
also women - often adult daughters or daughters-in-law and spouses (Horowitz, 1985; 
Mui, 1995; Stone, Cafferata, & Sangl, 1987). Studies have generally found that these 
female caregivers provide more hands-on assistance (Horowtiz, 1985); experience more 
emotional strain as a result of their care-giving duties (Mui, 1995); and report having to 
give something up in order to fulfill their care-giving responsibilities than male 
caregivers (Horowitz, 1985). "Care-giving daughters are middle-generation, usually 
middle-aged, and in the middle of competing demands on their time. They tend to hold 
primary responsibility for the emotional support of other family members, household 
management, and childrearing. In many cases they are also full-time workers" (Horowitz, 
1985, p. 616). 
The effect of women in the population on nursing home policy decisions has not 
been studied extensively. Swan, Harrington, and Pickard (2001) examined the factors 
affecting the state Medicaid nursing home per diem rates including the percent of women 
in the labor force. This was a measure of demand on the nursing home system since 
more women in the labor force could potentially mean fewer women available to care 
full-time for elderly relatives. However, this variable was not found to be significant in 
predicting changes in reimbursement rates. 
Given the predominant role of women in caring for family members, it is not 
surprising that women may differ from men in their support of government action, their 
perception of social problems and possible policy solutions including issues surrounding 
long-term care. Shapiro and Mahajan (1986) explored the differences between men and 
women on a variety of policy issues from the 1960's through the early 1980's using data 
from a variety of public opinion polls including 267 repeated foreign and domestic policy 
questions. The authors found gender differences in policy preferences with the largest 
difference (9%) in policies surrounding force or violence (e.g., gun control and capital 
punishment) with men more likely to support the more "violent" alternatives. The next 
biggest difference (5.8%) was in policies regarding regulation or protective policies to 
".. .regulate and protect consumers, citizens, and the environment" with women showing 
more support for these policies (Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986, p. 51). These include laws 
such as the 55 mile per hour speed limit, seat belt enforcement, and jail time for drunk 
drivers. Compassion policies also showed differences (3.3%) with women more 
supportive. These policies include those that would balance wealth, ensure jobs, and 
provide health care. 
The authors point out that the differences in regulation/protective and compassion 
issues have increased since the 1970's and may be partly due to the work of the women's 
movement. Women have become better educated and have shown greater participation 
in the workforce since the 1960's and society has undergone extensive political and 
social changes. "The salience of these issues for women increased more than it did for 
men, and gender differences in opinions increased in ways suggested by the interests 
which women have had and consistent with the intension of the women's movement" 
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(Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986, p. 59). It is understandable that women's policy preferences 
would change as did their roles in the home and workplace. Increasing female political 
participation could also mean that once small policy preference differences are becoming 
more significant if they are issues for which large interest group support develops 
(Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986). 
Regarding support for long-term care policy, Schlesigner and Heldman (2001) 
examined gender differences across five policy domains, including medical care, long-
term care, substance abuse treatment, education, and homeless programs via a national 
random sample telephone survey. The results showed that women were more likely than 
men to allocate responsibility to the federal government for helping people to pay for 
nursing home care. The authors conclude that there is a gender gap for certain issues. "In 
the domains in which there is the largest effect (long-term care in terms of allocating 
responsibilities...) the gender gap is larger than the differences in attitudes that one 
would predict between respondents who report themselves to be politically independent 
and those who consider themselves a strong partisan of either party" (Schlesinger & 
Heldman, 2001, p. 75). 
Schlesinger and Heldman (2001) also found that women were more likely to 
identify the need for long-term care as a problem within their family, to have greater 
emotional connection to the inadequacy of long-term care and to identify the need for 
long-term care as a national problem. However, women also appeared to be distrustful of 
government involvement in long-term care if resources are channeled through a health 
professional association instead of directly to families (Schlesinger & Heldman, 2001). 
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Women therefore approach long-term care policies differently than do men and place 
greater importance on the need for long-term care. 
As the population continues to age, women will likely continue to find themselves 
caring not only for their young children but also for their aging parents at the same time 
(Stone et al., 1987). Elderly women were originally deemed the "worthy" recipients of 
poorhouse care (Holstein & Cole, 1996) and they continue to make up the majority of the 
nursing home population. Given the fact that those providing and receiving long-term 
care both inside and outside of nursing homes are predominantly female and that women 
place a greater importance on issues surrounding long-term care and government 
regulation, it is reasonable to expect that the percentage of state population that is female 
would affect policy regarding nursing home care. 
H5: States with larger percentages of women in the state population will be more 
likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for 
quality of care. 
Race 
While the majority of nursing home residents are white, there are close to 200,000 
African-Americans living in nursing homes - or about 12.5% of all nursing home 
residents (National Centers for Health Care Statistics, 2004). However, African-
American elderly might have problems accessing nursing home care. Falcone and 
Broyles (1994) studied discharge data to analyze the differences in delayed discharge for 
patients leaving hospitals and going to a nursing home or a rest (domiciliary) home in 
North Carolina in 1991. Nonwhites were more likely to have a delayed discharge in 
general and while the average delay in discharge was 10.7 days, white patients had a 
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delay of only 8 days compared to 20 days for nonwhite patients. Those experiencing a 
delay were also more likely to have problems paying for the care to which they were 
being discharged, to have family problems in discharge arrangements, and to be 
discharged to a nursing home (versus a rest home). But the length of delay was still 
significantly longer for nonwhites even after controlling for these and other factors. "The 
compromise in access, marked by discharge delay, also has consequences for quality: the 
typical hospital, as its operations now are configured, is not the optimal residence for a 
frail elderly person who no longer needs the hospital's acute care services" (Falcone and 
Broyles, 1994, p. 592-593). 
Race may also be a factor when looking at the quality of nursing home care. 
Gottesman (1974) found that nursing homes in Detroit that were for-profit homes served 
a larger percentage of patients receiving public support, more men and residents with 
mental health issues. There were fewer visitors and community connections observed for 
residents in these homes. These homes appeared to be more available to black patients 
and had fewer activities, less staff involvement with those activities, and less interaction 
between residents. 
Wallace (1990) studied nursing home data for the city of St. Louis in the 1980's 
as well as survey data for community dwelling elders in 1987 to examine the effect of 
race on medical care. Using the index of dissimilarity, a measure of segregation, Wallace 
found that between 66 and 75% of either African-American or white nursing home 
residents would have to move to a different nursing home in order to have integration 
among nursing homes. This pattern is disturbing given the disparities in quality provided 
by these nursing homes. Wallace found (1990) that the average number of nursing home 
survey violations was 7.22 for predominantly African-American facilities compared to an 
average of only 3.17 violations for white nursing home facilities. "This shows that 
nursing home care is not only largely separate but is also unequal for African-American 
elderly in St. Louis" (Wallace, 1990, p. 521). While disparities in income and education 
may also play a role in which nursing homes the elderly are able to access, the data show 
that, similar to housing segregation, ".. .race has an independent effect, one that is larger 
than class factors in determining the pattern of institutions use. While class may be 
increasingly important in the economic life chances of African-Americans.. .wealth and 
class position alone fail to fully explain continued segregation" (Wallace, 1990, p. 532). 
Mor, Zinn, Angelelli, Teno, and Miller (2004) propose that there is a two-tiered 
system of nursing home care in regards to quality with homes in the lower tier having 
higher proportions of Medicaid-supported patients and thus fewer resources to provide 
better quality care. The authors used data from the three sources (the On-line Survey, 
Certification and Reporting - OSCAR, the Minimum Data Set - MDS, and the Area 
Resource File) for all publically supported nursing homes in the U.S. (n=14,130) except 
those that were operated by hospitals. Nursing homes in the lower tier were 
characterized by having 85% or more of their residents as Medicaid-supported, less than 
10% supported by private payers, and less than 8% Medicare supported. 
Mor et al. (2004) found that privately owned nursing homes were more likely to 
be in the lower tier compared to those not privately owned (15.4% compared to 10.2%). 
Homes in the lower tier had significantly fewer registered nurses per resident and had 
significantly more deficiencies (12.3 compared to 7.9) than the upper-tier homes. Lower-
tier homes also fared worse on certain quality measures in that these homes had a higher 
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occurrence of patients with pressure ulcers and more frequent use of restraints and 
antipsychotic medications. Lower-tier homes were also more likely in the poorest 
counties - both urban and rural. 
Perhaps the most startling result is that for racial differences. "In the entire 
country, approximately 9 percent of all white nursing home residents are in lower-tier 
facilities, whereas 40 percent of African-American residents are in lower-tier facilities" 
(Mor et al., 2004, p. 237-238). And the likelihood of African-Americans residing in a 
lower-tier home was consistent across almost all states. "The fact that African-American 
nursing home residents are grossly overrepresented in these low-revenue, understaffed, 
and poor-quality facilities is consistent with patterns of segregation observed in hospitals, 
schools and other social institutions" (Mor et al., 2004, p. 240). 
Since there is little in the way of state comparative nursing home policy research, 
the impacts of race are hitherto unknown. However, other state comparative studies 
indicate that race may also be factor in state policy decisions. In their study of state 
Medicaid expenditures, Kane et al. (1998) found that states with a higher percentage of 
minorities spent more on long-term care overall. This might be an issue of greater 
demand in states with larger minority populations. Soss, Schram, Vartarian, and O'Brien 
(2001) examined the stringency of welfare sanctions, work requirements, time limits, and 
family caps during the period of welfare reform and implementation of Temporary Aid to 
Needy Families (TANF). They found that a family cap condition disallowing benefits to 
new children conceived by welfare beneficiaries and shorter time limits for coming off of 
welfare were directly a function of race. States with higher percentages of African-
American and Latino on their welfare caseloads were more likely to have family caps and 
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stricter time limits. States with a higher percentage of African-Americans on their 
caseloads were more also more likely to have stricter sanctions for welfare recipients 
overall. The authors conclude that their ".. .analysis underscores that the 'problem of the 
color line' remains central to American welfare politics" (Soss, et al., 2001, p. 391). 
Since the history of nursing home care is so closely linked to relief for the poor and there 
remain apparent disparities in quality of nursing home care for minorities, it is anticipated 
that race may be an influential factor in nursing home regulatory decisions. 
H6: States with a larger minority population will be less likely to have nursing 
home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
The impact of demographic factors on state policy decisions has been examined 
extensively in the literature. However, state policy decisions regarding nursing home 
regulation have not been reported. The relevant demographic factors for this study 
include age, gender, and race to address possible differences based on the makeup of the 
elderly population. See figure 2.3 below. 
Percentage of Elderly 85 and older (+) 
Percentage of Women (+) 
Percentage Minority (-) 
Figure 2.3. Demographic Model. 
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Socioeconomic Model 
A study involving nursing home care and policy must include a discussion about 
socioeconomic factors within states and fiscal policy given the amount spent on long-
term care in the United States. Nursing home care represented almost $99 billion in 
national health expenditures in 2001 and over $60 billion of this care was paid for by 
public funds including Medicare and Medicaid (Levit, Smith, Cowan, Lazenby, Sensenig, 
& Catlin, 2003). Since a significant proportion of elders live in poverty or near-poverty 
(15.6% in 2006) and most do not have long-term care insurance, many have to eventually 
rely on public funding to support their long-term care needs (Administration on Aging, 
2008; Wiener & Stevenson, 1998). "Medicaid long-term care expenditures for the 
elderly are projected to more than double in inflation-adjusted dollars between 1993 and 
2018 because of the aging of the population and price increases in excess of general 
inflation" (Wiener & Stevenson, 1998, p. 81). 
About 17% of the Medicaid program budget is spent on nursing home care each 
year (Grabowski & Gruber, 2007). In order to qualify for Medicaid, individuals must 
have income and assets that do not exceed Social Security Income (SSI) thresholds or 
they must spend down those assets before receiving assistance (Grabowski & Gruber, 
2007; Wiener & Stevenson, 1998). Medicaid costs have greatly stressed state budgets 
representing an average of 20%) of state spending in 2001 (Levit et al., 2003). There is 
some perception that Medicaid has become an entitlement program for the middle class 
instead of a safety net for the poor given the various asset spend-down, transfer, and 
shelter "estate planning" allowances within Medicaid (Wiener & Stevenson, 1998). 
However, an examination of Medicaid policies from 1982 to 1999 matched to the 
National Long-Term Care Survey showed little effect of less stringent income or asset 
tests, increased reimbursement rates, or increased nursing home beds on nursing home 
utilization by the public. "Overall, our results are consistent with an inelastic demand for 
nursing home care with respect to public program generosity, indicating that the large 
increase in total nursing home expenditures over the past few decades is not 
predominantly attributable to increase generosity in state Medicaid eligibility" 
(Grabowksi & Gruber, 2007, p. 562). 
Lingering fears that asset loop-holes in Medicaid eligibility requirements may 
increase the demand for nursing home care has encouraged states to increase income and 
asset tests for Medicaid eligibility, to lower reimbursement rates for nursing home stays, 
or otherwise limit access to nursing home care by limiting the number of nursing homes 
and beds available (Grabowski & Gruber, 2007). States have been able to change their 
Medicaid reimbursement policies and rates due to the repeal of the Boren Amendment 
which originally required states to set reimbursement rates that were "reasonable and 
adequate" to support the administration of safe, efficient, and quality facilities (Wiener & 
Stevenson, 1998, p. 93). The ambiguity of the amendment led to many lawsuits against 
states by the nursing home industry. Since the repeal of the amendment in 1997, states 
presumably now have much more discretion in setting Medicaid reimbursement rates. 
However, given the strength of the nursing home lobby and the possibility that a 
minimum threshold of funding is needed to provide quality care, it appears that at least 
initially, reimbursement rates have not been substantially lowered following the repeal of 
the Boren Amendment (Grabowski, Feng, Intrator, & Mor, 2004). 
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Miller (2005) examined predictors of various health policy outcomes including 
Medicaid eligibility, Medicaid nursing home reimbursement, expenditures, and 
regulatory policy and other general aging and mental health policies. Predictors included 
socio-demographic, economic, supply, and political factors. Analysis of the equations 
used in 63 health policy studies showed that differences in state-level variables impacted 
general health policy outcomes. Socioeconomic factors had the most consistently 
significant association with health policy outcomes. This may be due to the fact that 
those factors may have two paths through which to impact state policy change: 
.. .directly, say, as the poverty rate influences the number of people qualifying for 
Medicaid. On the other hand, socioeconomic characteristics may influence state 
policy indirectly, say, as the percent aged influences the lobbying strength of elder 
advocacy groups, which, in turn, influence the availability of home care (Miller, 
2005, p. 2650). 
Miller concludes that researchers need to attend to both internal and external 
political, socioeconomic and other factors when trying to explain health policy outcome 
differences between states. Indeed, most state comparative studies of nursing homes 
focus on Medicaid reimbursement rates and other fiscal policies (Grabowski & Gruber, 
2007; Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, & Goldstein, 2002; Swan, Harrington, & Pickard, 
2001; Swan, Harrington, de Wit, & Zhong, 1997). 
Income 
Miller, Harrington, Ramsland, and Goldstein (2002) examined the relationship 
between state long-term care policies and the allocation of Medicaid long-term care 
dollars during the 1980's and 1990's. As reported in the preceding section, the authors 
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found a significant positive association between the percent of population that is 85 years 
and older and per capita long-term care expenditures and per capita nursing home 
expenditures. A positive association was also found between state per capita income and 
per capita long-term care expenditures in general and per capita nursing home 
expenditures. 
The state comparative study by Kane et al., (1998) that looked at state variation in 
overall Medicaid spending for long-term care per elder and the portion spent on home 
and community-based services per elder found mean state income to a be significant 
factor in overall Medicaid spending for long-term care per elder. Mean state income was 
also significantly associated with total long-term care expenditures per Medicaid 
recipients who are 65 and older. States with higher mean incomes spent more per elder 
on long-term care in general and also more per elderly Medicaid recipient on long-term 
care. State income was not significantly related to home and community-based 
expenditures. 
Evidence exists of per capita income affecting other state expenditures. In their 
study of state monthly expenditures on AFDC, education, and total spending per capita, 
Radcliff and Saiz (1998) found that per capita income was a significant factor in state per 
pupil education spending and total spending per capita. States with higher per capita 
incomes also spend more on education and total spending in general. Higher per capita 
income may mean greater state capacity to address long-term care needs and may be 
reflected in a state's nursing home regulations. 
H7: States with higher per capita income will be more likely to have nursing 
home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
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Percent of Elderly Receiving Medicaid 
Since nursing home care is expensive ($46,000 per year on average in 1995) and 
because most elderly rarely have private long-term care insurance to cover time spent in 
nursing homes, many elderly are forced to use up assets and other income before 
qualifying for Medicaid (Wiener & Stevenson, 1998; Stemkowski & Brandon, 2008). 
"Almost all legal residents of a state are covered for LTC under Medicaid once they have 
spent nearly all of their nonhousing assets to secure the care that they need" (Stemkowski 
& Brandon, 2008, p. 391). States cannot seize or force elders to "spend down" their 
primary home or automobile to qualify for Medicaid coverage (Stemkowski & Brandon, 
2008). The total Medicaid enrollment for fiscal year 2005 was just under 59 million 
people with just over 10% of those ages 65 and older (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005). 
Thus, states are serving over six million elderly through their Medicaid programs, 
ranging from just over 5,000 elderly in Wyoming to over half a million in New York 
(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005). 
Kane et al. (1998) found that the percentage of elderly on Medicaid was 
significantly related to total long-term care expenditures per elder as well as long-term 
expenditures per elderly Medicaid recipient. States with greater proportions of elderly 
receiving Medicaid also spend more on long-term care. The socioeconomic variables 
coupled with the demographic variables explained 59% of the variance in total long-term 
expenditures per elder and 64% of the variance in total long-term care expenditures per 
elderly Medicaid recipient. Elwell (1984) found that for 493 skilled nursing facilities in 
New York State, the proportion of Medicaid patients in those homes were positively 
associated with certain financial measures. Facilities with higher proportion of Medicaid-
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supported patients also spent more on administrative costs, medical services, nursing 
services, and housekeeping costs. 
Given that states set the eligibility requirements for Medicaid, a greater proportion 
of elderly receiving Medicaid may be yet another measure of state awareness and concern 
for the elderly. Further, the literature has shown that greater demand on the long-term 
care system in terms of Medicaid enrollment and the number of elderly to be positively 
related to increased financial support for the long-term care. Therefore, states with larger 
percentages of elderly receiving Medicaid may have nursing home regulations that also 
support quality care. 
H8: States with a larger percentage of elderly receiving Medicaid will be more 
likely to have regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
Medicaid Payments 
States have great amounts of discretion when setting Medicaid reimbursement 
rates. Differing degrees of demand for care, the ability to maximize Medicare funding, 
and the availability of other state sources to supplement federal funding are only a few of 
the factors that may influence reimbursement rates in addition to the factors discussed in 
the literature above (Wiener & Stevenson, 1998; Levit et al., 2003). The states therefore 
vary widely in the amount of their Medicaid reimbursement per recipient. In fiscal year 
2005, the average annual state reimbursement rate per elderly recipient ranged from 
$5,491 in South Carolina to $21,821 in Alaska with a U.S. average of $11,839 (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2005). 
In another example, Medicaid expenditures in California in the early 1990's 
totaled almost $9 billion for more than 4 million recipients while New York spent over 
$14 billion for only 2.4 million recipients (Sparer, 1993). State history and other political 
factors impacting the two systems are also very different. California's nursing home 
system is one with less quality oversight and lower costs while the New York nursing 
home has historically been dominated by other concerns. Interest groups, health care 
unions, highly publicized cases of fraud and abuse, and costly nonprofit care have 
influenced the nursing home industry differently for New York compared to California 
(Sparer, 1993). State reimbursement rates, while reflective of historical and political 
contextual factors, may also impact other state policies and nursing home industry 
factors. Higher reimbursement rates may show greater commitment and capacity to 
address long-term care needs. 
In a study of social and government altruism and it effect on nursing home 
regulatory violations, Payne and Gainey (2004) found that the average Medicaid payment 
to the elderly (government altruism) was negatively related to the rate of nursing home 
violations. States with more generous Medicaid reimbursement systems had fewer 
violations per nursing home. Yet, the relationship between Medicaid reimbursement 
rates on state nursing home regulatory policy has not been explored in the research 
literature. 
H9: States with higher Medicaid payments per elder will be more likely to have 
nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
Various socioeconomic factors have shown to be influential regarding state fiscal 
policies regarding long-term care. Per capita income, the percent of elderly receiving 
Medicaid, and the state average Medicaid payment per recipient were examined as to 
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their ability to predict state nursing home regulation decisions for quality of care. See 
Figure 2.4 below. 
Per Capita Income (+) ———________ 
Percentage Elderly Receiving Medicaid (+) 
Medicaid Payments Per Elder (+) ——" 
Figure 2.4. Socioeconomic Model. 
Political Model 
A variety of state political environment factors have also been shown to influence 
public policy decisions. The ideology of the electorate, the ideology and make-up of the 
legislative and executive branches as well as the political culture of the state can all 
influence what issues make the political agenda, the importance that is placed on certain 
issues, and how policy decisions are made (Elazar, 1984; Lockhart & Giles-Sims, 2007; 
Mead, 2004; Wright, Erikson, & Mclver, 1987). And many of these factors have proven 
significant in public policy decisions regarding Medicaid policy, allocated nursing home 
resources, and the quality of care within nursing homes. 
Public Opinion 
Public opinion reflects the views and needs of citizens and can impact the policy 
decisions made by state officials. "Public opinion is the aggregate of individual citizens' 
attitudes toward public issues. It forms the basis for party platforms and hence for policy 
enactment" (Morehouse & Jewell, 2003, p. 21). The ideological leanings of voters within 
a given state have an impact on the policy decisions made in that state. Wright, Erikson, 
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and Mclver (1987) developed a measure of public opinion ideology based on 48 
CBS/New York Times telephone surveys from 1976 to 1982 which asked respondents to 
classify themselves as liberal, moderate or conservative and used it to explain the policy 
liberalism across several policy measures including public education spending per 
student, the scope of Medicaid eligibility, consumer protection, an index of criminal 
justice measures, legalized gambling, number of years since passage of the Equal Rights 
Amendment, and tax progressivity. The authors created an index of policy liberalism 
based on the standardized scores of the items for 47 states that measured the general 
liberal-conservative leanings of each state's policies. The authors controlled for 
socioeconomic variables (median family income, percent of residents with a high school 
degree, and percent of population living in metropolitan areas) which have shown to be 
related to state policy and often used instead of public opinion ideology. 
Wright, et al., (1987) found that indeed the income and metropolitan population 
variables were highly correlated with public opinion ideology but only explained 31 % of 
the variance in the ideology variable. The regression analysis for overall policy 
liberalism and each of the policy areas individually showed that income and education 
did explain some of the variance across some of the policy areas but when the public 
opinion liberalism variable was entered, the amount of variance explained increased for 
all but one policy area (tax progressivity) as well as the overall state policy liberalism 
measure. The public opinion variable was a significant predictor for all of the policy 
areas and the composite overall policy liberalism measure. And many of the 
socioeconomic coefficients were no longer significant after entering the public opinion 
62 
variable. The amount of variance explained in the Medicaid scope variable was 42% 
when all variables were included. 
When adjusting for the effects of the socioeconomic variables and the 
measurement error of both the public opinion and policy variables, the public opinion 
variable explained 82% of the variance in the overall state policy liberalism variable. 
"Rather than concluding that state policy is inevitably determined by state wealth, we 
report with some confidence that the liberalism or conservatism of state policy results 
largely from the source that democratic theory would direct us to: the relative liberalism 
or conservatism of the state's electorate" (Wright, et al., 19887, p.992). The authors 
therefore conclude that public opinion matters in regards to the policy climate across the 
states - and it matters a bit more than the socioeconomic conditions. 
Miller's (2005) analysis of 63 health policy studies showed that public opinion 
was one of the most common determinants for state health policy outcomes and was often 
measured by the Americans for Democratic Action ratings of politicians voting record, 
political culture, and public opinion poll results. "Significant findings are unequivocal: 
liberal public opinion is positively associated with many outcomes, including Medicaid 
reimbursement, eligibility, services, and recipients and state aging, mental health, and 
hospital policy" (Miller, 2005, p. 2648). More liberal states are therefore more likely to 
have more liberal health policies across a variety of areas. 
Lockhart and Giles-Sims (2007) examined the factors that affect state nursing 
home resource adequacy and found that a liberal state predisposition (which included 
measures of state elite and public opinion ideology, electoral competitiveness, 
Democratic control in both branches, citizen political liberalism, and Democratic voting 
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patterns in the 2000 presidential election) was negatively associated with total nursing 
home resources. The surprising results of the liberal state predisposition was explained 
as possibly due to a focus on non-elderly recipients of public aid for those with a liberal 
or democratic leaning and that politically conservatives states might have strong(er) 
nursing home lobbies (Lockhart & Giles-Sims, 2007). However, when looking at nursing 
home resource adequacy on a per resident basis, a positive relationship was found with 
the liberal state predisposition measure. States with more liberal leanings allocated more 
nursing home resources on a per patient basis and the state ideology factors were 
significant, while state capacity (per capita income, state/local tax capacity, percent of 
population that is college educated) was not significant. 
The policies within a given state appear to reflect the liberal/conservative leanings 
of the general public. A more liberal citizenry also appears to be related to more 
generous nursing home allocation on a per resident basis. The general public may also 
have a similar influence on nursing home regulations. 
H10: States with more liberal public opinion ideology will be more likely to have 
nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
Party Control of Legislative and Executive Branches 
Since elected officials are supposed to represent the values of their constituents, 
party control within state government should also affect state policy decisions. 
The single most important factor in state politics is the political party. It is not 
possible to understand the differences in the way sovereign states carry out the 
processes of government without understanding the type of party whose 
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representatives are making the decisions that affect the health, education, and 
welfare of its citizens (Morehouse & Jewell, 2003, p. 15). 
The two major parties, Democratic and Republican, decide who pays for and 
reaps the benefits of the various public programs available in each state (Morehouse & 
Jewell, 2003). Legislators are "...subject to pressure from their constituents at home; 
lobbyists in the Capitol; and their leaders, fellow committee members, and colleagues in 
the legislature" (Morehouse & Jewell, 2003, p. 223). However, if there are bills under 
consideration for which a legislator's constituents find to be of little importance or for 
which there is no clear opinion, he/she is likely to be influenced by the attitudes of their 
state-level colleagues and their partisan views (Morehouse & Jewell, 2003). 
The governor is the state-level leader for his/her party setting the policy agenda 
both for their party and for the state. Generally members of the governor's party 
".. .usually work to help the governor get the program passed. Even if the governor's 
party is in the minority in one or both chambers, the legislators in the party have a strong 
incentive to maintain as much unity as possible" (Morehouse & Jewell, 2003, p. 224). 
And most governors have control over the budget that is submitted before the legislature 
and/or the ability to veto items within a bill without rejecting it in its entirety. These 
powers allow the governor additional leverage particularly when the governor's party is a 
minority in the legislature (Morehouse & Jewell, 2003). While legislators are held 
accountable by constituents in their local environments which are often homogenous, the 
governor must answer to a more diverse and varied citizenry. "No single local interest 
can dominate his judgment: he can balance one interest against another; he is free to 
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represent widely shared interest throughout the state; and he is free to direct himself to 
statewide problems" (Dye, 1971, p. 209). 
The literature has shown that party politics at the state level can impact long-term 
care, health, and other social policies. As mentioned above, Lockhart and Giles-Sims' 
(2007) state predisposition index that included measures of political elite's ideology as 
well as an index of Democratic control over both of the state government branches was 
shown to have significant predictive power in regards to the level of resources given to 
nursing homes on a total and per patient basis. Miller's (2005) analysis of various state 
health policy studies found that having a democratic governor is positively associated 
with regulatory enforcement and general Medicaid spending. Further, democratic 
governors tend to be more supportive of public health programs in general (Miller, 2005). 
In other policy areas, the ideology of state leaders has shown influence over 
policy decisions. Volden (2002) examined data for 47 states from 1975 to 1990 to 
examine the impact of various factors on welfare policies. In particular, he studied the 
likelihood that states would make increases in the AFDC benefit levels for a family of 
four in any given year and also the length of time between adjustments. Inflation 
increased the likelihood of states raising their AFDC benefits as did liberal state ideology. 
Volden's measure of state ideology (percent of population and elites having liberal views 
minus the percentage with conservative views) found that more liberal states were more 
responsive to interest group pressure and thus more likely to increase benefits over time. 
"The coefficient on state ideology indicates that states with a one-point more-liberal 
ideology score had almost three percent greater odds of a benefit rise" (Volden, 2002, p. 
358). Liberal-leaning states were also more likely to make increases on a more frequent 
basis (Volden, 2002). 
Soss et al. (2001), in their study of the stringency of state TANF policies, found 
that states with more conservative government ideologies had stricter sanctions for 
welfare recipients in general. Soss et al. (2001) used Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and 
Hanson's (1998) measure of government ideology based on the ideology score of the 
governor and the major party in each house of the legislature based on Americans for 
Democratic Action (ADA) and Committee for Political Education (COPE) scores and 
ratings. The literature in general seems to support the notion that when those in power at 
the legislative and executive level are more liberal or democratic, then there is more 
support for public health and long-term policies, regulatory policies, and policies which 
support the needy. 
HI 1: States where the Democratic party has control of the legislative branch will 
be more likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal 
regulations for quality of care. 
HI 2: States where the Democratic party has control of the executive branch will 
be more likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal 
regulations for quality of care. 
Women in the State Legislature 
Not only does the party controlling the various branches of state government 
make a difference in state policy decisions, but so too can the personal characteristics of 
those individuals serving within those branches, particularly the legislature. State 
legislatures have seen an increase in the number of women being elected to office but the 
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variation from state to state is quite large (Center for American Women and Politics, 
2001; Morehouse & Jewell, 2003). In 2001, the percentage of women in state 
legislatures ranged from only 8% in Alabama to 40% in Washington (Center for 
American Women and Politics, 2001; Morehouse & Jewell, 2003). While the percentage 
of women in state legislatures is increasing, the numbers are still not representative of 
women in the population as a whole. "Women appear to be more limited by family 
responsibilities than men are. Women are somewhat older when they first run for office, 
and it is rare for women (but not for men) to run for office if they are under thirty and 
have children at home" (Morehouse & Jewell, 2003, p. 204). 
As previously discussed, long-term care is an issue that greatly impacts women 
given that they are the primary recipients and givers of care (Harris & Benson, 2006). 
Similarly, 70% of those elderly living below the poverty level are women and more than 
50% of those elderly women who live in poverty after becoming widowed were not in 
poverty prior to their husband's death (Administration on Aging, 2000). Yet, the 
literature regarding the impact of women - whether it be in the population in general or 
their representativeness in government - is virtually silent on this issue in regards to long-
term care policies. 
Having women in elected office may increase the opportunity for more female-
friendly policies to be implemented in a given state. Caiazza (2004) studied the 
differences in women in elected state positions and how this corresponds with policies 
favorable for women in the United States. The policies were identified by the Women's 
Resource and Rights policy checklist developed by the Institute for Women's Policy 
Research. The checklist included items such as violence against women, child support, 
68 
welfare, and reproductive rights. The representation of women was measured by the 
proportion of women in the state legislature, the governor, and other elected executive 
officials other than the governor. 
The results showed a significant positive relationship between women 
representativeness and favorable policy for women. Favorable public attitudes toward 
women in politics and a strong Democratic party presence in the legislature were also 
associated with policies favorable for women. The author found that women in the 
legislature have a more positive impact on policies favorable to women than do women in 
the executive branch. "Women have an impact at a more aggregate level across the U.S. 
states, and their presence in elected office encourages states to pursue policies that are 
relevant and beneficial to women's lives" (Caiazza, 2004, p. 59). 
In a study of the determinants of state reproductive health policies, Morris, 
Lombard, and Greentree (2009) found that women in the legislature had a significant 
influence on state policy. The authors used a measure of state restrictiveness toward 
reproductive health policies developed by the National Abortion Rights Action League in 
their Pro-Choice America 2006 report card which scored states higher for more restrictive 
abortion and other reproductive healthcare laws. The inclusion of several religious, 
socioeconomic, and political variables showed that the percent of women in the state 
legislature explained the most variance in the dependent variable - states with greater 
female representation are more likely to support increased access to reproductive 
healthcare. The political model's two significant variables - Democratic control of and 
percent of women in the legislature - explained almost 50% of the variance in access to 
reproductive healthcare (Morris, et al, 2009). Clearly, women in elected positions can 
make a difference on certain types of policy decisions (Caiazza, 2004). 
HI 3: States with a larger percentage of women in the legislature will be more 
likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for 
quality of care. 
Political Culture 
Political culture has been a variable used extensively in state comparative studies 
and has been found to be significant in studies regarding nursing home quality and 
welfare reform. Elazar (1984) contends that one of the main factors that can affect state 
political activities is the state's political culture. "Political culture is particularly 
important as the historical source of differences in habits, perspectives, and attitudes that 
influence political life in the various states" (Elazar, 1984, p. 110). These political 
cultures are influenced in part by the original migratory patterns of immigrants and other 
groups as they moved from east to west in the United States. 
The three dominant political cultures are individualistic, moralistic, and 
traditionalistic. The individualistic political culture focuses on the idea of society as a 
marketplace and limiting government involvement in private matters. "In general, 
government action is to be restricted to those areas, primarily in the economic realm, that 
encourage private initiative and widespread access to the marketplace" (Elazar, 1984, p. 
115). Politicians rarely will initiate new programs on their own but wait for an 
outpouring of public demand and support for such things. "Its politicians are interested 
in office as a means of controlling the distribution of favors or rewards of government 
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rather than as a means of exercising governmental power for programmatic ends" 
(Elazar, 1984, p. 116). 
Moralistic political culture views politics as a means to achieve the public good or 
good of society. "Good government, then, is measured by the degree to which it 
promotes the public good and in terms of the honesty, selflessness, and commitment to 
the public welfare of those who govern" (Elazar, 1984, p. 117). Unlike the individualistic 
culture, there is an emphasis on participation by every citizen, politicians are often 
amateurs and there is likely to be less corruption (Morehouse & Jewell, 2003; Elazar, 
1984). "By virtue of its fundamental outlook, the moralistic political culture creates a 
greater commitment to active government intervention in the economic and social life of 
the community" even though these efforts might be highly localized (Elazar, 1984, p. 
118). Moralistic cultures can be found in New England and the west coast (Elazar, 
1984). 
The traditionalistic political culture reflects an older, preindustrial time in the U.S. 
and takes a "paternalistic" and "elitist" view of society (Morehouse & Jewell, 2003, p. 
35; Elazar, 1984). This political culture ".. .functions to confine real political power to a 
relatively small and self-perpetuating group drawn from an established elite who often 
inherit their right to govern through family ties or social position" (Elazar, 1984, p. 119). 
Participation in the political process is not promoted within this culture since government 
is seen to ensure the existing social order and this corresponds with this region's history 
of keeping blacks from voting (Elazar, 1984, Morehouse & Jewell, 2003). The 
traditionalistic culture is often found in the South (Morehouse & Jewell, 2003). 
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In their study of nursing home quality as measured by total facility deficiencies, 
Amirkhanyan et al. (2008) found that 30% of nursing homes operate in moralistic states, 
38% operate in individualistic states, and 32% operate in traditionalistic states. Nursing 
homes in individualistic states had fewer nursing home violations as did those in counties 
with a majority supporting Bush in the 2000 election and those with higher religiosity. In 
terms of access to nursing home care (number of Medicaid residents/number of residents 
in certified beds), nursing homes in moralistic and individualistic states offered greater 
access to nursing home care. The greater access in moralistic states is not surprising 
given that the moralistic culture views government as a means to enhance the greater 
good. The greater access and better quality for nursing homes in individualistic states is 
interesting given the limited role of government for the individualistic culture. Perhaps 
these states have had the outpouring of public demand for improved quality and access 
that has forced government officials to act as described by Elazar (1984). 
In his study of successful welfare reform implementation, Mead (2004) examined 
the impact of political culture on political performance in 24 states. Mead (2004) 
measured political performance in terms of whether or not the state developed its own 
policy regarding welfare reform, if there was consensus within the state on behalf of the 
reform, and if the state provided adequate resources to support the reform. He also looked 
at administrative performance in terms of the commitment shown by administrators, the 
degree of coordination amongst the agencies responsible for the reforms, and the 
capability of the bureaucracy to implement the reform. 
Mead (2004) found that when looking at culture alone, over half of the variance 
was explained. Both individualistic and moralistic states scored higher on government 
performance surrounding welfare reform than traditionalistic states. Even when other 
sets of variables were entered, including government ideology, socioeconomic variables, 
and social conditions within the state, the culture variables remain significant predictors 
of government performance. The moralistic variable remained significant when all 
variables were entered together. Mead also found that the moralistic states appeared to 
be doing well as measured by other factors such as work levels of single low-income 
parents and lower child poverty rates. "The reason could be effective reform 
implementation, or the content of reform policies, or simply the relative affluence of the 
moralistic states. Most likely, all three factors are involved" (Mead, 2004, p. 287). Since 
most surveys have shown that most Americans agree with what moralistic states have 
done: to demand work but also to provide families with aid, the author concluded that 
other states may need to move in the direction of the moralistic states to achieve similar 
results with welfare reform (Mead, 2004). Political culture may also make a difference in 
the policy decisions regarding nursing home care with moralistic states having a greater 
concern for the common good and government intervention that supports the public 
welfare. 
HI4: Moralistic states will be more likely to have nursing home regulations that 
exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
The influence of state politics on nursing home regulations will be examined in 
the current study using a variety of political variables. The state political culture, public 
opinion ideology, party control of the legislative and executive branches, and the 
percentage of women in the state legislature have been shown to be influential in other 
studies and are employed in the current study. See Figure 2.5 below. 
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Public Opinion Ideology (Liberal +) ^ 
Party Control Legislative Branch (Democrat +) 
Party Control Executive Branch (Democrat +) 
Percentage Women in Legislature (+) -~"^~^ 
Political Culture (Moralistic +) —-" 
Figure 2.5. Political Model. 
State Policy Model 
In addition to the many factors discussed above, there are other possible 
influences on state policy decisions including tendencies in other, related policies areas as 
well as the policies of neighboring states (see Miller, 2005; Payne & Gainey, 2004; Gray, 
1973; Ingle, Cohen-Vogel, & Hughes, 2007; Miller, 2005; Lockhart & Giles-Sims, 
2007). In a study examining the observed versus expected quality indicator scores in 
nursing homes across states in 2000, significant differences were found between states 
regarding the use of restraints and the incidence of contractures (Castle, Degenholtz, & 
Engberg, 2005). In trying to explain the differences in why states' quality scores vary, 
the authors conclude that for future studies, ".. .it may be productive to examine the 
association between state long-term care policies and quality" (Castle, Degenholtz, & 
Engberg, 2005, p. 1176) as the state policy environment may be influential in the quality 
of nursing home care. The authors argued that the ".. .state policy environment has the 
potential to influence the quality of nursing facility care..." (Castle, Degenholtz, & 
Engberg, 2005, p. 1178). 
State Nursing Home 
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There is much discussion about policy diffusion - "... [t]hat is to say, policies 
seem to spread between states in a region and between states that share borders" (Ingle, et 
al., 2007, p. 607). Policies implemented in neighboring states provide information about 
that new policy or program that makes it easier for policy-makers to justify such a policy 
in their own state (Berry & Berry, 1990). Research has examined state innovation (when 
a state implements a new policy or program) in the context of how quickly policies 
diffuse, why some states adopt and others do not, diffusion as social learning, and if 
policy success makes a difference in policy diffusion (Berry & Berry, 1990; Carter & 
LaPlant, 1997; Mooney, 2001; Gray, 1973; Hays, 1996; Volden, 2006). 
Berry and Berry (1990) argued that both regional policy diffusion and internal 
state characteristics need to be considered. The authors argue that some previous studies 
focused on diffusion to the exclusion of the other important state factors and vice versa. 
While internal state characteristics have shown to be explanatory in policy diffusion, it is 
".. .implausible to presume that states are totally insulated from influence by neighboring 
states, given the context of federalism, active national associations of state officials, and 
media attention on state innovations" (Berry & Berry, 1990, p. 396). Berry and Berry 
utilized event history analysis (EHA) which helps to explain change (the event) that 
occurs within a state or other unit of analysis at a specific time in their study of state 
lotteries. 
Berry and Berry (1990) analyzed the factors that impact whether states adopted 
lottery programs between 1964 and 1986. The results showed that the probability that a 
state will adopt a lottery program increases as the number of neighbors adopting grows -
even when controlling for internal characteristics. However, if that state happens to be in 
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an election year or in poor fiscal health, those factors increase the odds of lottery 
approval. "Neighboring states are found to have a stronger impact on the likelihood of a 
lottery adoption when the internal characteristics of a state are themselves favorable for 
innovation (e.g., poor fiscal health, and an election year)" (Berry & Berry, 1990, p. 411). 
In an examination of whether states change their welfare benefit levels in order to 
avoid becoming "welfare magnets", Volden (2002) found that neighboring states had an 
impact on the likelihood of increasing AFDC benefits in surrounding states. States had 
shorter periods of time in between increases when surrounding states increased their 
benefits. States in which all neighbors had increased benefits doubled the odds of 
increases compared to those states with no neighbors making increases (Volden, 2002). 
"States are hesitant to raise their own benefits unless surrounding states are willing to do 
the same. This finding is not just important for high-benefit states but for all states" 
(Volden, 2002, p.360). 
Volden (2006) also looked at the success of a policy and if this affected whether 
or not it diffused to other states. He looked at changes to the Children's Health Insurance 
Program (CHIP) during the first five years and paired each state together (dyads) for a 
total of 9,800 observations to see if State A changed its policy to that of State B during a 
given year. Success was measured as a decrease in the uninsured rate among children in 
families living below 200% of the federal poverty level. Volden (2006) found that dyads 
in which one state was successful in lowering the uninsured child rate had a 20% greater 
chance of the other state in the dyad abandoning its policy in favor of the successful state 
policy. Diffusion was more likely in states with similar income levels and states with 
similar increases or decreases in revenue had similar CHIP policies. "Most significantly, 
the role of policy success was found to be important for policy diffusion. Within the 
CHIP program, there was a great degree of change from states' initial experiments to the 
policies that were particularly effective at addressing the needs of uninsured poor 
children" (Volden, 2006, p. 310). 
In a qualitative study of policy adoption versus hold-out behavior, Ingle et al. 
(2007) studied the policy adoption patterns of merit aid for higher education in 11 
southeastern states. Their results showed the importance of internal state factors. Their 
analysis of documents, bills, news sources, and interviews showed that for those states 
that adopted merit aid, interstate competition for good students and educated workers and 
participation in regional policy networks were important deciding factors in adopting 
merit aid policies. Other influential internal factors included a strong or favorable 
economic climate, lack of opposition to the bill, and public discontent over current 
policies. For the hold-out states, attempts for merit aid came at a time when the economy 
was doing poorly or competing with other state-level needs. Strong religious anti-
gambling traditions also either slowed or prevented the use of the lottery as a funding 
source for merit aid. The authors conclude that".. .even as nearby states are used by 
policy actors as referents for policy ideas and policy obstacles, their behavior alone may 
not be sufficient for policy adoption.. .adoption is also dependent upon local contexts and 
intrastate politics" (Ingle et al., 2001, p. 625). 
More recent research on policy diffusion has further examined the issue of time. 
While initially a new policy may show potential for making a difference, as time goes on 
policymakers learn more about the problems and issues with implementing and 
sustaining a given policy and thus diffusion may actually decrease (Mooney, 2001). 
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Additionally, policy information is becoming more "nationalized" and policy-makers are 
able to learn about policies from other sources other than just their neighbors. (Mooney, 
2001). This study utilizes both internal state factors and regional diffusion measures to 
examine the differences in state nursing home policy. 
State Region 
Related to policy diffusion is the region of the country in which the state resides. 
Regional differences have been found in policy priority expenditures, welfare 
sanctions/policy stringency, and state policy innovation (Jacoby & Schneider, 2001; 
Breaux, Morris, & Travis, 2007; Carter & LaPlant, 1997). In their study of state policy 
priorities (the allocation of scarce resources to different program areas), Jacoby and 
Schneider (2001) found some regional variation in what states prioritize. Southern and 
Western states appeared to be more mindful of the common good than Midwestern states 
while states in the Northeast were more likely to prioritize particularized benefits. 
"Regional differences, probably stemming from a myriad of cultural, demographic, 
social, economic, and environmental factors, lead to sizable variations in the kinds of the 
social problems and issues to which states devote their public resources" (Jacoby & 
Schneider, 2001, p. 561). States in the Northeast have greater population density and 
more economic problems and therefore need to provide more benefits to the neediest 
within the population. States in the western part of the county, with more rural and less 
dense populations, focus on common good policies that deal with common use items such 
as highways, parks and recreation, and natural resources (Jacoby & Schneider, 2001). 
Breaux, Morris, and Travis (2007) looked for regional variation in state TANF 
policies - particularly for differences in the southern states. In general, the authors found 
no significant differences between the southern states' TANF policy decisions compared 
with the rest of the country. They did find, however, that increases in unemployment 
rates and incarceration rates (social control) were associated with more stringent TANF 
policy outcomes for the southern states than the rest of the country. Further, while most 
liberal states in the rest of the country had less stringent TANF policies, the more liberal 
states in the south actually had stricter time limits for TANF. The authors contend that 
other factors such as state wealth or political culture may provide additional insight. 
Regardless, since ".. .the poorest and most culturally conservative states opted to pursue a 
slower and less extensive welfare reform path continues to point to the south as a unique 
region" (Breaux, et al., 2007, p. 14). 
Carter and LaPlant (1997) looked at state innovation scores based on if and when 
a state adopted particular health care policies. The authors looked at a variety of factors 
including the problem environment, population density, political factors, and regional 
influences. While there were no consistently strong regional patterns for health care 
policy innovation diffusion, the authors did find some differences in certain areas of the 
country. "Northeastern states lead in the area of guaranteed renewal but are laggards in 
high risk-insurance pools. Southern states are pioneers in certificate-of-need reform" 
(Carter & LaPlant, 1997, p. 24). The authors contend that regional policy diffusion and 
other factors should continue to be a focus for researchers, especially as modes of 
communicating and networking between state officials and policy makers continues to 
change. 
Finally, in their study of over 13,000 Medicare/Medicaid certified facilities in 
1998, Harrington et al. (2002) found that investor-owned homes were more likely to be 
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located in the southern and western part of the country. And the literature has shown that 
privately owned homes often produce lower quality care. The regional patterns of 
nursing home ownership may also contribute to differences in state nursing home 
regulatory decisions. And the Northeast is one region that may offer more particularized 
benefits and policies compared to other regions. 
HI5: States in the Northeast will be more likely to have nursing home regulations 
that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
Nursing Home Regulations of Contiguous States 
Again, the literature is relatively lacking in studies of diffusion effects for nursing 
home policy. However, based on the research above, it is reasonable to expect that 
neighboring states would have similar nursing home regulations. Lockhart and Giles-
Sims (2007) found that total state nursing home resource allocations in neighboring states 
are positively related to each other. They found that".. .the strength of the correlation 
between the policies of neighboring states and [the] dependent variable is quite high. It 
suggests that public sector support of nursing facility long-term care for the elderly 
follows a pattern of sharp regional distinctiveness" (Lockhart & Giles-Sims, 2007, p. 11-
12). If neighboring states provide similar levels of resources for nursing home care, it is 
therefore possible that neighboring states would have similar regulations regarding 
nursing home quality of care. 
HI 6: States with a greater percentage of contiguous neighbors with nursing home 
regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care will also be 
more likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations 
for quality of care. 
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AFDC/TANF Policy Stringency 
Given the historical link between nursing home care and poor relief (welfare) 
described above and in the previous chapter, it is assumed that there will be some 
relationship between welfare policy and nursing home policy. "Since 1965, the Social 
Security Act has provided basic medical services (Medicaid) to all persons receiving 
AFDC and all states have made Medicaid available to meet the medical needs of the 
poor" (Morehouse & Jewell, 2003, p. 302). Yet, while young able-bodied AFDC/welfare 
recipients have often been viewed as the "unworthy" poor, the frail elderly living in 
nursing homes have more so been seen as deserving of public assistance (Morehouse & 
Jewell, 2003). 
In their explanation for why they found an inverse relationship between state 
liberalism measures and total nursing home resource adequacy, Lockhart and Giles-Sims 
(2007) point to the nature of the beneficiaries and that states may react to the needs of the 
elderly differently than they do other public assistance recipients. "For instance, public 
officials in conservative states (e.g., North Dakota) near the top of the state nursing 
facility total resource adequacy scale may prefer to extend public benefits to elderly 
citizens needing long-term care than to impoverished non-elderly persons" (Lockhart & 
Giles-Sims, 2007, p. 13-14). Thus, decision-makers in some liberal states may be more 
focused on the needs of the younger, needy populations. Taken with the fact that Soss et 
al. (2001) found that states with higher percentages of minorities in their welfare 
caseloads and more conservative governments had more strict sanctions and requirements 
for welfare recipients, it appears that the characteristics of beneficiaries may influence 
various policies differently. Nursing home regulations may therefore reflect a greater 
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concern for the "worthy" poor living in nursing home compared to other public assistance 
beneficiaries. 
HI7: States with more stringent AFDC/TANF requirements will be more likely 
to have state regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
Mandatory Reporting of Elder Abuse 
In one of the only state comparative studies related to nursing homes that 
examined other policies beyond Medicaid and long-term care expenditures, Payne and 
Gainey (2004) utilized measures of social and government altruism to explain differences 
in nursing home violations across states. Mandatory reporting laws for the elderly 
compel health and other professionals to report cases in which they suspect elder abuse 
and are similar to mandatory reporting child abuse laws. The authors argued that"—it is 
plausible to suggest that states with mandatory reporting statutes have higher rates of 
detection and subsequent punishment than do states without these measures" (Payne & 
Gainey, 2004, p. 65). 
The authors found that average Medicaid payments (government altruism) and the 
ratio of United Way contributions to aggregate income (social altruism) were negatively 
related to the rate of nursing home violations. Further, the average state rating of all 
nursing home violations was less severe in those states with mandatory reporting laws for 
elder abuse. The results show that".. .social altruism and government altruism are 
negatively related to regulatory violations and that one deterrence strategy (e.g., 
mandatory reporting laws) limited the severity of the offenses" (Payne & Gainey, 2004, 
p. 72). Thus, other state policies regarding the elderly can impact the quality of care. If a 
state has related laws and policies which are viewed as favorable for the elderly, then it is 
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feasible that those tendencies could be reflected in the state nursing home regulations 
themselves. 
HI8: States with mandatory reporting laws for elder abuse will be more likely to 
have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of 
care. 
The influence of other state policy decisions is relevant to the current study. 
Policies regarding the elderly, such as mandatory reporting laws for elder abuse, have not 
been examined as to their potential affect on nursing home regulation decisions. This 
study therefore addresses diffusion of nursing home quality of care regulatory decisions 
as well as the impact of other policies such as mandatory reporting and welfare policy 
stringency. See Figure 2.6 below. 
State Region (Northeast +) . 
Contiguous Neighbor Policy (+) — 
AFDC/TANF Policy Stringency (+) 
Mandatory Reporting of Elder Abuse (+ 
Figure 2.6. State Policy Model. 
Summary 
Studies focusing on nursing home quality and patient outcomes note the need for 
examination of state policies regarding long-term care. However, the state comparative 
research presented above is rather one-dimensional with an emphasis on Medicaid and 
other fiscal policies and little mention of other differences in the actual nursing home 
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regulatory policies between states. Further, many of the studies are somewhat dated, 
conducted over a decade ago. This study will therefore fill an important gap in the 
literature by examining the potential impact of differences between state and federal 
regulations and factors that affect differences in policy choices. As other authors have 
argued or implied, improved regulations and regulatory processes can mean improved 
outcomes in both the quality of care and life for our nation's elderly — which should be 
the ultimate goal of public health administrators and providers (Hovey, 2000; Nyman, 
1987; Day & Klein, 1987). See figure 2.7 below for a summary of the current study 
models. 
84 
Nursing Home Industry Model 
Nursing Home Ownership 
Nursing Home Size 
Size of Nursing Home Industry 
Demographic Model 
Percentage of Elderly 85+ 
Percentage of Women 
Percentage of Minorities 
Socioeconomic Model 
Per Capita Income 
Percentage of Elderly Receiving Medicaid 
Medicaid Payment Per Elder 
Political Model 
Public Opinion Ideology 
Party Control of Legislative Branch 
Party Control of Executive Branch 
Percentage of Women in the Legislature 
Political Culture 
State Policy Model 
State Region 
Contiguous Neighbor Policy 
AFDC/TANF Policy Stringency 
Mandatory Reporting of Elder Abuse 
Figure 2.7. Summary of Study Models 
As depicted in the figure above, this dissertation will test the following 
hypotheses: 
HI: States with a greater percentage of nonprofit nursing homes will be more 
likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for 
quality of care. 
H2: States with a greater number of nursing homes will be less likely to have 
nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
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H3: States with smaller nursing homes will be more likely to have regulations 
that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
H4: States with a larger percentage of elderly ages 85 and older will be more 
likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for 
quality of care. 
H5: States with a larger percentage of women will be more likely to have nursing 
home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
H6: States with a larger minority population will be less likely to have nursing 
home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care 
H7: States with higher per capita income will be more likely to have nursing 
home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
H8: States with a larger percentage of elderly receiving Medicaid will be more 
likely to have regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
H9: States with higher Medicaid payments per elder will be more likely to have 
nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
H10: States with a more liberal public opinion ideology will be more likely to 
have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of 
care. 
HI 1: States where the Democratic party has control of the legislative branch will 
be more likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal 
regulations for quality of care. 
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HI 2: States where the Democratic party has control of the executive branch will 
be more likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal 
regulations for quality of care. 
HI 3: States with a larger percentage of women in the legislature will be more 
likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for 
quality of care. 
HI4: Moralistic states will be more likely to have nursing home regulations that 
exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
HI5: States in the Northeast will be more likely to have nursing home regulations 
that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
HI 6: States with a greater percentage of contiguous neighbors with nursing home 
regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care will also be 
more likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations 
for quality of care. 
HI7: States with more stringent AFDC/TANF requirements will be more likely 
to have state regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
HI 8: States with mandatory reporting laws for elder abuse will be more likely to 
have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of 
care. 
The next chapter details the methodology for this state comparative study as well 
as operationalize the dependent variable and each of the independent variables. A 
discussion of the various data sources for each of the models is discussed along with the 
statistical tests performed. 
87 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
This is a state comparative study of U.S. nursing home regulations regarding 
quality of care. The factors which affect whether or not state nursing home regulations 
exceed the federal regulations are examined. As the literature review in the previous 
chapter has shown, no examination of differences in state nursing home regulations has 
taken place, and the state policy studies that have been conducted focus on Medicaid and 
other long-term care fiscal issues. Other state comparative studies focus on nursing home 
quality but neglect to discuss the factors which impact the regulations established to try 
and achieve quality of care. This study therefore adds to the state comparative literature 
as to which factors impact nursing home quality of care policy decisions. The study is 
designed to answer the following research question: What state level factors predict 
whether state regulations will exceed federal regulations regarding quality of care? The 
data for this study come from pre-existing sources, including government databases and 
websites, previously developed and published indexes, and state and federal documents. 
State comparative studies use the state as the unit of analysis. "Scholars who 
want to explain policy differences use policies as dependent variables and try to identify 
the economic, social, or political characteristics of each state that shape those policies" 
(Sharkansky & Hofferbert, 1971, p. 317). The different variables that can affect policy 
decisions allows for theory regarding those decisions to be built via a variety of different 
sources. "The concern for additive theory building stimulates various scholars to make 
their own analyses relevant to the findings of their colleagues, which helps integrate 
studies of different kinds of policy" (Sharkansky & Hofferbert, 1971, p. 316). State 
88 
comparative studies also move from prescription of specific policies to an explanation of 
how and why those policies were developed. Comparative state policy research is of 
interest to those who need to understand the factors impacting policy-making decisions 
such as government officials and others who may try to change policy (Sharkansky & 
Hofferbert, 1971). 
Denters and Mossberger (2006) address issues and recommendations for 
improved comparative research across nations and other areas and argue that comparative 
urban political research has both practical and scientific value. "From the perspective of 
scientific relevance, good comparative research will help us in providing valid and 
reliable answers to interesting questions and filling gaps in current knowledge about 
political phenomena" (Denters & Mossberger, 2006, p. 551). Since it is often not feasible 
to study decision-making and its context using a pure experimental design at the actual 
time of policy development and enactment, comparisons of states, cities, and nations are 
used to try and explain distinctions. "The logic of the comparative method is that by 
comparing units (countries, cities, or any other units) that are most similar in some 
aspects, the researcher will be able to control for the variables that are similar and isolate 
other variables as potential causes of observed differences" (Denters & Mossberger, 
2006, p. 553). This study utilizes the state comparative method to analyze nursing home 
quality of care policy decisions made from the 1990's to the present for all 50 states. 
This chapter defines the dependent and independent variables and how those 
variables were measured. The data sources for those variables are also identified. The 
various statistical tests and general analysis plan for the study is discussed followed by 
the delimitations and limitations of the study. 
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Variables: Definition and Measurement 
Dependent Variable 
Quality of health care in general is a complex concept that has been examined 
extensively in the health literature. Palmer, Donabedian, and Povar (1991) argue that the 
quality of health care is the ".. .production of improved health and satisfaction of a 
population within the constraints of existing technology, resources, and consumer 
circumstances" (p. 58). State nursing home regulations for quality of care may or may 
not exceed the regulations set forth by the federal government. To determine whether or 
not a state's nursing home regulations exceed the federal regulations regarding quality of 
care, the narratives of the states' quality of care sections were compared to the narrative 
of the federal regulations. 
The nursing home regulations for all 50 states regarding quality of care were 
utilized and compared to the federal regulations regarding quality of care. While the 
regulations cover many more areas including residents' rights and resident assessment, 
this study focuses only on the section devoted to quality of patient/resident care. The 
quality of patient care is the subject of much research and discussion in the literature (see 
Palmer, Donabedian, & Povar, 1991; Elwell, 1984; Zinn, Spector, Hsieh, & Mukamel, 
2005; Chou, 2002; Harrington, Woolhandler, Mullan, Carrillo, & Himmelstein, 2002). 
However, there is no discussion about the factors that can affect the regulations and 
policy decisions regarding quality of care. It is also necessary to limit the scope of the 
regulations studied in order to make the study manageable. 
The federal quality of care regulations provide that: "[e]ach resident must receive 
and the facility must provide the necessary care and services or maintain the highest 
practicable physical, mental, and psychological well-being, in accordance with the 
resident's comprehensive assessment and plan of care" (Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, 2005, n.p.). The regulations then go on to discuss the various aspects 
of care which must not diminish for residents while in the nursing home's care unless 
clinically unavoidable. The quality of care regulations cover the following areas: 
accidents, nutrition, activities of daily living, vision and hearing, pressure sores, urinary 
incontinence, range of motion, mental and psychological functioning, naso-gastric tubes, 
hydration, special needs, unnecessary drugs, medication errors, and influenza and 
pneumococcal disease (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2005). 
The policy scope of state nursing home regulations is a dichotomous variable 
which measures (yes/no) whether or a not a state's nursing home regulations regarding 
quality of care exceed the federal regulations. States that exceed the federal regulations 
for quality of care are coded 1 and those that do not are coded 0. States that have 
additional aspects of care or additional regulations beyond what is listed in the federal 
regulations for quality of care and are not included in other sections of the federal 
regulations are coded as 1 to indicate that the state regulations exceed the federal 
regulations. States that do not have additional regulations beyond what is listed in the 
federal quality of care regulations and effectively assume the federal regulations as their 
own are coded as 0. Those states that do not even address quality of care in their 
regulations must still meet the federal minimums in order to receive federal Medicaid 
funding and thus are coded as 0 to reflect the minimal requirements. 
The full verbiage of both the state and federal regulations can be obtained through 
links available on the NH Regulations Plus website (available at 
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www.hpm.umn.edu/nhregsPlus/index.htm). Researchers at the University of Minnesota 
created the NH RegsPlus website with funding from the Hulda B. and Maurice L. 
Rothschild Foundation to serve as a resource to researchers and citizens to search state 
regulations and to increase the transparency of the nursing home regulation factors that 
may influence improved resident quality of life. The site contains comparisons between 
state regulations and the federal regulations through the use of narrative and comparison 
tables. The website contains links to the state regulations as available as of July, 2007. 
The comparative tables provided by the NH RegsPlus website were used as an initial 
guide to this analysis. 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables employed in this study were collected from previously 
published research and indices, various official websites, government sources, and state 
regulations. A data collection tool was developed and can be found in the Appendix. A 
point of consideration is the date that the state nursing home regulations regarding quality 
of care were last revised or adopted. The year in which the states last revised their 
nursing home regulations for quality of care is different in many cases. Yet, most state 
regulations are not clear as to when the most recent change to the regulations was made 
and what changes were made to specific areas of the regulations versus simply reviewing 
the regulations and making no changes. The most recent date given to nursing home 
regulations can be misleading suggesting that changes have been made from earlier 
versions. For example, Delaware nursing home regulations are now dated 2008. 
However, the content for those areas regarding quality of care still do not exceed the 
federal regulations and the most recent date of review prior to 2008 was 1982. 
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The federal regulations are dated 2005, as amended 1992. Therefore, this study 
utilizes state census, political, nursing home, and Medicaid data collected for the year 
2000. One consistent year for data collection was chosen since this study attempts to 
measure differences between states on a variety of variables. This study does not attempt 
to measure changes in state nursing home regulation over time but rather whether states 
meet or exceed the federal regulations. The use of a consistent year allows for the 
independent variables to reflect the political and socioeconomic environment of all states 
at the same point in time regardless of what date is given to their nursing home 
regulations since in most cases it is unclear what that date reflects (changes and revisions 
or simple review). 
Nursing Home Ownership. The ownership of nursing homes has shown to be a 
determinant in quality care with nonprofit homes often providing better quality to their 
residents (Elwell, 1984; Zinn, Spector, Hsieh, & Mukamel, 2005; Chou, 2002; 
Harrington, Woolhandler, Mullan, Carrillo, & Himmelstein, 2002). Therefore, the 
number of nonprofit nursing, government, and for-profit homes were collected for each 
state and divided by the total number of nursing homes in order to determine a percentage 
of each nursing home ownership type. This information was gathered from the On-line 
Survey, Certification, and Reporting System (OSCAR) data as summarized by 
Harrington, Carillo, and Blank (2007). In all cases for the nursing home industry 
variables, the data collected was based on certified nursing home facilities which have 
been surveyed as to their compliance with federal regulations and are resurveyed 
annually (Harrington, et al., 2007). 
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Size of Nursing Home Industry. The number of nursing homes in a given state 
may reflect differences in the size and power of the nursing home lobby (Walshe, 2001; 
Braithwaite, Makkai, & Braithwaite, 2007). Additionally, nursing home size has been 
shown to be related to quality of care in some studies. The total number of certified 
nursing homes was collected for each state. This information was collected from the 
summary of OSCAR data by Harrington, et al. (2007). 
Nursing Home Size. Nursing home size has also been shown to be related to 
nursing home quality and is often measured by the number of beds (Amirkhanyan, Kim, 
& Lambright, 2008; Castle, 2001). The total number of certified nursing home beds for 
each state was calculated and divided by the total number of certified nursing homes to 
provide an average nursing home size for the state. This information was collected from 
the summary of OSCAR data by Harrington, et al. (2007). 
Age. Given that larger elderly populations will presumably reflect greater demand 
for nursing home care for states, the percentage of state residents ages 85 and older was 
collected (Miller, 2005; Kane et al., 1998). This information was collected from the U.S. 
Census. 
Gender. The percent of women living in a given state may also affect policies 
that are favorable for women - particularly those related to long-term care given the 
predominant role of women in caring for the elderly (Shapiro & Mahajan, 1986; 
Schlesinger & Heldman, 2001). The percentage of women living in each state was 
collected from the U.S. Census. 
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Race. The minority population in a state can also influence policy decisions 
(Kane et al., 1998). The percentage of minorities living in each state was collected from 
the U.S. Census. 
Per Capita Income. The literature has shown that states with higher per capita 
incomes may provide more social programs than other states (Miller et al., 2002; Radcliff 
& Saiz, 1998). The per capita income of each state is measured in U.S. dollars. This 
information was gathered from the U.S. Census. 
Elderly Receiving Medicaid. The percent of the elderly population receiving 
Medicaid benefits may be another demand variable that could impact policy decisions 
regarding long-term care (Kane et al., 1998). The percentage of elderly receiving 
Medicaid is calculated by dividing the number of state residents 65 and older as reported 
by the U.S. Census by the number of elderly receiving Medicaid for each state as 
reported by the Medicaid Statistical Information System of the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS). 
Average Medicaid Payment per Recipient. The average Medicaid payment per 
recipient varies greatly between states and has been shown to be predictive of nursing 
home violations (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2005; Payne & Gainey, 2004). The average 
Medicaid payment per recipient was collected from reports of the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services. 
Public Opinion Ideology. The ideology of a state's population, whether it leans 
liberal, conservative or moderate, may also predict state policy decisions (Miller, 2005). 
Erikson, Wright, and Mclver have developed a measure of public opinion based on 
several CBS/New York Times telephone surveys over a 17 year period (1996-2003) in 
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which respondents are asked to classify themselves as liberal, moderate or conservative. 
The measure is expressed as a mean in which conservative responses are scored as -100, 
moderate responses as 0, and liberal responses as +100 (Erikson, Wright, & Mclver, 
1993). Thus, states with a higher score tend to be more liberal. This information was 
obtained from Erikson, Wright, and Mclver's publication of their measure in Cohen 
(2006)'. 
Party Control of Legislative and Executive Branches. Policy differences have 
been found in states based on party control of state government (Lockhart & Giles-Sims, 
2007; Volden, 2002). The majority party in control of the legislative branch and the 
party identification of the governor of each state will be collected. Democratic party 
control is coded as 1 and Republican control as 0 in order to coincide with the public 
opinion ideology measure. This information was collected from the National Conference 
of State Legislatures web page, which includes information about party control. 
Women in the State Legislature. Just as the percentage of women in the general 
population may affect policy decisions, so too may the percentage of women in elected 
office (Caiazza, 2004; Morris, Lombard, & Greentree, 2009). The percentage of women 
in the state legislature was collected from Center for Women in Politics webpage which 
provides fact sheets about the number of women in the state legislatures. 
State Political Culture. Elazar's political culture has been shown to be influential 
in state policy differences (Amirkhanyan et al., 2008; Mead, 2004). The different 
political cultures include moralistic, traditionalistic, and individualistic. States which are 
moralistic are coded as 1 (yes) and the individualistic and traditionalistic states are coded 
1
 The measure printed in Cohen (2006) did not list all 50 states and therefore the complete listing of state 
public opinion ideology measures was obtained directly from the authors. 
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as 0 (no). Categorization of state political culture was taken from Elazar (1984) and 
Mead (2004). 
State Region. Regional differences appear in the state policy literature and are 
related to policy diffusion amongst neighboring states (Jacoby & Schneider, 2001; 
Breaux, Morris, & Travis, 2007; Carter & LaPlant, 1997). The region of the country in 
which a state is located will be determined using the regions as defined by the Council of 
State Governments (East, South, Midwest, and West). States in the Eastern region are 
generally northeastern states as defined by the Census. States in the Northeast are coded 
as 1 while states in the South, Midwest, and West are coded as 0. See the Appendix for a 
list of the Council of State Governments' regions. 
Nursing Home Regulations of Contiguous States. The policy diffusion literature 
suggests that states may make policy decisions in part based on the policy actions of their 
neighbors (Berry & Berry, 1990; Carter & LaPlant, 1997; Mooney, 2001; Gray, 1973; 
Hays, 1996; Volden, 2006). Therefore, diffusion of nursing home regulation decisions 
are tested by measuring the policy choices of contiguous states. In addition to whether or 
not a state's own nursing home regulations exceed the federal regulations for quality of 
care, the number of contiguous states that also have regulations that exceed the federal 
standards was collected and divided by the total number of contiguous states in order to 
obtain a percentage of state neighbors that exceed the federal regulations. Contiguous 
states are defined as those which share a geographic boundary and can be found in Berry 
and Berry (1990). The information on the regulations was collected from the nursing 
home regulations themselves. 
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AFDC/TANF Policy Stringency. Like mandatory reporting of elder abuse, state 
policies in one area may reflect tendencies of states in other policy areas. The stringency 
of AFDC or TANF policies is one such area. This information was collected from data 
summarized by Soss et al. (2001). The authors have classified each state as having weak 
sanctions, moderate sanctions, or strong sanctions since welfare reform efforts in 1996 
based on work requirements, time limits for aid, and family cap policies. "Sanction 
strength provides direct evidence of a state's willingness to restrict access to aid for 
families who are needy but deemed to be out of compliance with new program rules" 
(Soss, et al., 2001, p. 381). States were classified accordingly and coded 1 for strong 
sanctions and 0 for weak or moderate sanctions. 
Mandatory Reporting of Elder Abuse. States with mandatory reporting of elder 
abuse in institutional settings have less severe nursing home violations thus indicative of 
quality of care (Payne & Gainey, 2004). Mandatory reporting law data was collected 
from data compiled by Roby and Sullivan (2000). States which have mandatory 
reporting are coded as 1 (yes) and those without mandatory reporting are coded as 0 (no). 
A summary of the variables under study can be found in Table 3.1 below. 
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Table 3.1 
Variables and Definitions 
Variable Source Measurement (Level of 
Measurement) 
Nursing Home 
Ownership 
Size of Nursing 
Home Industry 
OSCAR data 
OSCAR data 
Nursing Home Size OSCAR data 
Age 
Gender 
Race 
Elderly Receiving 
Medicaid 
Average Medicaid 
Payment per 
Recipient 
Public Opinion 
Ideology 
Party Control of 
Legislative Branch 
Party Control of 
Executive Branch 
State Political 
Culture 
U.S. Census 
U.S. Census 
U.S. Census 
Per Capita Income U.S. Census 
CMS data 
CMS data 
Cohen (2006) 
National Conference of State 
Legislatures web page 
National Conference of State 
Legislatures web page 
Elazar (1984) and Mead 
(2004) 
Percent of nonprofit, government, 
and for-profit certified nursing 
homes in the state (ratio) 
Total number of certified nursing 
homes in the state (ratio) 
Average number of certified 
nursing homes beds in the state 
(ratio) 
Percentage of state residents ages 
85 and older (ratio) 
Percentage of women living in the 
state (ratio) 
Percentage of minorities living in 
the state (ratio) 
Per capita income for the state in 
U.S. dollars (ratio) 
Percentage of elderly receiving 
Medicaid (ratio) 
The average Medicaid payment 
per recipient in U.S. dollars 
(ratio) 
Conservative (-100), Moderate 
(0), Liberal (+100) (interval) 
Democratic party (1), Republican 
party (0) (nominal) 
Democratic party (1), Republican 
party (0) (nominal) 
Moralistic (1), Traditionalistic(O), 
Individualistic (0) (nominal) 
Table 3.1 
Variables and Definitions 
Variable Source Measurement (Level of 
Measurement) 
Women in the State Center for Women in Politics 
Legislature webpage 
State Region 
Nursing Home 
Regulations of 
Contiguous States 
AFDC/TANF 
Stringency 
Mandatory 
Reporting of Elder 
Abuse 
The Council of State 
Governments 
Berry & Berry (1990); NH 
Regs Plus website 
Soss et al. (2001) 
Roby and Sullivan (2000) 
Percentage of women in the state 
Legislature (ratio) 
Northeast (1), South, Midwest 
and West (0) (nominal) 
The percentage of states that share 
a geographic border and have 
nursing home regulations that 
exceed the federal regulations 
(ratio) 
Strong sanctions (1), weak or 
moderate sanctions (0) (ordinal) 
Mandatory reporting for elder 
abuse yes (1), no (0) (nominal) 
Data Analysis 
After the data are collected for each state, they were entered into SPSS 14.0 for 
analysis. Basic frequencies, calculation of means, and crosstabs were performed to 
provide a descriptive account of the data. The dichotomous nature of the dependent 
variable (state regulations exceed federal regulations - yes/no) lends itself to logistic 
regression analysis that predicts membership into the two groups (Mertler & Vannatta, 
2005). "More precisely, logistic regression specifies the probabilities of the particular 
outcomes (e.g., 'pass' and 'fail') for each subject or case involved" (Mertler & Vannatta, 
2005, p. 313). For the current study, the resulting regression equations predict the 
probability or odds that a state has nursing home regulations that exceed the federal 
regulations for quality of care ranging from 0 to 1 (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). Unlike 
multiple regression, logistic regression does not require that the independent or predictor 
variables are normally distributed or have a linear relationship and it can accommodate 
independent variables at all levels of measurement (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). Logistic 
regression is particularly relevant for the current study given the diverse nature of the 
independent variables which are both continuous and dichotomous. 
The data were examined for correlations between the independent variables to 
include problems with multicollinearity (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). Logistic regression 
is also sensitive to outliers that may require deletion of cases from the analysis or require 
transformations of skewed variables (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). The Nagelkerke 
Pseudo R2 was examined to see how much variance in the dependent variable is 
accounted for by each of the models. Finally, the significant odds ratios indicate the 
increase/decrease in the odds of a state having nursing home regulations which exceed 
the federal regulations when the independent variable increases by one unit (Mertler & 
Vannatta, 2005). 
The analysis indicates not only which variables are significant predictors of the 
dependent variable but also if one of the individual models (nursing home, demographic, 
socioeconomic, political, and state policy) is particularly superior at predicting group 
membership as well. Each of the proposed models was run separately with the 
corresponding model variables entered simultaneously. The significant predictor 
variables from all models were then entered to determine a model of "best fit". 
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Delimitations and Limitations 
This study focuses on the differences between state nursing home regulations and 
the federal nursing home regulations regarding quality of care only. Both the state and 
federal regulations cover many other areas including residents' rights, assessment, 
nutrition, quality of life, and medication use. The federal regulations for quality of care 
actually address some of these other areas such as activities of daily living, nutrition, use 
of medications, and immunizations. 
When using data from existing sources, the accuracy of the data and how it is 
reported or collected is in many cases unknown (Elwell, 1984). However, the use of 
secondary data provides the convenience of time and costs savings compared to 
collecting primary data (Elwell, 1984). The use of secondary data allows the author to 
include all states (using the same measures) which may not have been possible if state 
nursing home administrators, for example, had to be interviewed or surveyed in order to 
collect the same information (Elwell, 1984). 
Validity 
"Whenever you base your research on an analysis of data that already exist, you 
are obviously limited to what exists" (Babbie, 1992, p. 333). This study relies on 
secondary data that was collected for other official, governmental, and reporting purposes 
and not designed or collected by the author for the sole and specific purposes of this 
study (Elwell, 1984; Babbie, 1992). Therefore, some measures may be indirect measures 
of the concepts under study and may be a threat to validity (Babbie, 1992). However, the 
models described in the previous sections and chapters were based largely on the 
literature related to nursing home care and long-term care policy. Therefore, they are 
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logically derived as measures that could impact state nursing home regulatory decisions. 
This represents a ".. .carefully reasoned theoretical basis" for including the specified 
variables and this logical reasoning is one of the ways to address validity questions when 
using existing data (Babbie, 1992, p. 334). 
Additionally, while ideally the independent variables identified here are 
exhaustive of the factors which impact nursing home regulations, the reality is that there 
may be numerous other unidentified variables which could affect those decisions. 
However, it is necessary to keep the number of independent variables to a minimum 
given the relatively low number of cases (maximum n=50 states) (Goggin, 1986; Mertler 
& Vannatta, 2005). Further, history may be a factor - events may have occurred during 
the time period under study that would influence the results (Babbie, 1992). While all 50 
states were included, the study is cross-sectional in that the independent variable data 
collected for each state were from the year 2000, critical events may have occurred 
during that period of time. For example, states with regulations that exceed the federal 
regulations may have revised their policies after highly publicized cases of nursing home 
abuse or other quality issues or who were facing financial or other sanctions from federal 
surveyors. Finally, given that there may have been some difference between the date that 
the independent variable data are collected and the year in which the regulations were 
adopted or revised, some of the measures may have changed over time. For instance, 
political culture and public opinion ideology, while fairly consistent, have been known to 
change slightly over time (Mead, 2004; Erikson, Wright, Mclver, 2007). Control of the 
legislative and executive branches also change over time. 
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This study has few threats to external validity (the ability to generalize beyond the 
study group) since all states are examined and sampling will not be used (Babbie, 1992). 
Since data is available for all variables for all states, then the population (all 50 states) 
was examined and the results apply to that population. However, the results may not be 
generalized beyond that of nursing home quality of care policies. The results show which 
of the factors under study impact states' nursing home regulatory decisions but those 
same factors may or may not impact other state policy decisions in other areas. The 
results of the data analysis will be reported and displayed in tabular format in Chapter 4. 
The overall discussion of the study findings and the implications for policy and future 
study will be presented in Chapter 5. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
This chapter details the results of the data collection and analysis to include 
bivariate and multivariate analyses. Results will be presented in tabular displays and will 
be discussed in the context of the stated hypotheses. 
Data Diagnostic Screening 
The dependent and independent variables were collected and entered into SPSS 
14.0 for analysis. The Medicaid payment per elder listed for Tennessee in 2000 was 
$977 and was considerably lower than any other state (values ranged from $6,269 to 
$23,813). The value listed for 2000 was also considerably lower than the payment per 
elder for Tennessee in 1999 and 2001. Efforts were made to contact the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid services to confirm the correct value without success. 
Therefore, the average of the payment rates for Tennessee in 1999 ($6,595) and 2001 
($7,202) was calculated and used for the Tennessee payment rate ($6,899). 
Diagnostic analysis of the independent variables revealed that multicollinearity 
was not a problem with tolerance statistics all greater than .1 (Mertler & Vannatta, 2005). 
However, some of the ratio level independent variables were skewed. The percent of 
nonprofit nursing homes, percent of government nursing homes, the number of nursing 
homes, and the percent minority population were skewed in a positive direction 
(skewness = 1.5, 1.98, 1.38, and 1.61 respectively). The percent of profit nursing homes 
had a negative skew (-1.41). For the variables with a positive skew, a natural log 
transformation was performed and the skew was then within normal limits (i.e., 1.0). 
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For the percent of profit nursing homes, natural log and square root 
transformations were performed but did not improve the skew. The two cases that 
contributed to the negative skew (Alaska and North Dakota) were removed and a t-test 
was performed for the percent of profit nursing homes grouped by the dependent variable 
(exceed federal regulations yes/no). However, removal of the two cases did not affect the 
results of the t-test and therefore the two cases were kept in the dataset for further 
analysis. Use of the other transformed variables in place of the skewed variables also did 
not significantly affect the results of the multivariate analysis. The tables presented in 
this chapter include the variables in their natural metric for ease of interpretation and 
because the results are substantively consistent with those of the transformed variables. 
Coding of Dependent Variable 
Each state's nursing home regulations were searched for the quality of care 
section. If the regulations did not contain a section specifically labeled as quality of care, 
then the regulations were searched for a section(s) that contained the major areas covered 
by the federal regulations. There were 28 states that did not have a specific quality of 
care section but instead covered many of the federal regulations in a different section 
such as nursing services, resident care, routine care and services, or individual care. In a 
few cases, the state regulations covered the federal regulations in two different sections 
(Alaska, Massachusetts, and Minnesota). Two other states had a quality of care section 
but all/some of the specific areas of the federal regulations were covered in separate 
sections (Indiana and Kentucky). There were seven states that did not include a quality 
of care section nor any verbiage relating to the 14 areas covered by the federal 
regulations for quality of care. The review of the state regulations revealed that 19 states 
did not exceed the federal regulations for quality of care while 31 states did exceed. 
The content of each state's quality of care (or relevant section) was reviewed and 
each of the areas covered by the federal regulations was compared to the content of the 
state regulations. As previously mentioned, the federal regulations are very broad and 
ambiguous. In a very limited number of cases where it was unclear if the verbiage of the 
state regulations exceeded the federal regulations, a registered nurse with over eight years 
of nursing home experience, including three years as a nursing home supervisor, was 
consulted to provide clarification (Czajkowski, 2009). States that were determined to 
have exceeded the federal regulations often did so by being more specific and 
prescriptive as to how or what services or treatments would be provided or who would 
provide them to nursing home residents. States that were coded as exceeding an area of 
the federal quality of care regulations may have required that staff with specific training 
(LPN, RN, etc.) must perform the services or treatments listed in that area, for example. 
Further, states may have required a specific treatment or service be performed at a 
specific frequency and/or that the result of treatments or services be documented or 
reported to physicians or other nursing home staff such as the medical director. 
For example, the federal quality of care regulations for hydration read: "The 
facility must provide each resident with the sufficient fluid intake to maintain proper 
nutrition and health" (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2005, §483.25). 
However, Arkansas requires that water pitchers be within the reach of patients and that 
they be provided with clean drinking glasses. Pitchers are to be refilled at least once per 
shift and fluids shall also be offered to residents who are unable to get water themselves 
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(Arkansas Office of Long-Term Care, 2006). Additionally, the federal regulations for 
pressure sores read: 
(1) A resident who enters the facility without pressure sores does not develop 
pressure sores unless the individual's clinical condition demonstrates that they 
were unavoidable; and 
(2) A resident having pressure sores receives necessary treatment and services to 
promote healing, prevent infection, and prevent new sores from developing 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2005, §483.25). 
However, many states that exceed the federal regulations in this area require more 
individualized care and require that residents are repositioned with certain frequency. The 
Kansas regulations require that a skin integrity program is developed for each at-risk 
resident including changing of position at least once every two hours, protection of skin 
from items that could further diminish skin integrity, and the use of protective devices to 
protect vulnerable areas (Kansas Department on Aging, 1999). Minnesota requires that 
residents unable to change their own position are moved at least once every two hours 
even during the nighttime hours (Minnesota Department of Health, 2005). 
States may also cover other areas in their quality of care (or related section) that 
pertain to quality of care but are not covered in other parts of the federal regulations. For 
example, New Jersey includes the provision of care and services to address pain 
management in their overall definition of quality of care. Oklahoma requires that pain is 
assessed for each resident when vital signs are taken and more frequently if the resident's 
condition necessitates. Kansas requires the prevention of stasis ulcers in addition to 
pressure sores. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
The dates of the state quality of care nursing home regulations ranged from 1985 
to 2008 with an average date of 2002. Hawaii had the "oldest" nursing regulations dating 
back to 1985. State officials were contacted and they confirmed this date as valid. The 
analysis was performed both with and without Hawaii, however, the deletion of that case 
did not substantively alter the results. Given the limited number of cases for the study, 
therefore, the analysis reported below includes Hawaii. Table 4.1 below shows the 
frequency with which states exceeded each of the areas of the federal regulations for 
quality of care. Activities of daily living (46%), pressure sores (38%), and urinary 
incontinence (20%) were the areas most frequently exceeded by states. "Other" areas in 
which states exceeded the federal quality of care regulations included: pain management 
and assessment, standards to be in conformance with the Gerontological Nursing Practice 
of the American Nursing Association, responsibility for reporting questionable care, 
excoriation evaluation/treatment, prevention of stasis ulcers, and more frequent 
measurement/recording of vital signs. 
Table 4.1. 
Areas of Federal Regulations that are Exceeded by State Regulation 
Federal Regulation Area % States Exceeding (n) 
Activities of daily living 46.0% (23) 
Vision and hearing 2.0% (1) 
Pressure sores 38.0% (19) 
Urinary incontinence 20.0% (10) 
Range of motion 4.0% (2) 
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Table 4.1. 
Areas of Federal Regulations that are Exceeded by State Regulation 
Federal Regulation Area % States Exceeding (n) 
Mental and psychosocial functioning 
Nasogastric tubes 
Accidents 
Nutrition 
Hydration 
Special needs 
Unnecessary drugs 
Medication errors 
4.0% (2) 
2.0% (1) 
2.0% (1) 
16.0% (8) 
14.0% (7) 
4.0% (2) 
2.0% (1) 
0.0% (0) 
Influenza/pneumococcal immunizations 0.0% (0) 
Other areas 18.0% (9) 
Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the 50 states for all interval/ratio 
level variables. The average number of areas that states exceed the federal regulations 
for quality of care was just under two. As indicated in the literature, the most common 
type of nursing home is for profit (60.7%). The average size of certified nursing homes 
across states is just under 100 beds (mean = 95.1). The average number of nursing homes 
in a given state is about 300 but there is much variation between states. 
In terms of population characteristics, the states were fairly similar regarding the 
percentage of elderly 85 years and older (1.5%, s.d. = .36) and the percentage of women 
(50.8%, s.d. = .76). However, the percentage of minorities varied greatly with an average 
of 20.5% (s.d. = 12.96) but ranging from 3.1% to 75.7%. The average per capita income 
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was just under $21,000 (s.d. = 2848.74) and the percent of elderly receiving Medicaid 
was 10.3% (s.d. = 3.51). The average Medicaid payment per elder was $12,643 (s.d. = 
4031.37). 
The average state political ideology leaned conservative with a mean of-13.6 (s.d. 
= 8.80) on a scale of-100 to +100 with higher scores being more liberal. The states 
averaged 22.5% (s.d. = 7.31) of legislative seats belonging to women. An average of 
two-thirds of a state's neighbors had quality of care regulations that exceeded the federal 
regulations. Table 4.3 below shows the descriptive statistics for the categorical variables 
for all states. Most states had a Republican governor in 2000 (58%) and the control of 
state legislatures was relatively evenly spread across the two parties or split. Most states 
had mandatory reporting of elder abuse (88%) and close to half of all states had moderate 
welfare policy stringency (42%). 
Table 4.2. 
Descriptive Statistics for All 50 States 
Variable Mean Median Mode Range 
(sdj 
Total Number of 1.72 1.00 0 8 
Areas Exceed (1.95) 
% Non-Profit Homes 30.2% 26.7% 14.8% 70.1% 
(14.38) 
% Profit Homes 60.7% 64.8% 62.3% 81.8% 
(17.51) 
% Government 9.1% 6.2% 4.8% 38.5% 
Homes (8.22) 
NHSize 95.1 94.5 89.2 123.6 
(# of Beds) (21.18) 
Table 4.2. 
Descriptive Statistics for All 50 States 
Variable Mean Median 
(sd) 
Mode Range 
Number of 
Nursing Homes 
Percent Population 
854-
Percent Population 
Female 
Percent Population 
Minority 
Per Capita Income 
Percent Elderly 
Receiving Medicaid 
Medicaid Payment 
Per Elder 
Public Opinion 
Ideology 
Percent Women in 
Legislature 
Percent Contiguous 
Neighbors Exceed 
300.9 
(258.71) 
1.5% 
(.36) 
50.8% 
(.76) 
20.5% 
(12.96) 
$20,767 
(2848.74) 
10.3% 
(3.51) 
$12,643 
(4031.37) 
-13.6 
(8.80) 
22.5% 
(7.31) 
64.0% 
(26.35) 
245.5 
1.5% 
51.0% 
18.3% 
$20,566 
9.5% 
$12,414 
-14.4 
22.4% 
66.6% 
39.0 1071.0 
1.3% 1.9% 
.51.0% 3.7% 
15.0% 72.6% 
$15,853 $12,913 
7.1% 17.0% 
$6,269 $17,544 
-22.1 38.2 
12.6% 32.9% 
66.6% 100% 
Table 4.3. 
All 50 States - Categorical Variables 
Variable %M. 
Party Control - Legislative Branch 
Party Control - Executive Branch 
Political Culture 
State Region 
AFDC/TANF Policy Stringency 
Mandatory Reporting of Elder Abuse 
(yes) 
36.7 Republican (18) 
32.7 Democrat (16) 
30.6 Split (15) 
58.0 Republican (29) 
38.0 Democrat (19) 
4.0 Other (2) 
34.0 Individualistic (17) 
34.0 Moralistic (17) 
32.0 Traditionalistic (16) 
20.0 Eastern (10) 
32.0 Southern (16) 
22.0 Midwest (11) 
26.0 West (13) 
28.0 Strong (14) 
42.0 Moderate (21) 
30.0 Weak (15) 
88.0 (44) 
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Bivariate Results 
Correlations Between Independent Variables 
Correlation analysis was performed for the ratio level independent variables and 
many had significant correlations. Table 4.4 below shows some of the significant 
correlations below. A full correlation matrix can be found in the appendix. As Table 4.4 
shows, some of the nursing home ownership variables are significant and negatively 
correlated (percent nonprofit and profit as well as percent profit and government) as 
would be expected given that three figures sum to 100% for a given state. The percent 
elderly 85 years and older is negatively correlated with percent minority population (r = -
.437, p<.01) and positively correlated with the percent female population (r = .462. 
p<.01), perhaps reflecting that women tend to live longer than men. The percent elderly 
85 and older is also positively correlated with Medicaid payment per elder (r =. 364, 
p<.01) indicating that as the percentage of the oldest elderly increases so does the 
Medicaid payment per elder. The percentage of minority population is negatively 
correlated with the percent of contiguous states that exceed the federal regulations (r = -
.445,p<.01). 
Medicaid payment per elder is negatively associated with the percent of for profit 
homes (r = -.327, p<.05) and positively correlated with average nursing home size (r = 
.282, p<.05). Per capita income is also positively associated with average nursing home 
size (r = .474, p<.01) and strongly correlated with public opinion ideology (r = .722, 
p<.01) indicating a positive relationship between income and liberal ideology. Public 
opinion ideology is also positively correlated with the percent of women in the legislature 
(r =.519, p<.01) and Medicaid payment per elder (r = .370, p<.01). The positive 
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correlation between Medicaid payments per elder and liberal public opinion ideology is 
consistent with the literature which tends to show liberal support for Medicaid 
reimbursement and other elder health policies (Miller, 2005). 
Interestingly, the percent of women in the population is negatively correlated with 
percent of women in the legislature (r = -.311, p<.05). However, studies have shown that 
additional factors, beyond the mere availability of qualified female candidates, may affect 
the proportion of women participating in politics (Rule, 1981; Paxton, 1997). Such 
factors include party control and competition, economic conditions, and other contextual 
factors (Rule, 1981). This appears to be the case for the current study - while there are 
positive correlations between percent of women in the legislature and per capita income 
and political ideology (liberal), there are not significant correlations between the percent 
of women in the general population and per capita income or political ideology. 
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Nursing Home Variables 
There was not a great deal of variation in most of the independent variables 
between those states that exceeded the federal regulations for quality of care and those 
that did not. Although the difference is not statistically significant, states that did not 
exceed the federal regulations for quality of care had a slightly higher average percentage 
of nonprofit homes (31.6% compared to 29.4%) and a slightly lower average percentage 
of for-profit homes (59.2% compared to 61.5%) which is in the opposite direction 
expected. Both groupings of states had about the same average percentage of government 
homes (about 9%). The average size of nursing homes as measured by number of beds 
was slightly lower in states that exceeded the federal regulations as hypothesized, 
however, the difference was not statistically significant (94.7 beds compared to 95.7 beds 
in states that did not exceed). States that exceeded the federal quality of care regulations 
actually had a higher average number of nursing homes (320.6) compared to those states 
that do not exceed (269) and this is contrary to what was expected although again not 
statistically significant. See Tables 4.5 and 4.6 below. 
Demographic Variables 
The demographic characteristics are remarkably similar for states that do and do 
not exceed the federal quality of care regulations. Both had about the same average 
percentage of 85 and older adults (1.5%) and percent female population (50.8%). The 
average percent minority population was slightly lower in states that exceeded the federal 
regulations (18.5% compared to 23.9%) as expected but not significant. See Tables 4.5 
and 4.6 below. 
Table 4.5. 
Descriptive Statistics for States that Exceed Federal Quality of Care Regulations (n=31) 
Variable Mean Median Mode Range 
(sd) 
Total Number of 
Areas Exceed 
% Non-Profit 
Homes 
% Profit Homes 
% Government 
Homes 
2.77 
(1.78) 
29.4% 
(11.84) 
61.5% 
(17.27) 
9.1% 
(9.31) 
2.00 
26.6% 
64.6% 
4.8% 
13.4% 48.1% 
62.3% 81.7% 
4.8% 38.5% 
Average NH Size 94.7 91.7 91.7 123.6 
(# of Beds) (24.32) 
Number of 320.6 271.0 389.0 1071.0 
Nursing Homes (252.80) 
Percent Population 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 
85+ (.35) 
Percent Population 50.9% 51.0% 51.0% 3.7% 
Female (.81) 
Percent Population 18.5% 15.1% 15.0% 37.4% 
Minority (10.24) 
Per Capita Income $20,980 $20,506 $16,477 $12,289 
(3233.09) 
Percent Elderly 10.1% 10.0% 7.5% 10.6% 
Receiving (2.79) 
Medicaid 
Medicaid Payment $13,530 $13,297 $6,269 $17,544 
Per Elder (4245.26) 
Public Opinion -12.83 -14.3 -2.6 30.2 
Ideology (8.19) 
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Table 4.5. 
Descriptive Statistics for States that Exceed Federal Quality of Care Regulations (n=31) 
Variable Mean Median Mode Range 
(sdj 
Percent Women in 22.5% 22.3% 24.7% 23.9% 
Legislature (6.02) 
Percent Contiguous 66.8% 66.6% 66.6% 100% 
Neighbors Exceed (20.46) 
Table 4.6. 
Descriptive Statistics for States that Do Not Exceed Federal Quality of Care Regulations 
(n=19) 
Variable Mean Median Mode Range 
(sd) 
27.8% 14.8% 68.7% 
65.0% 12.9% 68.9% 
8.1% 5.6% 21.3% 
Average NH Size 95.7 95.2 89.2 55.8 
(# of Beds) (15.30) 
Number of 269.0 182.0 39.0 987.0 
Nursing Homes (271.92) 
Percent Population 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% 1.4% 
85+ (.38) 
Percent Population 50.8% 50.8% 51.0% 2.6% 
Female (.71) 
Percent Population 23.9% 24.5% 3.2% 72.5% 
Minority (16.23) 
% Non-Profit 
Homes 
% Profit Homes 
% Government 
Homes 
31.6% 
(18.05) 
59.2% 
(18.28) 
9.2% 
(6.29) 
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Table 4.6. 
Descriptive Statistics for States that Do Not Exceed Federal Quality of Care Regulations 
(n=19) 
Variable Mean Median Mode Range 
(sd) 
Per Capita Income $20,421 $20,625 $15,853 $7,991 
(2113.31) 
Percent Elderly 10.7% 9.3% 4.6% 17.0% 
Receiving (4.52) 
Medicaid 
Medicaid Payment $11,195 $9,845 $7,431 $12,044 
Per Elder (3261.32) 
Public Opinion -14.9 -16.3 -30.2 38.2 
Ideology (9.81) 
Percent Women in 22.4% 22.4% 12.6% 32.9% 
Legislature (9.23) 
Percent Contiguous 59.5% 66.6% 66.6% 100% 
Neighbors Exceed (34.03) 
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Socioeconomic Variables 
The two groups of states were also very similar in regards to average per capita 
income and percent elderly receiving Medicaid. States that exceeded the federal quality 
of care regulations had an average per capita income of $20,980 compared to $20,421 for 
states that did not exceed. This is in the direction expected but not statistically 
significant. The percent of elderly receiving Medicaid was 10.1% for states exceeding 
the federal regulations and 10.7% for states that did not exceed. 
The average Medicaid payment per elder was significantly different as measured 
by a t-test. States that exceeded the federal regulations for quality of care had an average 
Medicaid payment of $13,530 compared to only $11,195 in states that do not exceed (t = 
-2.052, p<.05). This is in the direction expected with states that exceeded the federal 
regulations for quality of care having higher Medicaid payments per elder. 
Political Variables 
The average public opinion ideology did lean more liberal in states that exceeded 
the federal regulations (-12.8 compared to -14.9) which is in the direction expected but 
not statistically significant in the bivariate analysis. The average percentage of women in 
the legislature was about the same for both groups of states (22.5%). The make-up of the 
state legislatures in 2000 was also similar between the two groups. Those states that did 
exceed the federal regulations had a slightly higher percentage of Democratically 
controlled legislatures as expected but not significant (35.5% compared to 27.8%). States 
that exceeded the federal quality of care regulations also had a higher percentage of 
Republican governors in 2000 (64.5% compared to 47.4%) which was contrary to the 
stated hypothesis. States that exceeded the federal regulations were also more often 
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moralistic states (35.5% compared to 31.6%) while those states that did not exceed were 
more often traditionalistic (42.1% compared to 25.8%). It was hypothesized that 
moralistic states would be more likely to exceed the federal regulations but the difference 
was not statistically significant. 
Policy and Other Variables 
The average percentage of contiguous neighbors that exceeded the federal 
regulations is in the direction expected, with states that exceeded having a higher 
percentage of neighbors that also exceed (66.8% compared to 59.5%) but again the 
difference is not statistically significant. Equal percentages of states that exceeded the 
federal regulations were found in the south or the west (29%) while most states that did 
not exceed the federal regulations were found in the south (36.8%). Again, the difference 
is not statistically significant. 
A slightly larger percentage of states that exceeded the federal regulations had 
strong AFDC/TANF regulations than states that did not exceed (29% compared to 
26.3%>) which is in the direction expected. However, there was also a slightly larger 
percentage of states that exceeded that had weak sanctions (32.3% compared to 26.3%). 
A larger percentage of states that do not exceed the federal regulations have moderate 
AFDC/TANF sanctions (47.4% compared to 38.7%). Finally, the percentage of states 
with mandatory reporting for elder abuse was about the same between the two groups 
with a slightly larger percentage of states that did not exceed the federal quality of care 
regulations (89.5%) compared to 87.1%) of states that did exceed) (see Table 4.7 below). 
Table 4.7. 
Descriptive Statistics - Categorical Variables 
Variable Exceed Federal 
Regulations 
% 00 
Do Not Exceed Federal 
Regulations % (n) 
Party Control - Legislative 
Branch 
Party Control - Executive 
Branch 
Political Culture 
State Region 
AFDC/TANF Policy 
Stringency 
Mandatory Reporting of 
Elder Abuse (yes) 
35.5 Republican (11) 
35.5 Democrat (11) 
29.0 Split (9) 
64.5 Republican (20) 
29.0 Democrat (9) 
6.5 Other (2) 
38.7 Individualistic (12) 
35.5 Moralistic (11) 
25.8 Traditionalistic (8) 
19.4 Eastern (6) 
29.0 Southern (9) 
22.6 Midwest (7) 
29.0 West (9) 
29.0 Strong (9) 
38.7 Moderate (12) 
32.3 Weak (10) 
87.1 (27) 
38.9 Republican (7) 
27.8 Democrat (5) 
33.3 Split (6) 
47.4 Republican (9) 
52.6 Democrat (10) 
26.3 Individualistic (5) 
31.6 Moralistic (6) 
42.1 Traditionalistic (8) 
21.1 Eastern (4) 
36.8 Southern (7) 
21.1 Midwest (4) 
21.1 West (4) 
26.3 Strong (5) 
47.4 Moderate (9) 
26.3 Weak (5) 
89.5 (17) 
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Multivariate Results 
Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, logistic regression 
analysis was used to test the stated hypotheses. The summary of the results for each 
model are described below. 
Nursing Home Model 
It was hypothesized that various nursing home industry variables would predict 
whether or not states exceeded the federal regulations for quality of care. As can be seen 
from Table 4.8 below, none of the nursing home variables were significant predictors of 
the dependent variable with all of the odds ratios close to 1.00. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, 
states with a higher percentage of nonprofit nursing homes did not have increased odds of 
exceeding federal regulations nor did states with a larger average nursing home size 
(Hypothesis 3). Having a larger number of nursing homes also did not increase the odds 
of exceeding the federal regulations (Hypothesis 2). Further, very little of the variation is 
explained by the nursing home model variables (Nagelkerke Pseudo R = .026). Thus, 
the nursing home industry factors employed in the current study do not significantly 
influence state quality of care regulatory decisions. 
Table 4.8. 
Nursing Home Model Logistic Regression 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
% Nonprofit Nursing -.017 .047 .134 1 .714 .983 
Homes 
% Profit Nursing -.007 .040 .030 1 .863 .993 
Homes 
Nursing Home Size -.007 , .016 .185 1 .667 .993 
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Table 4.8. 
Nursing Home Model Logistic Regression 
Variable B S.E. Wald 
Number of Nursing .001 .001 .584 
Homes 
Constant 1.754 3.575 .241 
df 
1 
1 
Sig. 
.445 
.624 
Exp(B) 
1.001 
5.777 
Demographic Model 
It was hypothesized that states with a larger elderly population and a larger female 
population would be more likely to exceed the federal regulations reflecting the demand 
these two groups place on the nursing home system and the large proportion of female 
employees and residents in nursing homes (Harris & Benson, 2006). It was also 
hypothesized that states with a larger minority population would be less likely to exceed 
the quality of care regulations reflecting disparities in access to nursing home care in 
general and good quality care more specifically (Falcone & Broyles, 1994; Mor et al., 
2004). As can be seen in Table 4.9 below, none of the demographic variables were 
significant predictors of the dependent variable. And again, the model explained very 
little of the variance in the dependent variable (Nagelkerke Pseudo R2 = .083). Thus, 
demographic variables that have been significant in other state comparative studies have 
little predictor ability for whether or not states exceed the federal quality of care 
regulations. 
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Table 4.9. 
Demographic Model Logistic Regression 
Variable 
% Population 85+ 
% Female Population 
% Minority 
B 
-1.090 
.415 
-.052 
S.E. 
1.176 
.486 
.035 
Wal df 
d 
.859 1 
.728 1 
2.179 1 
Sig. Exp(B) 
.354 .336 
.393 1.514 
.140 .950 
Population 
Constant -17.850 23.436 .580 1 .446 .000 
R2=.083 
Socioeconomic Model 
Socioeconomic variables have shown to be explanatory in other nursing home 
policy. Further, much of focus of state comparative studies has been on fiscal nursing 
home policies (Grabowski & Gruber, 2007; Miller et al., 2002; Swan et al., 2001). It was 
expected that states with higher per capita incomes, higher percentages of elderly 
receiving Medicaid, and higher Medicaid payments per elder would all be more likely to 
exceed the federal quality of care regulations (Hypotheses 7-9). Table 4.10 below shows 
that of the socioeconomic variables, only Medicaid payment per elder was significant at 
the p<. 10 level. The other two variables were not significant with odds ratios very close 
to 1.00. 
The findings indicate that states with higher Medicaid payments per elder were 
more likely to have nursing home regulations that exceeded the federal regulations for 
quality of care. Given an odds ratio of 1.214, an increase in $1000 in Medicaid payment 
per elder increased the odds of state exceeding the federal quality of care regulations by 
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21%. However, the model explained only a small portion of the variation in the 
dependent variable (Nagelkerke Pseudo R =.119). 
Table 4.10. 
Socioeconomic Model Logistic 
Variable 
Per Capita Income 
% of Elderly 
Receiving Medicaid 
Medicaid Payment 
per Elder 
Constant 
R2 = .119, *p<.10 
Political Model 
B 
.000 
.031 
.194 
-1.445 
Regression 
S.E. 
.000 
.094 
.105 
2.867 
Wal 
d 
.087 
.108 
3.399 
.254 
df 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Sig. 
.768 
.743 
.065* 
.614 
Exp(B) 
1.000 
1.031 
1.214 
.236 
State policies are often affected by political factors within the state (Miller, 2005; 
Lockhart & Giles-Sims, 2007; Volden 2002). It was hypothesized that states with a more 
liberal public opinion, Democratic control of the legislature and executive branch, a 
larger percentage of women in the legislature, and a moralistic political culture would be 
more likely to exceed the regulations for quality of care (Hypotheses 10-14). Table 4.11 
below shows that only party control of the executive branch is significant at the p< .05 
level with states with Democratic governors actually being less likely to exceed the 
federal quality of care regulations. This is opposite the direction expected as states with 
Democratic governors decrease the odds of exceeding the federal regulations by 76%. 
Political culture approaches significance at the p=.104 level with states that are 
traditionalistic also less likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal 
regulations for quality of care. All other variables have odds ratios close to 1.00. This 
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model explains more variation in the dependent variable than all of the previous models 
although it also has more variables than the previous models which often leads to higher 
levels of explained variation even without significant effects (Nagelkerke Pseudo R = 
.216). 
Table 4.11. 
Political Model Logistic Regression 
Variable 
Public Opinion 
Ideology 
% of Women in the 
Legislature 
Party Control of 
Legislature (D) 
Party Control of 
Legislature (Split) 
Party Control of 
Executive (D) 
Political Culture 
(Moralistic) 
Political Culture 
(Traditionalistic) 
Constant 
B 
.014 
-.047 
1.433 
.364 
-1.416 
.005 
-1.635 
2.397 
S.E. 
.052 
.064 
.990 
.882 
.694 
.947 
1.006 
1.895 
Wald df 
.072 1 
.542 1 
2.095 1 
.171 1 
4.163 1 
.000 1 
2.645 1 
1.599 1 
Sig. 
.788 
.461 
.148 
.679 
.041** 
.995 
.104 
.206 
Exp(B) 
1.014 
.954 
4.192 
1.440 
.243 
1.005 
.195 
10.988 
R2=.216, **p<.05, 
State Policy Model 
Policy studies often explore policy diffusion and regional differences between 
states (Gray, 1973; Berry & Berry, 1990; Jacoby & Schneider, 2001). Hypothesis 15 
predicted that states in the Northeast would be more likely to exceed the federal 
regulation for quality of care and Hypothesis 16 stated that states with more contiguous 
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neighbors with nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of 
care would be more likely themselves to exceed the federal regulations. As can be seen 
from Table 4.12 below, neither the policy diffusion nor the region variables were 
significant predictors of whether or not states exceed the federal quality of care 
regulations. 
Nursing home policy has been historically linked to welfare policy and the 
dissolution of the poorhouse (Morehouse & Jewell, 2005). Hypothesis 17 states that 
states with more stringent welfare requirements would be more likely to exceed the 
federal regulations for quality of care. However, as Table 4.12 shows, there were no 
significant differences between states of different policy stringency. States with 
mandatory reporting of elder abuse were also not more likely to exceed the federal 
regulations as states in Hypothesis 18. The model also explains very little of the variation 
in the dependent variable (Nagelkerke Pseudo R = .073). 
Table 4.12. 
State Policy Model Logistic Regression 
Variable 
State Region 
(Eastern) 
State Region (South) 
State Region 
(Midwest) 
AFDC/TANF Policy 
(Strong) 
AFDC/TANF Policy 
(Weak) 
B 
-.608 
-.683 
-.659 
.740 
.695 
S.E. 
.923 
.859 
.978 
.835 
.784 
Wald 
.434 
.633 
.454 
.785 
.786 
df Sig. 
.510 
.426 
.500 
.376 
.375 
Exp(B) 
.544 
.505 
.517 
2.096 
2.004 
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Table 4.12. 
State Policy Model Logistic Regression 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
% Contiguous .015 .012 1.535 1 .215 1.015 
Neighbors that 
Exceed 
Mandatory Reporting -.543 1.087 .250 1 .617 .581 
Elder Abuse 
Constant .084 1.318 .004 1 .949 1.088 
R2 = .073 
Summary of Original Models 
Most of the variables utilized in the current study, which have been significant in 
other state comparative studies, were not significant in predicting whether or not states 
exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. None of the demographic, nursing 
home industry, or state policy variables were significant predictors of whether or not 
states exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. There does appear to be some 
socioeconomic and political influence on nursing home quality of care regulations. 
States with higher Medicaid payments per elder were more likely to exceed the federal 
regulations for quality of care. States with Democratic governors in 2000 were less likely 
to exceed the federal regulations for quality of care, however, this was in the opposite 
direction than expected. States with traditionalistic political cultures may also be less 
likely to exceed to federal regulations for quality of care. 
Model of Best Fit 
As described in Chapter 3, all of the variables that were significant in each of the 
individual models were to be included together in a model of "best fit". Since so few 
variables were significant, even at the p<.10 level, and other variables with the lowest p 
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values from each model were included in a model for analysis. These were also variables 
that showed more variation in the comparisons between the two groups of states. These 
included Medicaid payment rate per elder (p<10), political culture (p<.10), party control 
of the executive (p<.05), number of nursing homes (p=.445), percent minority population 
(p=.140), party control of the legislature (p=.148), and percent of contiguous that exceed 
federal regulations (p=.215). The model of best fit shows the results when the 
independent variables are entered together in the same model versus in their original 
individual models. 
As can be seen from Table 4.13 below, party control of the executive again 
emerges as significant at the p<.10 level indicating that states with Democratic governors 
decrease the odds by about 72% of exceeding the federal regulations. Once other 
demographic, political, and socioeconomic variables are controlled for, party control of 
the legislature is also significant with Democrat controlled state legislatures increasing 
the odds by about 13 times that they will exceed the federal regulations compared to 
Republican controlled legislatures. Percent minority population also emerges as 
significant with a one percent increase in minority population decreasing the odds of 
exceeding the federal regulations by 7.5%. This model of best fit explains about 35% of 
the variance in the dependent variable. 
Table 4.13. 
Model of Best Fit 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Medicaid Payment .080 .132 .373 1 .541 1.084 
Rate per Elder 
Political Culture -1.866 1.252 2.221 1 .136 .155 
(Traditionalistic) 
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Table 4.13. 
Model of Best Fit 
Variable 
Political Culture 
(Moralistic) 
Party Control of 
Executive (D) 
Party Control of 
Legislature (D) 
Party Control of 
Legislature (Split) 
Number of Nursing 
Homes 
% Minority 
Population 
% Contiguous 
Neighbors Exceed 
Constant 
B 
-1.080 
-1.262 
2.6.34 
.103 
.001 
-.078 
-.002 
1.756 
S.E. 
1.141 
.765 
1.291 
.939 
.001 
.046 
.016 
3.003 
Wald df 
.897 1 
2.722 1 
4.165 1 
.012 1 
.646 1 
2.907 1 
.012 1 
.342 1 
Sig. 
.344 
.099* 
.041** 
.913 
.421 
.088* 
.913 
.559 
Exp(B) 
.399 
.283 
13.93 
1.108 
1.001 
.925 
.998 
5.790 
R2=346, **p<.05, *p<.10 
Summary 
The hypotheses for this study assumed that many different demographic, 
socioeconomic, nursing home industry, political, and state policy variables would predict 
whether or not states exceed the federal regulations for quality of care in order to address 
the research question "What state level factors predict whether state regulations will 
exceed federal regulations regarding quality of care?". However, the results do not show 
much support for the stated hypothesis and shed very little light on the factors which 
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predict whether or not states exceed federal quality of care regulations. Unlike other state 
comparative studies and research on fiscal nursing home policy, nursing home industry 
and other state policy variables provide no significant predictive power for determining 
whether or not states exceed the federal quality of care regulations. 
There does appear to be some minimal demographic, socioeconomic and political 
influence on whether or not states exceed the federal regulation for quality of care. In 
support of Hypothesis 6, states with a larger percentage minority population were less 
likely to exceed the federal regulations for quality of care as indicated in the model of 
best fit. In support of Hypothesis 9, Medicaid payment per elder is significant at both the 
bivariate and multivariate level. States with higher Medicaid payments per elder were 
more likely to exceed the federal regulations for quality of care in the individual 
socioeconomic model. Traditionalistic states were also less likely to exceed the federal 
quality of care regulations in the original political model. This was not in direct support 
of Hypothesis 14 which stated that moralistic states would be more likely to exceed the 
federal regulations. Medicaid payments per elder and political culture were not 
significant, however, when controlling for other state-level factors and combined with 
other variables in the model of best fit. 
In the individual political model and the model of best fit, states with Democratic 
governors in 2000 were less likely to exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
However, this was the opposite of stated Hypothesis 12. In the model of best fit, states 
with Democrat-controlled legislatures in 2000 had much higher odds of exceeding the 
federal regulations for nursing home quality of care in support of Hypothesis 11. 
Nevertheless, it appears that much of difference between states that do and do not exceed 
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the federal quality of care regulations cannot be explained by any one of the individual 
study models. Further, much of the variance in the dependent variable remains 
unexplained even when several of the study variables are combined for analysis. 
The next chapter places the results in the context of the existing literature 
including state comparative and nursing home research. The implications of the current 
study as well as study limitations of the study are discussed. Areas for future study are 
also identified. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Nursing home policy has evolved in the U.S. as an outgrowth of other policy 
areas (i.e., poorhouses, Social Security, and welfare) and regulating nursing home care 
has not been an easy task. "As the nursing home experience suggests, the more 
engineering content there is to an activity, the easier it is to draw regulatory standards; the 
more the activity resembles social work or individual counseling, the harder it is" 
(Vladeck, 1980, p. 149). Yet, rarely has nursing home policy come to the forefront of the 
national policy agenda or inspired social or political protest and advocacy. "Most 
Americans know little about nursing homes, have little interest in knowing more, and 
desperately want to avoid them" (Mor et al., 2004, p. 250). While state nursing home 
regulations can meet or exceed the federal regulations there has been little if any attention 
given as to how many states actually exceed the federal regulations, in what manner and 
how those states might differ from other states that do not exceed quality of care 
regulation in the research literature until the current study. Further, what factors might 
predict whether or not states exceed the federal regulations on any aspect of nursing 
home care, including quality of care has been previously unexplored. 
Summary of Study Findings 
In an attempt to answer the research question " "What state level factors predict 
whether state regulations will exceed federal regulations regarding quality ofcareT', the 
state quality of care regulations for all 50 states were examined and compared to the 
federal quality of care regulations. Demographic, socioeconomic, nursing home industry, 
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political, and other state policy data were was also collected for each state. Bivariate 
analyses were performed including correlations, cross-tabulations, and t-tests. 
Multivariate analysis consisted of logistic regression to determine those variables under 
study that would increase the odds of a state exceeding the federal quality of care 
regulations. Logistic regression analyses were performed for each individual model and 
then for variables that were significant or approached significance. 
This study shows that indeed some states do exceed the federal quality of care 
regulations while others do not explicitly address quality of care in their state regulations. 
A total of 31 states exceeded the federal quality of care regulations in at least one area 
and up to eight different areas. The most common areas exceeded were activities of daily 
living, pressure sores, urinary incontinence and nutrition and hydration. These are among 
the areas that are often identified as lingering problems for nursing homes and among the 
most cited deficiencies during nursing home inspections (Wunderlich & Kohler, 2001; 
OIG, 1999). This may reflect that fact that the "...history of nursing home regulation is 
largely one of attempting to prevent in the future abuses discovered yesterday" (Vladeck, 
1980, p. 256). Regardless, some states have apparently identified the need to further 
regulate these problem areas and require more from staff and treatment services to 
address these care issues. 
The ways in which states exceed the federal regulations include requiring that 
staff with specific credentials (LPN, RN, etc.) must perform the services or treatments 
listed in that area. States may require a specific treatment or service be performed at a 
specific frequency and/or that the result of treatments or services were documented or 
reported to other staff. These might seem like subtle and inconsequential differences. 
However, requiring these types of care may translate into better quality of care outcomes 
for patients. "Repositioning and turning of residents is usually performed by nurse 
assistants to prevent the development of decubiti [pressure sores]. However, assessment 
of skin condition is a professional nursing function that determines the risk for decubiti 
formation" (Munroe, 1990, p. 269). Nursing home quality has also been found to be 
higher when there is a higher ratio of registered nurses to less qualified staff (Munroe, 
1990). Staff with advanced nursing credentials may be key to ensuring that regulatory 
standards are being met and may be an area for future study. 
Prior studies have shown the influence of a wide range of state-level factors on 
other long-term care policy areas. While this study also incorporated several variables 
found significant in prior studies, only a few emerged as significant predictors of whether 
or not states exceed the federal quality of care regulations. Very few of the hypotheses 
were supported at the bivariate or multivariate levels and none of the original individual 
models explained a large amount of the variance in the dependent variable. Of the 
individual models, the political model explained the most variance (R2 = .216). A model 
of best fit, which combined variables from each of the individual models explained more 
variation (R2 =.346). A summary of each hypothesis is presented below. 
HI: States with a greater percentage of nonprofit nursing homes will be more 
likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for 
quality of care. Hypothesis 1 was not supported at either the bivariate or 
multivariate level with both groups of states having similar percentage of 
nonprofit nursing homes. 
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H2: States with a greater number of nursing homes will be less likely to have 
nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported at either the bivariate or multivariate level. States 
that exceed the federal regulations actually had a slightly larger average number 
of nursing homes (301) compared to states that do not exceed (269) although the 
difference is not statistically significant. 
H3: States with smaller nursing homes will be more likely to have regulations 
that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. Hypothesis 3 was largely 
unsupported. While states that exceed the federal regulation for quality of care 
had a slightly smaller average nursing home size (94.7 beds compared to 95.7 
beds), that difference was not statistically significant. 
H4: States with larger percentages of elderly ages 85 and older will be more 
likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for 
quality of care. Hypothesis 4 was not supported at the bivariate or multivariate 
level with both groups of states having very similar percentages of elderly 85 
years and older. 
H5: States with larger percentage of women will be more likely to have nursing 
home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
Hypothesis 5 was not supported with both groups of states having very similar 
percentages of women in the general population. 
H6: States with a larger minority population will be less likely to have nursing 
home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
Hypothesis 6 was supported in the model of best fit with a one percent increase in 
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minority population decreasing the odds of exceeding the federal regulations by 
7.5%. 
H7: States with higher per capita income will be more likely to have nursing 
home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. There 
was no support for Hypothesis 7 with both groups of states having similar average 
per capita incomes. 
H8: States with a larger percentage of elderly receiving Medicaid will be more 
likely to have regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
Hypothesis 8 was not supported at either the bivariate or multivariate level with 
both groups of states having similar percentage of elderly receiving Medicaid. 
H9: States with higher Medicaid payments per elder will be more likely to have 
nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
Hypothesis 9 was supported at the bivariate and in the original multivariate 
model. States that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care have an 
average Medicaid payment per elder of $13,530 while states that do not exceed 
have an average payment rate of only $11,195. The average Medicaid payment 
rate per elder was also a significant predictor in the original socioeconomic model 
with an increase in $ 1000 in Medicaid payment per elder increasing the odds of 
state exceeding the federal quality of care regulations by 21%. However, this 
difference disappeared when controlling for other variables in the model of best 
fit. 
H10: States with more liberal public opinion will be more likely to have nursing 
home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. While the 
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average public opinion ideology did lean more liberal in states that exceed the 
federal regulations for quality of care, that difference was not statistically 
significant at either the bivariate or multivariate levels. 
HI 1: States where the Democratic party has control of the legislative branch will 
be more likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal 
regulations for quality of care. Hypothesis 11 was not initially supported with the 
bivariate or the original political multivariate analysis. However, after controlling 
for other demographic, socioeconomic, and policy variables, the odds of 
exceeding the federal regulations are 13 times higher for Democratic-controlled 
legislatures. 
H12: States where the Democratic party has control of the executive branch will 
be more likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal 
regulations for quality of care. Hypothesis 12 was contradicted in the original 
political multivariate model and the model of best fit. After controlling for other 
variables, states with Democratic governors are actually less likely to exceed the 
federal regulations and decreased the odds of exceeding the federal regulations by 
72%. 
HI 3: States with a larger percentage of women in the legislature will be more 
likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for 
quality of care. Hypothesis 13 was not supported as both groups of states had 
similar percentages of women in their legislatures. 
HI4: Moralistic states will be more likely to have nursing home regulations that 
exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. Hypothesis 14 was not 
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supported at either the bivariate or multivariate level. The original political model 
actually indicated that states with traditionalistic political cultures may be less 
likely to exceed the federal regulations (p=.104). However, this relationship 
disappeared in the model of best fit. 
HI 5: States in the Northeast will be more likely to have nursing home regulations 
that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. Hypothesis 15 was not 
supported and no regional variation was found between states that did and did not 
exceed the federal quality of care regulations. 
HI 6: States with a greater percentage of contiguous neighbors with nursing home 
regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care will also be 
more likely to have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations 
for quality of care. While states that exceed the federal regulations for quality of 
care had slightly larger percentages of neighbors that also exceed the federal 
regulations (66.8% compared to 59.5%), this difference was not statistically 
significant giving little support for Hypothesis 16. 
HI7: States with more stringent AFDC/TANF requirements will be more likely 
to have state regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care. 
The current study found no support for Hypothesis 17 at either the bivariate or 
multivariate level. 
HI 8: States with mandatory reporting laws for elder abuse will be more likely to 
have nursing home regulations that exceed the federal regulations for quality of 
care. Both groups of states had similar percentages of states with mandatory 
reporting laws thus giving no support to Hypothesis 18. 
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Summary of Significant Findings 
Socioeconomic factors such as higher per capita income have been linked to states 
with higher per capita long-term care expenditures (Miller, et al., 2002) as well as 
education spending and total state spending in general (Radcliff & Saiz, 1998). A larger 
percent of elderly receiving Medicaid has been linked to higher total long-term care 
expenditures (Kane et al., 1998) and higher Medicaid payment rates have been found in 
states with fewer nursing home violations (Payne & Gainey, 2004). Given that nursing 
homes are providing care for sicker and more disabled residents than in years past 
(Grabowski et al., 2004), it would be expected that Medicaid payments would increase 
over time to reflect the increase in costs for care. 
This study found that states that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care 
did have higher Medicaid payments per elder in 2000. The average Medicaid payment 
per elder was more than $2,000 higher in states that exceed the federal regulations for 
quality of care. Medicaid payment per elder was significant at both the bivariate and 
multivariate level (original individual socioeconomic model) with a $1000 increase in 
Medicaid payments increasing the odds that a state would exceed the federal quality of 
care regulations by about 21%. Pearson's correlation analysis also showed that as the 
percentage of elderly 85 and older increases so does the Medicaid payment per elder. It 
is possible that these states that provide higher levels of Medicaid support are more 
cognizant of the costs of elder care, perhaps due to the percentages of elderly living in 
that state, and also the importance of regulating for quality of care in a nursing home 
setting. Since states have some discretion in establishing Medicaid reimbursement 
policies, higher payment rates may be reflective of greater commitment and capacity by 
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states to address long-term care needs. If so, it also supports the notion of Medicaid 
payment rates as a measure of government altruism as argued by Payne and Gainey 
(2004). 
Political differences between states have shown to be influential in various policy 
areas including the current study. Public opinion ideology is positively correlated with 
the Medicaid payment rate per elder indicating that a more liberal public is also 
associated with higher Medicaid payments per elder. Democratic party leadership in 
general is often associated with more favorable or generous health care and welfare 
policies (Miller, 2005; Volden, 2002). The current study also found similar results as 
those states with Democrat-controlled legislatures increased the odds of exceeding the 
federal quality of care regulations by 13 times when combined with other socio-economic 
factors. 
However, states with Democratic governors were much less likely to exceed the 
federal regulations for quality of care. Having a Democratic governor decreased the odds 
of exceeding the federal regulations by about 72%. This goes against the notion of 
Republicans as anti-regulation and likely to be allied with the nursing home industry 
which would also strive for fewer regulatory hurdles (Wiener & Stevenson, 1998). 
Republican or conservative support for nursing home care is not totally absent in the 
literature, however. Lockhart and Giles-Sims (2007) found similar results in their study 
which showed that liberal state predisposition was negatively related to nursing home 
total resource adequacy. The authors speculated that".. .public officials in conservative 
states.. .near the top of the state nursing facility total resource adequacy scale may prefer 
to extend public benefits to elderly citizens needing long-term care than to impoverished 
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non-elderly persons" (Lockhart & Giles-Sims, 2007, p. 13-14). This may be further 
supported by the fact that states with a higher percentage minority population were also 
less likely to exceed the federal quality of care regulations - perhaps another distinction 
between the worthy and unworthy poor (Katz, 1984; Holstein & Cole, 1996). 
There is also some evidence of the elderly increasingly voting Republican with 
many older voters shifting from the Democratic party to Republican in the 1980's 
(Conway, 2000; Warren, 2008). In 1998, the elderly ages 75 and older were one of the 
two groups most likely to identify themselves as Republican (Conway, 2000). Governors 
may be acting as policy entrepreneurs in response to their elderly constituents. A policy 
entrepreneur is "...a political leader with sufficient clout and skill [who] brings to bear 
concentrated and persistent pressure for change in a venue where policy is made" 
(Weissert, 2008, p. 320). At least at the national level, nursing home policy has had very 
few policy entrepreneurs over the years but they are often critical to bringing about policy 
reform (Weissert, 2008). 
Political culture has also been a significant factor in access to nursing home care 
with moralistic and individualistic states providing better access to nursing home care and 
individualistic states having fewer nursing home violations (Amirkhanyan et al., 2008). 
States with a traditionalistic culture were less likely to have quality of care regulations 
that exceeded the federal regulations in the current study. Traditionalistic states 
decreased the odds of exceeding the federal regulations by about 80% in the political 
model. Given that states with a traditionalistic culture have historically constrained 
decision making and political power to an established elite in order to maintain a 
favorable social order, it seems reasonable that these states would be less likely to exceed 
the federal regulations and thereby maintain the status quo without taking on "initiatory 
roles" in long-term care policy (Elazar, 1984, p. 119). 
Summary of Other Findings 
Other variables found to be significant in previous state comparative or nursing 
home studies were not found to play an explanatory role in the current study. 
Demographic factors such as age have shown to be significantly related to Medicaid 
spending on long-term care (Kane, et al., 1998). However, this study showed very little 
variation between states that do and do not exceed the federal regulations for quality of 
care in regards to age and gender in the general population. Neither of these variables 
were significant predictors of whether or not states exceed the federal quality of care 
regulations. This may indicate that the elderly and others affected by issues related to 
long-term care do not have the voice needed in order to influence state policy decisions 
regarding quality of care. "Those in institutions, or at greatest risk for 
institutionalization, are a small minority in the increasingly heterogeneous elderly 
population, the majority of whom are most concerned with social security benefits, 
property taxes, inflation, and crime" (Vladeck, 1980, p. 198). 
Policy diffusion has been found in studies of nursing home resource allocation 
(Lockhart & Giles-Sims, 2007) and regional differences in welfare reform policies have 
also been documented (Breaux et al., 2007). States also differ in regards to mandatory 
reporting of elder abuse and TANF policy stringency. Given the historical link between 
nursing homes, welfare and the poor, it was thought that differences in these policy areas 
might also be related to differences in state regulations for quality of care. However, no 
regional differences were found in the current study and while states that exceeded the 
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federal quality of care regulations had a higher percentage of neighbors that also 
exceeded, that difference was not statistically significant. Further, there was not a 
significant difference in the percentage of states with mandatory reporting of elder abuse 
between the two groups nor in welfare policy stringency. 
States were also very similar in terms of the make-up of their nursing home 
industry regardless of whether or not they exceeded the federal regulations. Both groups 
of states had very comparable percentages of nonprofit, profit, and government nursing 
homes and had similarly sized nursing homes. States that did exceed the federal 
regulations for quality of care had a higher average number of nursing homes than states 
that did not exceed, but again, this difference was not statistically significant. If there is 
indeed a strong nursing home lobby that is working to keep regulatory burden to a 
minimum, it is not represented by the mere numbers of for profit homes or the size of the 
state nursing home industry in and of itself. 
Study Implications 
This study aimed to answer the research question "What state level factors predict 
whether state regulations will exceed federal regulations regarding quality of care?". 
This study is the first to examine the specific state regulations regarding quality of care, 
note the differences between the federal and state regulations, and try to identify the 
predictors of why states do or do not exceed the federal quality of care regulations. 
Despite the use of several different potential models and employing variables found 
significant in other state comparative policy studies, much of the variance between the 
two groups of states remains unexplained. It appears that the variables and theory needed 
to explain differences in state nursing home policy may be different from other policy 
areas in terms of what factors affect policy outcomes and how they affect those 
outcomes. The model of best fit, which incorporated a variety of demographic, 
socioeconomic, political and other variables, explained the most variance at 34.6% 
although most of the individual variables were themselves not significant. Medicaid 
payment per elder, which was significant in the bivariate and the socioeconomic 
multivariate models, was not significant in this model of best fit nor was traditionalistic 
political culture. Party control of the legislative and executive branches appear to be 
rather consistent significant predictors. Race also emerged as significant when 
controlling for other socioeconomic and political variables. 
It is possible given the results in the model of best fit that a combination of other 
state factors may drive differences in state nursing home regulation as compared to the 
federal regulations. Despite OBRA and other regulatory changes, problems with quality 
still exist. "Beneath the statistics are shocking human stories that periodically surface in 
the lay press and in reports by consumer watchdog organizations" (Harrington, et al., 
2002, p. 322). It may be these unique circumstances that would vary greatly from state to 
state that influence state nursing home policies to differ from the federal regulations in 
specific areas. For example, Oklahoma's nursing home regulations have specific 
requirements for measuring resident's pain and providing pain management treatment 
and this came about through declaration of an emergency bill (Advisory Council on Pain 
Management, 2005). An Advisory Council on Pain Management was created and 
responsible for providing recommendations on pain management policies to the state 
legislature. 
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In addition, the Oklahoma Attorney General at this time was chair of the End-of-
Life Health Care project of the National Association of Attorneys General as well as a 
state-level task force that appeared to be concerned with end of life issues including 
chronic pain (Myers, 2005). Oklahoma newspaper accounts also cited the fact that 
upwards of 40% of nursing home patients nationwide are suffering from chronic and 
untreated pain and that the changes in policy were derived to address this problem (Price, 
2005). It therefore appears that Oklahoma had some influential state-level awareness and 
support for addressing pain issues in nursing homes that may have facilitated regulatory 
enhancements to nursing home quality of care. The efforts of the State Attorney General, 
perhaps acting as a policy entrepreneur, appear to have contributed to the issue of pain 
management making its way onto the public agenda. 
Given the findings of the current study and how little is explained by the variety 
of variables included, how and why states differ from the federal regulations for quality 
of care may likely be unique to each state and possibly driven by critical events, policy 
entrepreneurs and the local context within the nursing home industry as in the case of 
Oklahoma. Those who argue for different regulatory models often point to the 
differences between states and how those differences should be reflected in regulatory 
approaches. "What is appropriate in Virginia will not necessarily be appropriate in New 
York; what is appropriate in up-state New York will not necessarily be appropriate in the 
Bronx and Brooklyn" (Day & Klein, 1987, p. 342). The lack of many significant findings 
in the current study may speak to the diversity of possible policy predictor variables and 
the impact of the state context on nursing home regulations. 
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It is important to point out that this study may imply that exceeding the federal 
regulations for quality of care is a desirable condition for state nursing homes. However, 
there is much discussion in the literature that more stringent regulation does not always 
mean better regulation nor does it necessarily translate into better conditions for nursing 
home residents. There is likely a point where the extra staff time and other resources 
needed to meet regulatory standards outweigh the possible sanctions for not meeting 
those standards and thus regulatory standards may not be upheld in daily practice 
(Braithwaite et al., 2007). 
It has also been questioned whether or not quality can truly to be regulated. 
"Certain structural requirements can be imposed .. .but it is very difficult to define what 
constitutes even technical medical quality, much less the less tangible attributes of the 
'caring' and decent treatment so important in long term care" (Nyman, 1987, p. 250). 
High quality care may, from a resident's point of view, be that which is provided in: 
.. .a clean and pleasant environment, in which the food is good, that there is plenty 
to do, assistance is readily given with dressing and bathing, people are nice to 
each other and respect each other's privacy and personal dignity, and good 
medical and nursing services are provided to those who need them. This may 
seem like a simple set of requirements, but in practice, it is not (Vladeck, 1980, p. 
149). 
While improvements have been seen in some areas following national level 
nursing home policy changes, such as the use of restraints, increased federal regulation 
has had questionable impact on the quality of nursing home care as a whole (Winzelberg, 
2003; Walshe, 2001). Nursing home staff may be ".. .more focused on the hoops than on 
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the outcomes that jumping through them will achieve" (Braithwaite, et al., 2007, p. 43). 
While documentation efforts have reportedly increased both on the part of nursing home 
staff and inspectors, little research has been done to see if improved documentation has 
resulted in improved quality of care (Braithwaite, et al., 2007). Nursing homes may also 
draft a new policy or require staff training as a result of some negative nursing home 
survey finding in order to avoid sanctions or being labeled as non-compliant. This 
ritualistic approach makes for "roller coaster nursing homes" when ".. .they make a few 
changes to come into compliance only to be found out of compliance again at the next 
survey because of their fundamental lack of commitment to regulatory goals" 
(Braithwaite et al., 2007, p.131). 
Additionally, even if states do have policies that exceed those of the federal 
government, those policies may or may not be enforced in the annual inspection surveys 
or sanctioned in the same way from state to state or nursing home to nursing home 
(Hovey, 2000; Braithwaite, et al., 2007). So much is dictated by the culture of regulation 
for the state as whole and by the inspection team that enters a nursing home on any given 
day (Braithwaite, et al., 2007; Day & Klein, 1987). In fact, one reason why states may 
not differ drastically from the federal regulations is that the regulations themselves stifle 
innovation. "What may be a necessary rule for those not motivated or able to provide 
quality care, could be an obstacle to others seeking creative ways to improve the quality 
of care and life and autonomy of those using long-term care" (Wunderlich & Kohler, 
2001, p. 139). Even those states that exceed federal quality of care regulations did so in 
an average of less than three areas out of a possible fourteen care areas. While these were 
not the specific issues of focus for the current study, it is necessary to mention this debate 
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surrounding nursing home regulation. The importance of identifying and evaluating 
regulatory standards that better protect residents and that help ensure quality care and 
quality of life cannot be understated as a goal for future nursing home regulatory 
research. 
Limitations of the Current Study 
There obviously are some variables which were not included in the study that 
could have some explanatory power. State population size, as a measure of fiscal and 
political ability, has been found to be influential in terms of differences in state 
environmental efforts (Bacot & Dawes, 1997). In fact, it may be that differences in state 
nursing home regulations are better explained in terms of state capacity and capability 
using measures related to staffing, spending and accountability as proposed by Bowman 
and Kearney (1988). Both Medicaid payment per elder and per capita income were 
positively correlated with the average size of nursing homes in a given state. Medicaid 
payments per elder may therefore be a measure of state capacity in regulating and 
providing nursing home care. Further, if more qualified nursing home staff is also critical 
to ensuring nursing home quality (Munroe, 1990), the ratio of registered nurses to nursing 
home patients aggregated to the state level may also be a measure of state capacity in the 
case of quality of care regulation. 
Consumer activist groups have played a part in long-term care legislation such as 
the Nursing Home Reform Act (Wunderlich & Kohler, 2001). The most common 
advocacy program for nursing home residents is the state long-term care ombudsman 
program. State ombudsman programs are partially responsible for addressing individual 
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nursing home resident complaints and other issues (Wunderlich & Kohler, 2001). "They 
also help educate the public and facility staff on complaint filing, new laws governing 
facilities, and best practices used in improving quality of care and evaluating long-term 
care options" (Wunderlich & Kohler, 2001, p. 175). It may be that the size, strength, and 
available resources of state ombudsman programs are integral in bringing regulatory 
issues to the attention of state policy makers and influencing state nursing policy from the 
inside out. 
Quality of care is only one of many areas covered by the federal regulations and 
may have been too narrow an area of focus as a dependent variable. If additional 
regulatory areas were included - such as residents' rights or quality of life - more 
variation between the two groups of states may have been discovered. Further, state 
comparative studies suffer from a small maximum number of cases (no more than 50 
states) and thus statistical analysis may be limited from the outset (Goggin, 1986). While 
it may have been ideal to have a ratio-level dependent variable that may have captured 
more variation between states, the results did not bear out this way. The highest number 
of areas exceeded by states was eight and many states (19) did not exceed the federal 
regulations at all making a dichotomous variable the more valid measure to be used for 
analysis. 
The inability to measure the historical course to changes in state nursing home 
regulations may have also been a factor in the limited significant results. Since it was 
largely difficult to tell exactly when a state most recently changed its regulations and in 
what areas changes were made (versus states simply reviewing the regulations in a given 
year and making no changes), the year 2000 was chosen as the year of reference when 
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collecting the independent variable data. While data such as per capita income and 
percent female population may not vary much year to year, other variables such as party 
control of the executive branch can change (from one party to another) in a matter of a 
year. If the specific year of change was able to be determined then variables such as 
party control would have been more accurately measured and perhaps produced different 
outcomes. However, it is unknown how much influence party of the governor, for 
example, would have over nursing home regulatory decisions versus other state policy 
areas. In some states, governors may act as policy entrepreneurs in regards to long-term 
care and in other states that might not be the case. 
Thus, history was very likely a factor in that some incident(s) may have occurred 
during the time period under study that would influence the results (Babbie, 1992). 
While all 50 states were included in the study, critical events may have taken place that 
influenced states to make regulatory changes. The case of Oklahoma is a good example 
of how historical events and specific individuals, which were unmeasured by the current 
study, may have had significant influence on the dependent variable. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Obviously, there is still much to be learned about how and why states differ in 
regards to quality care regulation. The lack of significant findings implies that nursing 
home regulatory policy is different from other policy areas explored in the state 
comparative literature. The results of this study infer that perhaps a quantitative approach 
is not totally suitable to understand differences between state and federal regulation even 
though a large proportion of state comparative studies rely on quantitative data and 
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methods (Lockhart & Giles-Sims, 2007; Miller, 2005; Soss et al., 2001; Carter & 
LaPlant, 1997). The case of Oklahoma speaks to other influential state-level factors that 
are not easily measured by existing data sources or by those captured by quantitative 
methods. Ingle et al. (2007), in their qualitative study of lottery adoption decisions in 
support of merit aid for higher education in the Southeast, argue as to the importance of 
using methods employed by other disciplines to capture differences between states and 
variations over time in policy diffusion. They argue ".. .that qualitative approaches 
represent an important tool for comparative state and innovation diffusion 
scholars... Qualitative research may be well suited to hone in on a set of explanations for 
the variation" (Ingle et al., 2007, p. 626). Interviews with key stakeholders in state 
nursing home regulatory agencies and ombudsman programs as well as possible policy 
entrepreneurs in those states that exceed the federal regulations for quality of care should 
be pursued to shed light on the decision making processes regarding quality of care. It is 
through this path that information about critical events and other state policy contexts 
may be discovered. 
It appears that many of the variables that have been found to be significant for 
other state comparative policy studies do not have the same explanatory power for 
nursing home regulation. Another avenue to explore is the capability or capacity of state 
governments as related to nursing home regulation. Bowman and Kearney (1988) have 
developed measures to address state capacity and urge further study utilizing these 
measures in exploring state policy outputs. It may be that state capacity measures are 
better predictors of regulatory differences than some of the more traditional economic, 
demographic and political variables utilized in this study. It is unclear whether this 
measure is a valid measure when applied to nursing home regulations but may be a 
possible area for future study. 
This study does provide some initial information on which states exceed the 
federal quality of care regulations, in what areas they exceed, and how those states differ 
from other states that do not exceed the federal regulations. Those states that exceed the 
federal quality of care regulations do so most often in the areas where nursing homes 
have historically had quality of care problems - pressure sores, activities of daily living 
and urinary incontinence. States with higher Medicaid payments per elder increase the 
odds of exceeding the federal quality of care regulations while traditionalistic states 
decrease the odds in their respective models. States with a larger minority population 
also have decreased odds of exceeding the federal regulations after controlling for other 
variables. States with Democratic legislatures and Republican governors also increase 
the odds of exceeding the federal quality of care regulations. There is some political, 
demographic, and socioeconomic influence on whether or not states exceed the federal 
quality of care regulations. More work is needed, however, to discover other vital 
predictors for exceeding federal regulation requirements. Other studies suggest that the 
quality of care in a given state may be shaped by the local policy environment (Castle et 
al., 2005). Research that explores state differences in quality deficiencies or other 
indicators of quality care in relation to regulatory differences should therefore be 
considered. 
It has been argued that the "new generation of elderly" may be wealthier, better 
educated, and more likely to advocate for themselves than past generations (Kodner, 
1996). "The next generation of better-educated and more insistent elderly people will 
also transform themselves from today's 'invisible' long-term care consumers to 
tomorrow's demanding long-term care customers" (Kodner, 1996, p. 281). This next 
generation may very well command more attention from politicians, nursing home 
regulators, and caregivers regarding long-term care. Therefore, the issues surrounding 
quality of care, regulatory challenges and differences at the state and national levels are 
likely to be areas of great concern for the next generation of elderly. This study offers 
some evidence about how to continue to investigate these issues. 
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State: 
Coding Sheet 
171 
Ql. State regs have QOC section? 
Qlb. Other areas in which state regs exceed federal regs 
per NH Regs Plus? 
Q2. States regs exceed federal regs? 
Q2a. Activities of daily living? 
Q2b. Vision and hearing? 
Q2c. Pressure sores? 
Q2d. Urinary incontinence? 
Q2e. Range of motion? 
Q2f. Mental and psychosocial functioning? 
Q2g. Nasogastric tubes? 
Q2h. Accidents? 
D Yes 
• Yes 
# 
• Yes 
D Yes 
# 
• Yes 
# 
D Yes 
# 
• Yes 
# 
a Yes 
# 
• Yes 
# 
• Yes 
# 
a Yes 
# 
a No 
• No 
• No 
• No 
• No 
D No 
• No 
D No 
• No 
• No 
• No 
172 
Q2i. Nutrition? 
Q2j. Hydration? 
Q2k. Special needs? 
Q21. Unnecessary drugs? 
Q2m. Medication errors? 
Q2n. Influenza and pneumococcal immunizations? 
Q2other. Other areas not in federal regs? 
Q3Total. Total number of areas state regs exceed federal 
regs. 
Q4. Year of QOC/most recent change/amendment 
Q5. Ownership of nursing homes 
Source: 
Q6. Average nursing home size 
Source: 
Q7. Number of nursing homes 
Source: 
• Yes D No 
# 
a Yes • No 
# 
• Yes • No 
# 
D Yes • No 
# 
• Yes • No 
# 
D Yes • No 
# 
• Yes • No 
# 
# 
Year: 
% nonprofit 
% profit 
% gov't 
# of beds 
# 
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Q8. Percent population 85+ 
Source: 
Q9. Percent female population 
Source: 
Q10. Percent minority 
Source: 
Ql 1. Per capita income 
Source: 
Q12. Percent elderly receiving Medicaid 
Source: 
Q13. Medicaid reimbursement rate 
Source: 
Q14. Public opinion ideology 
Source: 
Q15. Party control legislative branch 
Source: 
Q16. Party control executive branch 
Source: 
Q17. Percent of women in the legislature 
Source: 
Q18. Political culture 
Source: 
Q19. State region 
Source: 
Q20. Percent of contiguous neighbors which exceed 
federal regs 
Source: 
Q21. AFDC/TANF policy stringency 
Source: 
Q22. Mandatory reporting of elder abuse 
Source: 
% 
% 
% 
$ 
% 
$ 
# 
(-100 to 0 to+100) 
D Republican (0) 
• Democrat (1) 
D Republican (0) 
o Democrat (1) 
% 
• Individualistic (0) 
• Moralistic (1) 
• Traditionalistic (0) 
a Eastern (1) 
p Southern (0) 
a Midwest (0) 
D West (0) 
% 
a Strong (1) 
• Moderate (0) 
•Weak (0) 
• Yes • No 
174 
Coding for State Region 
Taken from The Council of State Governments: www.csg.ore 
Eastern Region: 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont 
Midwestern Region: 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, 
South Dakota, Wisconsin 
Southern Region: 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, Virginia, West 
Virginia 
Western Region: 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming 
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